Kahng v. City of Houston
| Decision Date | 24 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. H-07-0402. |
| Citation | 485 F.Supp.2d 787 |
| Parties | Estate of Lawrence KAHNG and Clara Kahng, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF HOUSTON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Kristopher K. Ahn, Attorney at Law, Larry Andrew Dunham, Ahn Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Robert Louis Cambrice, City of Houston Legal Dept., Houston, TX, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs, Clara Kahng and the Estate of Lawrence Kahng, bring this action against defendant, the City of Houston, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the wrongful death of Lawrence Kahng and for the deprivation of Lawrence Kahng's right to equal protection. Pending before the court is Defendant City of Houston's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 3) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and plaintiffs' request for leave to amend included in Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 4). For the reasons explained below the defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted, and the plaintiffs' request to amend will be denied.
Defendant argues that plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted because plaintiffs have failed to allege facts capable of establishing the deprivation of a right secured by federal law.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted tests the formal sufficiency of the pleadings and is "appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied sub nom. Cloud v. United States, 536 U.S. 960, 122 S.Ct. 2665, 153 L.Ed.2d 839 (2002). The court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id.
When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 997, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). "[A] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Id. at 998. See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ().
Plaintiffs' Original Complaint asserts two claims: "Count 1 — Deprivation of rights under [42] U.S.C. § 1983,"1 and "Count 2 — Wrongful Death,"2 which is also based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating rights conferred elsewhere. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 811, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that an individual acting under color of law caused the deprivation of a right secured by federal law. Id. (). Municipal liability lies under § 1983 when a policy or custom of a municipality has caused the violation of an individual's federal rights. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-2038, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Plaintiffs' equal protection claim is based on allegations that
[o]n January 31, 2005, Decedent, Lawrence Kahng, was struck and killed by several vehicles while attempting to cross the I-10 Freeway in Houston, Texas. Mr. Kahng was driving westbound on I-10 when the van he was driving ran out of gas.
Defendant, the City of. Houston, had recently begun a "Safe-clear" program whose aim was to clear any stalled vehicles off of Houston freeways in six minutes or less, ostensibly to help traffic flow. The vehicles were to be towed at the owner's expense. The City of Houston received several complaints about the program, particularly from drivers who were awaiting assistance but had their car towed before their help could arrive and ended up paying expensive towing fees as a result.
After his vehicle ran out of gas, Mr. Kahng pulled onto the median of the freeway adjacent to the far left lane. He crossed over to the shoulder of the freeway and then made it to a nearby gas station to fill up a gas can with which he was going to put gas in his van so that he could drive off. After he filled up the gas can, he returned to the shoulder where he saw that a tow truck was preparing to take his van away. He dropped the gas can and hastily attempted to re-cross the freeway, but was struck just as he reached the far left lane. He was thrown back into oncoming traffic, at which time he was run over by several motorists and killed.
Plaintiffs allege that the "Safe-clear" program instituted by the City of Houston deprived Mr. Kahng of his rights of equal protection in that it unduly discriminated against the elderly and disabled. Mr. Kahng was killed as a direct and proximate result of the discriminatory practices of the City of Houston in implementing its "Safe-clear" program.3
Defendant argues that plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted because plaintiffs have not alleged that the city's Safe-Clear policy classifies or distinguishes based upon age and/or disability, that the Safe-Clear policy is selectively enforced against the elderly and/or the disabled, or that the Safe-Clear policy's unequal enforcement was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.4
Plaintiffs respond that they have met the low notice-pleading burden of Rule 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs argue that their
claim for violation of the equal protection clause is supported by facts stated in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs' complaint indicating that the City of Houston had received complaints regarding the `safe-clear' program yet continued with the program regardless. These facts are sufficient to support the allegation that Defendant's program discriminated against elderly and disabled drivers who were not able to obtain gas and return to their vehicle in time to prevent it being towed by the city, and that Defendant and its representatives were aware of this discriminatory practice but did nothing to prevent it and encouraged it to continue.5
Plaintiffs' allegations that enforcement of the City of Houston's Safe-Clear policy deprived Mr. Kahng of his right to equal protection invoke protections guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause "commands that no State shall `deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)). A city "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 306 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 995, 118 S.Ct. 559, 139 L.Ed.2d 400 (1997) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)). "Rather, as long as they do not burden a fundamental right or target a suspect class, ... [government] `agencies may pursue legitimate purposes by any means having a conceivable rational relationship to those purposes.'" Id. (quoting Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital District, 778 F.2d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1957, 90 L.Ed.2d 365 (1986)).
When the challenged law creates no classifications at all, even the deferential "rational basis" scrutiny that is applied to ordinary governmental classifications is not appropriate. Id "[I]f the challenged government action does not appear to classify or distinguish between two or more relevant persons or groups, then the action-even if irrational-does not deny them equal protection of the laws." Id. (quoting Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir.1988)). Moreover, disparate impact alone cannot suffice to state an equal protection violation because, otherwise, any law could be challenged on equal protection grounds by whomever it has negatively impacted. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2051-52, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). "Thus, a party who wishes to make out an Equal Protection claim must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination' motivating the ... [governmental] action which caused the complained-of injury." Id (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1767, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)). "Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, and not simply in spite of, the adverse impact it would have on an identifiable group." Id. at 307, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir.1995)).
Plaintiffs' discrimination claim fails to state a claim cognizable under § 1983 for several reasons. First, no fundamental right was...
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