Kaiser v. Kaiser

Decision Date14 February 1978
Citation93 Misc.2d 36,402 N.Y.S.2d 171
PartiesIn the Matter of Sherril KAISER, Petitioner, v. Sallie KAISER, Respondent.
CourtNew York Family Court

James Scott Bennett, Hauppauge, of counsel, Suffolk County Legal Aid Society, for petitioner.

Selig Rosenzweig, Port Jefferson Station, for respondent.

JACK J. CANNAVO, Judge.

In this proceeding under Section 415 of Article 4 of the Family Court Act, respondent has moved to dismiss the support petition on the grounds that respondent is not legally responsible for the support of the petitioner.

The question presented herein is whether a stepparent, whose marriage has been terminated by the death of the child's natural parent, is legally responsible for the support of the stepchild.

Petitioner is an 18 year old single female attending Suffolk County Community College on a work-study program. Her mother died on September 2, 1961. Subsequently, her father married respondent on August 9, 1962 when petitioner was three years of age. Two female children, petitioner's half sisters, were born of this union. Her father died on March 10, 1975. Petitioner continued to reside in respondent's home until June 15, 1977. In June of 1977, petitioner left respondent's residence to reside with relatives and now seeks support from the respondent pursuant to Section 415 of Article 4 of the Family Court Act. Concededly, petitioner has limited income and is imminently liable to go on public assistance. She is in fact presently receiving medicaid benefits from the Suffolk County Department of Social Services. Respondent, however, maintains that the stepparent relationship required under Section 415 of the Family Court Act ceased when her marriage was terminated by the death of her husband.

A stepparent does not merely by reason of the affinity stand in loco parentis to a stepchild. The legal liability of support of a stepparent for a stepchild arises by statute when the child is receiving or is in danger of receiving public assistance. No such obligation, however, existed at common law, (Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N.Y. 312; Matter of Kane v. Necci, 245 App.Div. 1, 280 N.Y.S. 489, app. dismd. 269 N.Y. 31, 193 N.E. 13; S. v. S., 52 Misc.2d 865, 276 N.Y.S.2d 663). Section 415 of the Family Court Act creates this liability and provides as follows:

"Except as otherwise provided by law, the spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof or of a patient in an institution in the department of mental hygiene, if of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person or patient, provided that a parent shall be responsible only for the support of his child or children who have not attained the age of twenty-one years. In its discretion, the court may require any such person to contribute a fair and reasonable sum for the support of such relative and may apportion the costs of such support among such persons as may be just and appropriate in view of the needs of the petitioner and the other circumstances of the case and their respective means. Step-parents shall in like manner be responsible for the support of children under the age of twenty-one years."

Petitioner cites the cases of Peake v. Peake, 205 Misc. 393, 128 N.Y.S.2d 631, and Jones v. Stautz, 5 Misc.2d 185, 159 N.Y.S.2d 903, in support of her contention that the death of a parent does not conclude the stepparent relationship because death is an act of God and is therefore not a willful act. In contrast, the petitioner further argues, a divorce does end this relationship since there is an "intent to terminate the living tendrils of the marriage."

While petitioner's arguments appear to be persuasive, they are not convincing to this Court. The relationship between stepparent and stepchild arises as a result of the remarriage of the natural parent. Liability for support of stepchildren...

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7 cases
  • Ruben v. Ruben, 82-344
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 7 Junio 1983
    ...the obligation to support the stepchild. See Swain v. Swain, 250 Cal.App.2d 1, 7, 58 Cal.Rptr. 83, 87 (1967); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Misc.2d 36, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (Fam.Ct.1978); see also Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 583 We agree with those jurisdictions, and hold that upon the dissolution of a mar......
  • Janet S.M.M. v. Commissioner of Social Services
    • United States
    • New York Family Court
    • 18 Agosto 1993
    ...relationship ceases by death, divorce, or otherwise [FCA § 415; Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 362, 461 A.2d 733; Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Misc.2d 36, 38-39, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171; see Swain v. Swain, 250 Cal.App.2d 1, 7, 58 Cal.Rptr. 83]. Once the stepparent relationship ceased, the petitioner's leg......
  • Randolph v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 30 Septiembre 1997
    ...decedent (see, Matter of Erie County Bd. of Social Welfare v. Schneider, 6 Misc.2d 374, 163 N.Y.S.2d 184; see also, Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Misc.2d 36, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171). Thus, at the time of their deaths, plaintiff's decedent and his stepchild were no longer "relatives" within the meaning of ......
  • Martel v. Southampton Hosp., INDEX No. 07-24175
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 29 Noviembre 2013
    ...ends when the parties' divorce becomes final (Peake v Peake, 205 Misc 393, 138 NYS2d 631 [Dom Rel Ct, Kings County 1954]; Kaiser v Kaiser, 93 Misc2d 36, 402 NYS2d [1978]). In the absence of a clear statutory provision continuing the obligation of a stepparent after the death of either party......
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