Kaiser v. CSL Plasma Inc.

• Citation: 240 F.Supp.3d 1129
• Decision Date: 02 March 2017
• Docket Number: CASE NO. C15–0842RSM
• Parties: Jasmine KAISER, Plaintiff, v. CSL PLASMA INC., a corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

240 F.Supp.3d 1129

Jasmine KAISER, Plaintiff,

v.CSL PLASMA INC., a corporation, Defendant.

CASE NO. C15–0842RSM

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

Signed March 2, 2017

David James Ward, Legal Voice, Isaac Ruiz, Kathryn M. Knudsen, Keller Rohrback, Seattle, WA, Jill R. Gaulding, Gender Justice, St. Paul, MN, for Plaintiff.

Bruce Douglas, Stephanie Willing, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Minneapolis, MN, Sarah Jung Evans, Adam T. Pankratz, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 50. Plaintiff asks the Court for an Order dismissing Defendant's defense that this action has been settled, and dismissing Defendant's affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim, preemption and primary jurisdiction. Id. Defendant opposes the motion and asks the Court to instead grant summary judgment in its favor on the bases of preemption and primary jurisdiction. Dkt. # 57. For the reasons set forth below, the Court now GRANTS Plaintiff's motion, thereby denying Defendant's request for summary judgment in its favor.

II. BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute the following. On April 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a discrimination action in King County Superior Court against Defendants. Dkt. # 1–1. Defendant removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. # 1.

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant CSL Plasma Inc. operates and advertises a plasma center in Kent, Washington, where it pays individuals in exchange for plasma

"donations." Dkt. # 1–1 at ¶ 7. Plaintiff further alleges that she went to CSL Plasma intending to make a donation but was turned away because she is a transgender person. Dkt. # 9. Plaintiff was apparently told that CSL Plasma had placed a "lifetime" deferment on any donation by Plaintiff, and that CSL Plasma would be notifying other, similar centers of the lifetime deferment, which essentially precluded her from ever "donating" her plasma at one of these centers. Id. As a result, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit alleging violations of Washington State's Consumer Protection Act (CPA), RCW 19.86.010 to .920, and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60.010 to .505. Through her suit, Plaintiff seeks the following relief:

A. a monetary judgment against defendant CSL Plasma and in favor of Ms. Kaiser;

B. declaratory relief pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act and the Washington Law Against Discrimination;

C. injunctive relief pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act;

D. exemplary damages, including exemplary damages under RCW 19.86;

E. an award of attorney fees and costs to the extent authorized by Washington law, including the Washington Law Against Discrimination and the Consumer Protection Act; andF. such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dkt. # 1–1 at 4, Prayer for Relief.

On August 17, 2015, this Court remanded this matter back to King County Superior Court after finding that Defendant had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the minimum amount in controversy requirement for subject matter jurisdiction had been met. Dkt. # 24. The case was then closed. Id.

On April 12, 2016, Defendant again removed the action to this Court. Dkt. # 27. Defendant alleged diversity jurisdiction as the basis of removal, and set forth new evidence of the requisite amount in controversy. Id. Removal was not challenged by Plaintiff, and the Court retained the case.

On or about November 2, 2106, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement agreement and asked the Court to enter its standard Order of Dismissal. Dkt. # 37. The Court entered its standard Order and again closed the matter. Dkt. # 37. However, the Court's Order provided that "[i]n the event that the settlement is not perfected, any party may move to reopen the case, provided that such motion is filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this order." Id.

Just a few weeks later, on November 29, 2016, Plaintiff moved to reopen this case on the basis that the parties had not been able to perfect settlement. Dkt. # 38. The motion was unopposed, and the Court re-opened the matter. Dkt. # 40.

Defendant then filed a Motion to Confirm and Enforce Settlement Agreement, and a Motion for Protective Order, both of which this Court DENIED. Dkts. # 45, # 48, # 63 and # 64. At the same time, Plaintiff filed the instant motion, which is now ripe for review.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but "only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Crane v. Conoco, Inc. , 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers , 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992) ). Material facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See O'Melveny & Myers , 969 F.2d at 747, rev'd on other grounds , 512 U.S. 79, 114 S.Ct. 2048, 129 L.Ed.2d 67 (1994). However, the nonmoving party must make a "sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof" to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Further, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In this case, the parties do not dispute the material facts pertaining to the issues raised in the instant motion. Instead, they both argue that they are entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law. See Dkts. # 50 and # 57.

B. Settlement Agreement

As an initial matter, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion to the extent that it seeks a dismissal of the defense that this case has settled. As the Court previously ruled, no enforceable settlement agreement was reached between the parties. Dkt # 63.

C. Affirmative Defenses of Failure to State a Claim, Preemption and Primary Jurisdiction

The Court next turns to Plaintiff's arguments that three of Defendant's affirmative defenses should be dismissed—failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, preemption and primary jurisdiction. Dkt. # 50 at 18–24. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that each of these defenses should be dismissed.

1. Failure to State a Claim

Plaintiff first argues that this Court should dismiss Defendant's affirmative defense of failure to state a claim, asserting that it is not properly asserted as an affirmative defense. Dkt. # 50 at 18. Plaintiff relies on two out of District cases in support of that assertion. Id. at 18, fns. 63 and 64. Defendant does not respond to this argument. See Dkt. # 57.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(c). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense." Wyshak v. City Nat . , 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47–48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ); accord Simmons v. Navajo , 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) ; Schutte & Koerting, Inc. v. Swett & Crawford , 298 Fed.Appx. 613, 615 (9th Cir. 2008). "Fair notice generally requires that the defendant state the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense." Kohler v. Islands Restaurants, LP. , 280 F.R.D. 560, 564 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Conley , 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99 ). "On the other hand, an affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it clearly lacks merit ‘under any set of facts the defendant might allege.’ " Id. (quoting McArdle v. AT & T Mobility, LLC , 657 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1149–50 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ).

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have routinely held that "failure to state a claim" is not a proper affirmative defense. See , e.g. , Vargas v. Cnty. of Yolo , 2016 WL 3916329, 5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94793, 13–14 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2016). Indeed, these courts have explained, "[f]ailure to state a claim is not a proper affirmative defense but, rather, asserts a defect in [plaintiffs'] prima facie case ... [and] is more properly brought as a motion." Vargas , 2016 WL 3916329, *5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94793, *13–14 (quoting Powell v. Union Pac. R. Co. , 864 F.Supp.2d 949, 962–63 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ) (citing Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan–Nonbargained Program , 718 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ); see also Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co. , 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense."). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to Defendant's first Affirmative Defense of failure to state a claim, and dismisses that defense.

2. Preemption

Plaintiff next argues that the Court should dismiss Defendant's eighth affirmative defense of preemption. Dkt. # 50 at 18–22. Defendant responds that Plaintiff's claims are preempted and therefore this Court should grant summary judgment in its favor on that issue. Dkt. # 57 at 16–19. The Court disagrees with Defendant.

Defendant's...