Kaiser v. North, s. 14 to 17.

• Citation: 289 N.W. 325,292 Mich. 49
• Decision Date: 20 December 1939
• Docket Number: Nos. 14 to 17.,s. 14 to 17.
• Parties: KAISER v. NORTH et al., and three other cases.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

292 Mich. 49

289 N.W. 325

KAISER

v.NORTH et al., and three other cases.

Nos. 14 to 17.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 20, 1939.

Actions by Margaret Kaiser, and by Mary Louise Kaiser, a minor, by Margaret Kaiser, her next friend, and by Margaret Mary Kaiser, a minor, by Margaret Kaiser, her next friend, and by Anthony Kaiser, a minor, by Margaret Kaiser, his next friend, against William J. North, Sr., and another, to recover damages sustained in automobile accident. From judgments of dismissal, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Arthur E. Gordon, Judge of the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Vandeveer, Vandeveer & Haggerty, of Detroit, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Leo H. Robb and Frederick C. Wardle, both of Detroit (Julien Winterhalter, of Detroit, of counsel), for defendants and appellees.

NORTH, Justice.

In these cases plaintiffs seek to recover damages alleged to have been sustained in consequence of the negligent manner in which an automobile belonging to the defendant, William J. North, Sr., was driven by his son, the defendant William J. North, Jr. The litigants reside in Detroit, Michigan; but the accident happened in the province of Ontario, Canada. In each of these cases the declaration, as amended, contains two counts. In the first count only ordinary negligence is alleged, but in the second count defendants are charged with gross negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct. And plaintiffs allege that the parties who suffered physical injuries from the automobile accident were guest passengers. Defendants made a motion in each case to dismiss for the reasons hereinafter noted. These motions were granted and plaintiffs have appealed.

In part the reasons assigned in support of the motion to dismiss were as follows:

‘Because the plaintiff's said amended declaration does not establish a cause of action under the laws of the Province of Ontario, Canada, for the reason that plaintiff's amended declaration alleges that plaintiff was a guest passenger in defendants' automobile.

‘Because the statutes of the Province of Ontario, Canada, do not provide a cause of action for injuries suffered by persons while riding as guest passengers in an automobile against the owner or driver of such automobile, but on the contrary the statutes of the Province of Ontario, Canada, specifically provide that such guest passengers shall not have any right of action against the owner or operator of an automobile for injuries suffered while riding as such guest passengers of the owner or operator.’

The pertinent portion of the revised statutes of Ontario read:

‘Sec. 47. (1) The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for loss or damage sustained by any person by reason of negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle on a highway unless such motor vehicle was without the owner's consent in the possession of some person other than the owner or his chauffeur, and the driver of a motor vehicle not being the owner shall be liable to the same extent as such owner. 1930, c. 48, s. 10.

‘(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1, the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation, shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from such motor vehicle. 1935 c. 26, s. 11.’ Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1937. Vol. III, page 3917, Chap. 288.

Appellants in support of their contention that the trial judge erred in dismissing their respective suits in consequence of the above quoted statutory provisions urge that these provisions of the Ontario statute contravene Articles 7 and 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A., and also Article 2, section 13 of the Constitution of this state, ‘by depriving plaintiffs of trial of their causes of actions by jury’ and by depriving them of due process and equal protection of the law. Appellants further assert that the quoted Ontario statutory provisions offend against public policy of this state because the statute constitutes an arbitrary discrimination against a particular class of persons, and because it arbitrarily abolishes causes of action granted the citizens of this state under the common law and under its statutory law. For the reasons just above indicated appellants assert that the statutory provisions of Ontario should not be applied in the trial of these suits in this state.

Section 2 of the Ontario statute is so plain in its terms it could scarcely be asserted that these plaintiffs could successfully prosecute these suits in the courts of Ontario. And regardless of the forum in which an action of this character is instituted, the liability for the alleged tort is determined by the place of injury.

‘The question of whether or not an act gives rise to a civil liability for tort depends on the law of the place where it is committed.’ 12 C.J. 452.

‘The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.’ American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356, 357, 29 S.Ct. 511, 512, 53 L.Ed. 826,16 Ann.Cas. 1047.

See also Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883.

Appellants' contention that the Ontario statute should be held to be ineffective because it is violative of the noted provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of this state, and also because it deprives plaintiffs in cases of this character of trial by jury, cannot be sustained. Neither our constitutional laws nor our statutory laws are of extra-territorial force as applied to a case of this character.

‘It is obvious that no law has any effect of its own force beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. Conversely, every person who is found within the limits of a government, whether for temporary purposes or as a resident, is bound by its laws so far as they are applicable to him. It...