Kahn Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 19 December 1929 |
| Docket Number | 4933 |
| Citation | 75 Utah 145,283 P. 1054 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | KAHN BROS. CO. et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al |
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Charles A. Doe, opposed by the Kahn Bros. Company and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. Compensation was awarded in claimant's favor by the Industrial Commission and employer and insurer bring certiorari.
AWARD SUSTAINED.
Irvine Skeen & Thurman, of Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
George P. Parker, Atty. Gen., M. Logan Rich, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Stewart, Alexander & Budge, of Salt Lake City, for defendants.
The applicant, Charles A. Doe, an employee of Kahn Bros. Company, was severely injured, January 21, 1929, while crossing a public street in Salt Lake City en route from his home to the Salt Lake post office. An award of compensation was made in favor of the applicant by the Industrial Commission of Utah. The only question raised in this review is whether the accident was one arising out of or in the course of employment. The facts are without dispute, having been stipulated by the parties.
Applicant, a bookkeeper for Kahn Bros. Company, 45 South Third West street, resided at the Fremont apartments, 50 East Fifth South street, both in Salt Lake City. He had charge of the books of the company, handled the office and business work, including the receiving of receipts and depositing same at the National Copper Bank. He customarily did general uptown business for his employer, such as making collections, credit investigations, and calling for the company's mail at the post office. This uptown business was habitually cared for by him on his way home to lunch or on his way back to the office after lunch. His custom was to make the bank deposit on his way home and make the other calls after leaving home and before going back to his office. He always called at the Salt Lake post office, located on Main street between Third South and Fourth South streets, on the return trip after lunch. Applicant had no regular time for lunch, but would leave the office at such times as he could conveniently get away, frequently barely in time to reach the bank before it closed. He did not take a full hour for lunch, but often hurriedly left home to keep his business engagements in town for the employer. On the day of the accident, Doe visited the bank, made his deposit, ate his lunch at home, and had proceeded from his home towards the post office, when struck by an automobile as he was walking northerly across Fifth South street on the east side of the main street intersection. He was then on his way, by the most direct route, to the post office, for the purpose of collecting the company's mail. It was his purpose to go to the office of the Mutual Coal Company in the Clift building and to the Lincoln G. Kelly Company in the Walker bank building before returning to the office. All these calls were strictly in the performance of his duty in behalf and under the direction of the employer.
It is a general rule that injuries sustained while an employee is traveling to and from his place of employment are not compensable. An exception to this rule, however, is where an employee, either on his employer's or his own time, is upon some substantial mission for the employer growing out of his employment. In such cases the employee is within the provision of the act. The mission for the employer must be the major factor in the journey or movement and not merely incidental thereto. London Guaranty & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission , 190 Cal. 587, 213 P. 977. The precise question for decision therefore is, was applicant in the course of execution of an errand or special mission on behalf of the employer at the time he suffered the accident. If he was the award must be sustained. From the undisputed evidence we are of the opinion that the applicant was, while on his way to the post office, in the performance of a special mission for his employer. He was doing the errand he was directed to do. He resumed the purpose of his employment when he left home bound for the post office and the other offices where his business called him.
This court has decided the issue...
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