Kaine v. Weigley

• Decision Date: 01 October 1853
• Citation: 22 Pa. 179
• Parties: Kaine versus Weigley.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

22 Pa. 179

Kaine versus Weigley.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Fayette county.

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Kaine, with whom was Ewing, for plaintiff in error.—It was said that as the statute of Elizabeth avoided all conveyances made with intent to defraud creditors, the payment of the consideration money, if it had been paid, would not validate the deed if the parties to it designed to commit a fraud upon the creditors of the grantor: 3 Watts 230, McKee v. Gilchrist; 11 Ser. & R. 328; Cowper 434.

The doctrine that fraud must be proved, not presumed, is subject to the qualification that it may be established, like other facts, by presumptive evidence: 4 Watts 360, Rogers v. Hall; 4 Harris 488, Zerbe v. Miller; 1 Rawle 349, Geiger v. Welsh.

As to the second assignment was cited Rogers v. Hall, also Zerbe v. Miller, and Lloyd v. Williams (9 Harris 327).

Veech, contrà.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by BLACK, C. J.

This was an ejectment for a house and lot formerly owned by one Neal, under whom both parties claim. Neal conveyed it to his sister and her husband, the defendants in this cause, before judgments were entered up against him, but after he had become hopelessly insolvent. His creditors afterwards caused it to be sold for their debts, and the plaintiff, making title through a sheriff's deed, avers that the previous conveyance was fraudulent and void.

One who has a bonâ fide debt against an insolvent man, may take property at a fair price in payment of it, without danger of having his title afterwards impeached. But when a person in failing circumstances sells land to one who is not his creditor, his motives are suspicious, for he can, if he pleases, put the money out of reach, and defeat those who are entitled to it. If the vendee knows that such is the vendor's purpose, he must take the consequences in the loss of his title, though he has paid an outside price for it. When it is sold either in payment of a debt or for cash at a price considerably below its real value, the conveyance may be impugned by creditors without proof of more than the vendee's knowledge that the vendor was indebted. In such a case the parties cannot choose but know, that the creditors are cheated to the extent of the difference between the price and the value; and the transaction being touched with fraud is tainted throughout. If the transfer is made without any consideration at all, it is nakedly fraudulent, and it requires no evidence beyond that fact alone to overthrow it.

In the present case it is alleged, that the conveyance was made when both parties knew the vendor to be insolvent; that the grantees were a brother-in-law and a sister of the grantor; that the consideration stated in the deed was less than the value of the land by twenty or twenty-five per cent.; that, of the sum, which was said to be the price, only fifty dollars were paid when the deed was delivered, and that amount was handed to the grantor by his sister after they had gone together into a private room, from whence she returned with the money in her hand. I say these facts are alleged. I do not say that they were fully proved, or that if proved, the jury were bound to infer from them any actual dishonesty. But if true, they make out a very serious case, which ought to be submitted with no instructions tending to prevent a verdict for the plaintiff, unless the jury should be able to explain the evidence in some way consistently with the fairness of the transaction.

It is said that fraud...