Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 14 September 1967
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, a corporation, Southern California Permanente Medical Group, a partnership, and Robert M. Fischer, M.D., and individual, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; Linda Valerie MOORE, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 31809.

Page 330

62 Cal.Rptr. 330

254 Cal.App.2d 327

KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, a corporation, Southern California Permanente Medical Group, a partnership, and Robert M. Fischer, M.D., and individual, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent Linda Valerie MOORE, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 31809.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Sept. 14, 1967.

Hearing Denied Nov. 8, 1967.

Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges and John G. Flett, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Robert G. Leff, Beverly Hills, for real party in interest.

McCOY, Associate Justice pro tem. ^*

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate to compel respondent court to enter an order granting their motion for a summary judgment. Petitioners contend that a prior judgment in their favor as defendants in a personal injury case brought by a husband and wife is a bar to a subsequent wrongful death action brought by the daughter of the deceased wife, and that the motion for summary judgment should have been granted on that ground.

The personal injury action was commenced in 1961 by Bernard Moore and Sybil Moore, husband and wife, against these petitioners and others, as defendants, seeking damages based upon the alleged negligent medical treatment of Sybil Moore. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, and judgment thereon became final in 1964.

On March 23, 1965, the wrongful death action was commenced by Bernard Moore and Linda Valerie Moore, a minor, husband and daughter of the deceased Sybil Moore, based upon the same alleged acts of negligence as those alleged in the personal injury action. The real party in interest herein admits that the second complaint arose out of the same facts, but alleges that the wrongful death action seeks damages, not only for negligence, but for breach of contract arising from the Kaiser Permanente Plan.

Petitioners, defendants in the wrongful death action, moved for a summary judgment against both plaintiffs therein on the ground that the final judgment in the personal injury action was a bar. The respondent court, on January 26, 1967, entered its order granting the motion against plaintiff Bernard Moore on the ground that he was a party to the prior action and was collaterally estopped in this action. The motion was denied as to plaintiff Linda Valerie Moore, the real party in interest here, on the ground that since she was not a party to the prior action, she was not collaterally estopped by the prior judgment.

Although the order in question was made on January 26, 1967, the petition before us was not filed until May 15, 1967. The real party in interest does not complain of this delay. She contends, however, that this is not a proper case for the issuance of a writ of mandate. We agree.

Petitioners her contend that they are entitled to a writ of mandate compelling the respondent court to grant their motion for a summary judgment. They contend in substance, that to force them to go to trial in the wrongful death action and then appeal from an adverse judgment does not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

It has been held that: 'A motion for summary judgment is a proper procedure by which to raise the defense of res judicata' (Smith v. City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal.App.2d 112, 128, 11 Cal.Rptr. 898, 908), and that an order denying a motion for a summary judgment is merely an intermediary judgment during trial and is nonappealable. (Nevada Constructors v. Mariposa etc. Dist., 114 Cal.App.2d 816, 251 P.2d 53.) But whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandate to compel the granting of their motion for summary judgment in the circumstances of this case is quite another matter. 'It is obvious that the writ of mandate, like other extraordinary writs, is not designed and should not be utilized to unduly control the ordinary activities of trial courts. In matters involving discretion it will not lie to control such discretion 'except in those rare instances where under the facts it can be * * * exercised in but one way', as was declared in Hilmer v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 71, 73, 29 [254 Cal.App.2d 331] P.2d 175, quoted in Lincoln v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.2d 304, 313, 139 P.2d 13, 18.' (Monroe v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.App.2d 470, 472, 218 P.2d 136; Dryer v. Dryer, 231 Cal.App.2d 441, 446, 41 Cal.Rptr. 839.) Similarly, 'Where the facts are undisputed, and the law establishes the right of a party to an order or to the relief which the court has refused the writ will lie.' (California Pine Box & Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.App. 65, 70, 108 P. 882, 884.)

A motion for summary judgment is one of several procedures established by law whereby a party may secure a favorable determination of his plea of res judicata and thus avoid a trial of the case on the merits. ¹ It must be remembered, however, that the function of a motion for summary judgment is limited and is to be distinguished from a motion for a trial of an affirmative defense under section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Proceedings Without Trial, § 76(d), p. 1713.) 'As to the procedure under section 437c, Code of Civil Procedure, the following is stated as a fundamental principle in Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal.2d 553, 555, 122 P.2d 264, 265: 'The issue to be determined by the trial court in consideration of a motion thereunder is whether or not defendant has presented any facts which give rise to a triable issue or defense, and not to pass upon or determine the issue itself, that is, the true facts in the case. (Citations.) If that were not true, controversial issues of fact would be tried upon affidavits by the court and not a jury.' In Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 441, 116 P.2d 62, 64, the same rule is expressed as follows: 'Thus, in passing upon a motion for summary judgment, the primary duty of the trial court is to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. If it finds one, it is then powerless to proceed further, but must allow such issue to be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived. " (Gardner v. Shreve, 89 Cal.App.2d 804, 807, 202 P.2d 322, 324.) On the other hand, where it appears by agreement or otherwise that there is no material issue of fact to be tried, and that the sole question remaining is one of law as to whether the claim of the moving party is tenable on the undisputed facts, 'That question of law could appropriately be determined on a motion for summary judgment.' (Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Cal.2d 264, 269, 5 Cal.Rptr. 317, 321, 352 P.2d 725; cf. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. CO. OF PITTSBURGH V. SUPERIOR COURT, 252 CAL.APP.2D 568, 60 CAL.RPTR. 535.)^A 'The reason for the enactment of the provision for summary judgments is to help clear the courts of an overload of repetitious suits when it appears that no factual issues exist in the second cause, or that one side or the other is wholly without right.' (Dryer v. Dryer 231 Cal.App.2d 441, 449, 41 Cal.Rptr. 839, 844.)

Although it now appears from an examination of the record after oral argument that the alternative writ may have been inadvertently issued, nevertheless, having issued the alternative writ we assume for the purpose of this opinion only that mandamus is the proper remedy and that a determination on the merits of the issues raised by the petition will expedite rather than disturb the orderly processes of justice. (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.2d 481, 483--484, 171 P.2d 21, 166 A.L.R. 701; Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 574, 582, 283 P.2d 704; 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (1954) Extraordinary Writs, § 31, pp. 2503--2504.)

In the case before us the facts are undisputed. On the basis of those facts petitioners contend that the prior judgment against Sybil Moore in the personal injury action is conclusive against her daughter, Linda Valerie Moore, as plaintiff in the wrongful death action on the issue of liability as a matter of law 'because (1) the prior judgment negatives the existence of conditions which would charge the petitioners with responsibility for Sybil's death and (2) plaintiff is a privy or successor in interest of her mother and thus estopped from relitigating the issue of petitioners' liability for Sybil's injuries.'

'The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect. As the court stated in Todhunter v. Smith (1934), 219 Cal. 690, 695, 28 P.2d 916, 918, '(a) former judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but, in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.' (Citations.) In its first aspect, res judicata is effective as a merger or bar; in the second as a collateral estoppel. While under either aspect, the doctrine is in the usual instance operative to make an existing final judgment conclusive of the rights of parties to the former action or of those persons in privity with such parties (Rest., Judgments, §§ 79, 83), the doctrine has been invoked as a collateral estoppel by persons who are strangers, that is neither parties nor privies, to the former action.' (McDougall v. Palo Alto etc. School Dist., 212 Cal.App.2d 422, 428, 28 Cal.Rptr. 37, 40.)

We are concerned here only with the second aspect of the doctrine, since there is a lack of identity of causes of action. 'The cause of action for wrongful death provided for in Code of Civil Procedure § 377 is an original one, arising on the death in favor of those...