Kahn v. I.N.S.

• Decision Date: 28 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 91-70544,91-70544
• Citation: 36 F.3d 1412
• Parties: Ruta Marie KAHN, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1412

36 F.3d 1412

Ruta Marie KAHN, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 91-70544.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 3, 1993.

Originally Filed March 25, 1994.

Amended Sept. 28, 1994.

Further Dissent Filed Sept. 28, 1994.

Frank T. Vecchione, San Diego, CA, for petitioner.

Anne C. Arries, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

On Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Before: BROWNING, HUG, and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ruta Marie Kahn, a native and citizen of Canada, was admitted to the United States as a permanent resident alien in 1978 and has lived in California since. Kahn was convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) found Kahn deportable under 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1251(a)(11) and 1251(a)(4)(B) because of her drug conviction, and she petitioned for a waiver of deportation under Sec. 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(c). Her petition was granted by an Immigration Judge (IJ), but denied on review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board). Kahn appeals.

I

The INS requires an alien who has been convicted of a serious drug offense to demonstrate outstanding equities in her favor to be considered for a waiver of deportation under Sec. 212(c). Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 944 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir.1991). In determining whether to grant relief under Sec. 212(c), the Board has refused to adopt an inflexible test, preferring instead a test that looks to the individual merits of each case. The IJ must balance the social and humane considerations presented on the alien's behalf against the adverse factors including the alien's undesirability as a permanent resident. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, ----, No. 91-70114, slip op. 11477, 11481-82 (9th Cir.1993); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (1978). Among the factors to be weighed in a petitioner's favor is the existence of family ties within the United States. ¹

The IJ heard testimony from Kahn and others about her long-standing relationship with a Mr. Caldwell, with whom she had been living for several years. Caldwell characterized the relationship as "like [a] common-law" marriage and stated the couple intended to marry if Kahn were not deported. Members of Caldwell's extended family testified to the existence and strength of Kahn's relationship with Caldwell and with them. The IJ found Kahn's family ties in the United States were strong, and on the basis of this and other equities granted Kahn's request for a waiver under Sec. 212(c). The Board reversed.

The Board recognized that the existence of substantial family ties in the United States is a weighty factor in the support of the favorable exercise of discretion under Sec. 212(c). In evaluating Kahn's family ties in this country, however, the Board found conclusive the fact that California, her state of residence, did not recognize common law marriages. The Board said:

We ... do not find the respondent's relationship to Mr. Caldwell to be a substantial equity. During the hearing, Mr. Caldwell testified that he considered the respondent to be akin to a common law wife. However, common law marriages are not recognized in California. See Malhiot v. Southern California Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 [105 S.Ct. 959, 83 L.Ed.2d 965] (1985).

The government asks this court to adopt the Board's analysis and make state law determinative of family ties for purposes of discretionary relief under Sec. 212(c): "[B]ecause California law does not recognize common law marriage, the petitioner's relationship ... was not a substantial equity." (Gov. Brief p. 16).

II

The Board, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, may establish standards to guide the exercise of discretion in granting waivers of deportation under Sec. 212(c) "as long as [they] are rationally related to the statutory scheme." Ayala-Chavez, 944 F.2d at 641. A standard must be based on a permissible interpretation of the statute, although it need not be "the only one [the agency] could permissibly have adopted ... or even the reading the court would have reached if the question had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 n. 11, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

The Board erred as a matter of law in adopting state law as the conclusive measure of family ties in the United States for purposes of Sec. 212(c) relief. The Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that "in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, ... Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law." Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104, 63 S.Ct. 483, 485, 87 L.Ed. 640 (1943); see Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1605, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119, 103 S.Ct. 986, 995, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983); NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600, 603, 91 S.Ct. 1746, 1748, 29 L.Ed.2d 206 (1971); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411, 77 S.Ct. 397, 399, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957). This presumption is especially appropriate where the federal statute is generally intended to have uniform nationwide application and where the federal program would be impaired if state law were to control. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 43-44, 109 S.Ct. at 1606.

These principles are applicable here. The INA "was designed to implement a uniform federal policy," and the meaning of concepts important to its application are "not to be determined according to the law of the forum, but rather require[ ] a uniform federal definition." Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 223 (2nd Cir.1992) (applying by analogy Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians ). Common law marriages are accorded legal status under the laws of thirteen states and the District of Columbia, but are denied such status under the laws of twenty-seven states, including California. See Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 Geo.L.Rev. 1829, 1831 n. 11 (1987). Under the Board's standard the state of an alien's residence has a conclusive veto power over the circumstances the Board may consider in exercising its discretion under Sec. 212(c). Nothing in Sec. 212(c) justifies granting such power to state law and treating similarly situated aliens disparately. In the absence of an express or implied Congressional intention to the contrary, the Board's adoption of a standard that conclusively defines family ties under Sec. 212(c) by reference to legal classifications that vary from state to state is not rationally related to the INA's purpose and is not a permissible interpretation of the Act. ²

The dissent asserts that the Board is simply following a general rule that federal law relies on state law to define personal and family relationships. Each statute cited by the dissent in support of this general rule either expressly states or strongly implies that its application is controlled by a person's status under state law. Where marriage is relevant to gaining admittance to the United States, for instance, the INA defines a "qualifying marriage" as one which "was entered into in accordance with the laws of the place where the marriage took place." 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). ³ The dissent has cited no case in which application of a uniform federal statute such as the INA has turned entirely on a person's status under state law, without express Congressional authorization. ⁴

The dissent also misses the mark when it concludes we require the Board to adopt a federal law of domestic relations and prevent the Board from giving weight to the legal status of an alien's relationship with a United States citizen. We merely hold that the Board may not bar consideration of otherwise relevant facts based upon the law of the state in which petitioner resides when exercising its discretion under Sec. 212(c). In deciding whether to grant a waiver of deportation, the Board must apply a flexible, uniform standard that reflects the federal policies underlying Sec. 212(c) as implemented in Matter of Marin, supra. It may consider the status of an alien's relationship under state law when analyzing an alien's ties to the United States. However, the Board cannot be barred from considering the substance of the relationship in determining the strength of the alien's ties to the United States. ⁵

III

The Board's evaluation of Kahn's family ties in this country was only one of several factors the Board weighed in casting the balance against Kahn's request for a Sec. 212(c) waiver. Nonetheless, it was clearly a significant one. Since the Board adopted a definition of family ties that was unauthorized by the statute, the judgment of the Board must be vacated and the matter remanded for reconsideration, and it is so ordered. ⁶

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

According to the majority, the INS errs as a matter of law when it treats aliens who are actually married under the law of their domicile differently from those who are not. Such reliance on state law, the majority holds, is inconsistent with uniform federal application of the immigration laws, is not rationally related to the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is therefore not a permissible interpretation of that statute.

With this conclusion, I respectfully disagree. Because federal law virtually always relies on state law to define personal and family relationships, the INS's decision to follow state law here is neither bizarre nor irrational. It is the majority's approach--which forces the INS to treat unmarried people as married--that will lead to irrational results and seriously...