Kahn v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 30 November 1995
• Docket Number: CA-CV,No. 2,2
• Citation: 916 P.2d 1124,185 Ariz. 408
• Parties: Edmund D. KAHN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Floyd THOMPSON; Affirmative Action Division of the City of Tucson, Tucson City Manager's Office; Isadore Davis; the City of Tucson Human Relations Commission and the Members Thereof, Defendants/Appellees. 95-0167.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1124

916 P.2d 1124

185 Ariz. 408

Edmund D. KAHN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Floyd THOMPSON; Affirmative Action Division of the City of Tucson, Tucson City Manager's Office; Isadore Davis; the City of Tucson Human Relations Commission and the Members Thereof, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 95-0167.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 2, Department B.

Nov. 30, 1995.

Review Denied May 21, 1996.

Edmund D. Kahn, Tucson, in Propria Persona.

Thomas J. Berning, City Attorney by Merle Joy Turchik, Tucson, for Defendants/Appellees.

OPINION

ESPINOSA, Presiding Judge.

Appellant Edmond D. Kahn ¹ appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees the City of Tucson Affirmative Action Division, City Manager's Office, Human Relations Commission, and officers thereof. Kahn contends that appellees violated the Human Relations Ordinance of the Tucson Code when they failed to investigate his claims that certain discounts for senior citizens and children constitute illegal age discrimination. The superior court concluded on public policy grounds that such discounts are reasonable and found no violation of the ordinance. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In the spring of 1994, Kahn filed two complaints with the Affirmative Action Division of the Tucson City Manager's Office (Division). The first alleged unlawful discrimination by the city's Randolph Park tennis facility in charging adults over 18 and under 60 fees of $1.50 while charging seniors and juniors only $1.00. The second complaint alleged that Smitty's Super Store discriminated by offering a 10% discount every Tuesday to customers age 60 and over. Kahn alleged that these practices were prohibited by the Tucson Human Relations Ordinance, Tucson Code, Chapter 17 (ordinance).

In June, the Division informed Kahn by letter that it did not have jurisdiction to review complaints directed at the city, but that it was "in the process of completing its inquiry" into his claim against Smitty's. In a July 28 letter, the Division advised Kahn that it had completed its inquiry and determined that Smitty's was not in violation of the ordinance and that the Division would not investigate his complaint. Kahn requested review of that decision by the Tucson Human Relations Commission, which confirmed the Division's findings and decision. Kahn then filed a complaint for special action writ of mandamus in superior court to compel the Division to "perform the acts required of them." Appellees moved for summary judgment, primarily on the ground that there had been no violation of the ordinance. The trial court granted the motion, finding senior citizen discounts reasonable and a favored public policy. ²

On appeal, Kahn contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees because the Division violated its mandatory duty to investigate his claims, and that it was error for the court to conclude as a matter of law that senior citizen discounts do not constitute unlawful age discrimination. He also claims violations of his constitutional rights and challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance.

Mandamus

Kahn first argues that summary judgment was improper because appellees failed to investigate his charges and furnish copies of the charges to the respondents, "contrary to the specific ministerial duties imposed upon them by the Tucson Human Relations Ordinance." We disagree.

The relevant portions of the ordinance provide:

Sec. 17-15. Complaint Procedures.

(a) ... The division shall furnish the respondent with a copy of the charge and shall promptly investigate the allegations of discriminatory practices set forth in the charge.

(b) The division shall, within one hundred twenty (120) days of receiving the charge, render written findings as to whether there is reasonable cause to substantiate the charge.

The ordinary meaning of "investigate" is "[t]o observe or inquire into in detail." American Heritage Dictionary 675 (2d college ed. 1982). The record shows that after receiving Kahn's complaints, the Division made an "inquiry" into the allegations against Smitty's, ³ and informed Kahn by letter of its conclusion that the facts alleged did not violate the ordinance. In response to Kahn's interrogatories, the Division stated that it had accepted Kahn's factual allegations against Smitty's as true. Kahn does not explain what more there was for the Division to investigate, nor can we fathom why the Division's inquiry was not an "investigation" for the purpose of determining whether the charge could be substantiated. That the Division determined not to pursue the matter further does not mean its initial inquiry cannot be considered an investigation. As Kahn apparently concedes, "[h]ow the bureaucrats investigate and the extent of the investigation is, probably, discretionary." We conclude that sufficient investigation was conducted to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance, and Kahn makes no showing that the Division was required to do more. ⁴

Kahn's argument is also meritless because the Division's duty here was not ministerial. Ministerial duties are those which permit a public officer only one course of action on an admitted state of facts. State Board of Barber Examiners v. Walker, 67 Ariz. 156, 192 P.2d 723 (1948). Mandamus may compel the performance of a ministerial duty or compel the officer to act in a matter involving discretion, but it may not designate how that discretion shall be exercised. City of Phoenix ex rel. Backstein v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 6 Ariz.App. 327, 432 P.2d 471 (1967). Nor is it available to compel an officer to perform acts not authorized or required by some plain provision of the law. Ruck Construction Company, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 116 Ariz. 533, 570 P.2d 220 (App.1977).

The purpose of the Human Relations Ordinance is to eliminate "prejudice and discrimination" in places of public accommodation, employment and housing. § 17-1. The subsection prohibiting discrimination in public places provides that no "facility or service shall be refused or restricted because of race, color, religion, ancestry, sex, age, physical handicap, national origin, sexual or affectional preference, or marital status," nor shall these factors result in any person being "unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, undesirable or not solicited." § 17-12(a). Price discounts are not among the prohibited acts delineated in the ordinance, thus Kahn's claims do not expressly state violations of the ordinance. Consequently, the question of whether age-related discounts fall within the ordinance, or whether such discounts result in other persons being "refused or restricted" from service, are matters involving interpretation of the ordinance. The Division is entitled to exercise its judgment and discretion in determining the scope of the ordinance since it is charged with enforcing it. See Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Ariz. 17, 198 P.2d 134 (1948). Because the Division had discretion to determine whether Kahn had stated a colorable claim, and obviously exercised that discretion, mandamus is not available. See Kord's Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 157 Ariz. 311, 757 P.2d 115 (App.1988).

That the Division failed to carry out the ministerial act of furnishing a copy of the charge to the respondent does not require a different result. Reading the ordinance as a whole, the word "shall" as applied to providing notice of a non-colorable charge may be reasonably construed as used in a directive rather than mandatory sense. See Arizona Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Foundation, 130 Ariz. 550, 555, 637 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1981) (construing racing commission's statutory mandate to recognize permittee agreements as "directory" when not in the public interest or convenience). Under the circumstances here, providing notice would have been pointless, and Kahn neither alleges nor shows any resulting prejudice.

Senior Citizen Discounts

We also find no error in the trial court's conclusion that senior citizen discounts do not amount to unlawful age discrimination. Section 17-12 of the ordinance makes it unlawful for any place of public accommodation "to discriminate against any person" because of race, color, religion, ancestry sex, age, physical handicap, or national origin. "Discriminate" is defined as "any distinction with respect to any person" based on the above factors. § 17-11(a). Thus, as Kahn urges, the language of the ordinance can be construed literally to prohibit any pricing practice based on age.

The plain language of a statute is normally controlling, except in the case where it would lead to an absurd result or a result at odds with the intent of its drafters. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 877 P.2d 294 (App.1994). In construing the provisions of an ordinance, the principal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislative body. Sandblom v. Corbin, 125 Ariz. 178, 608 P.2d 317 (App.1980). In doing so, we consider the words, context, subject matter, effects and consequences, spirit and reason of the law, and other acts in pari materia. State v. McGriff, 7 Ariz.App. 498, 441 P.2d 264 (1968).

Even without revisiting the express purpose and specific provisions of the Tucson civil rights ordinance as noted above, it is readily apparent that prohibiting age-related discounts is not an intended objective or construction of the legislation. Since the enactment of the ordinance in 1974, the Tucson City Council has specifically established numerous mandatory senior citizen discounts. These include reduced rates for the use of city tennis courts, § 21-10, city-sponsored recreation trips, § 21-13.2, city gymnasium equipment, §§ 21-14.1, 14.2, city golf courses, § 21-25.3, city zoo admission, § 21-51, and city buses, § 2-18. While Kahn argues that all of these discounts are "arbitrary" and equally prohibited, we believe the city's...