Kaiser v. State

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MASON, J.:
• Citation: Kaiser v. State, 80 Kan. 364, 102 P. 454 (Kan. 1909)
• Decision Date: 05 June 1909
• Docket Number: 16,066
• Parties: PETER KAISER, as Administrator, etc., v. THE STATE OF KANSAS

102 P. 454

80 Kan. 364

PETER KAISER, as Administrator, etc., v. THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 16,066

Supreme Court of Kansas

June 5, 1909

Decided January, 1909.

Error from Franklin district court; CHARLES A. SMART, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. INSANE PERSONS--Liability of Estates for Cost of Maintenance at State Hospital--Constitutional Provision. The provision of the constitution (art. 7, § 1) that "institutions for. the benefit of the insane, blind, and deaf and dumb, and such other benevolent institutions as the public good may require, shall be fostered and supported by the state, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law," does not prevent legislation making the estates of persons committed to the state hospital for the insane liable for the cost of their maintenance there.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--Uniform and Equal Taxation. Nor is such legislation in conflict with the constitutional provision requiring uniformity and equality in the rate of taxation.

3. INSANE PERSONS--Liability of Estates for Maintenance at State Hospital. Under the provision of the statute in relation to the state hospital for the insane (Gen. Stat 1889, § 3726; Gen. Stat. 1901, § 3988) that if the probate court shall find that a person adjudged to be insane has sufficient means for his maintenance and that of his family, without impoverishment, it shall order his guardian to pay for his maintenance out of his estate, the state may upon the death of a patient in such hospital recover from his administrator the cost of his maintenance for any period during which he was possessed of means not needed for the support of any one dependent upon him.

4. INSANE PERSONS--Same. The rule stated in the foregoing paragraph is. not altered by the fact that the form of commitment prescribed in that statute, directing the patient to be received and maintained at the expense of the county or the guardian, was changed in a revision (Laws 1901, ch. 353, § 60) to read "at the expense of the state."

5. JUDGMENTS--Res Judicata. The fact that the probate court found that a person adjudged insane was without sufficient means for his support, and ordered that his maintenance should be at the cost of the state, does not constitute an adjudication against the contention of the plaintiff in an action brought by the state to charge the estate of such person after his decease with the cost of his maintenance at the hospital for the insane.

William H. Clark, for the plaintiff in error.

Fred S. Jackson, attorney-general, and John Marshall, assistant attorney-general, for The State; John S. Dason, and Harry C. Bowman, of counsel.

OPINION

MASON, J.:

In 1883 August Freitag was adjudged insane and committed to the state insane asylum, where he remained until 1905, when he died owning considerable property, leaving no one dependent upon him, and having no known heirs. An administrator was appointed, and in 1907 the state brought action against him to recover the expense of Freitag's maintenance during all the time he was at the asylum and recovered a judgment for the full amount, from which the defendant prosecutes error.

The grounds on which a reversal is sought are: (1) That the legislature has no power under the constitution to impose upon the estate of an insane person a liability for his support at a state institution; (2) that if such power exists it was never exercised prior to 1907, and in the absence of a statute there can be no such liability; and (3) that if such liability ever existed it can not be enforced by the method pursued here, especially in view of the proceedings under which the commitment was made.

The state constitution provides that "institutions for the benefit of the insane, blind, and deaf and dumb, and such other benevolent institutions as the public good may require, shall be fostered and supported by the state, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law." (Art. 7, § 1.) The defendant insists that this provision affixes to a state hospital for the insane the character of a benevolent institution, and that the exaction of payment from the persons there cared for is inconsistent with the idea of benevolence; and, also, that the obligation placed upon the state to foster and support such an institution implies that it is to be maintained wholly at the expense of the public. We do not think, however, that the use of the term "benevolent" in describing the class to which the enumerated institutions belong was intended to confine them to the rendition of purely gratuitous services. And even if an unqualified requirement that the state should foster and support such institutions could be regarded as forbidding any charge being made to the direct beneficiaries, the addition of the words "subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law" precludes such an interpretation here, and plainly indicates that the selection of ways and means was committed to the legislature without restriction. The provision of the constitution quoted was taken from that of Ohio, with only verbal changes. In The State v. Kiesewetter, 37 Ohio St. 546, a statute was construed to authorize the expense of clothing the inmate of a state insane asylum to be collected from his estate. An attack upon its validity was disposed of in these words:

"It is also claimed that this construction of the statute brings it in conflict with section 1, article 7, of the constitution, which declares that 'institutions for the benefit of the insane, blind, deaf and dumb, shall always be fostered and supported by the state; and be subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by the general assembly.'

"The answer to this objection is that the provision of the constitution is not self-executing, and that the mode in which such institutions are to be fostered and supported is left to the discretion of the general assembly. That discretion has been exercised in the passage of the statute now under consideration." (Page 549.)

In Baldwin v. Douglas County, 37 Neb. 283, 55 N.W. 875, the court held, practically overruling State v. Douglas County, 18 Neb. 601, that a statute requiring those liable for the support of an insane person to pay the expense of his maintenance at a state insane asylum could not be enforced against one who as a taxpayer had contributed. to the support of the institution, on the ground of a. conflict with a constitutional provision requiring the state's revenue to be provided by a tax by valuation, so that every person should pay a tax in proportion to the value of his property. The grounds of the decision were thus indicated in the opinion:

"The annual cost of maintaining the insane hospital is provided for by a general tax, levied with reference to the assessed valuations of the respective counties; again, . . . the amount due the hospital for the care, board and treatment of the insane must be paid by the several counties, reference being had to the amount expended in that behalf for the insane properly chargeable to each county. Thus it would seem that the taxpayer has twice paid taxes for this one purpose. . . . As is said in the County of Delaware v. McDonald, 46 Iowa 170, 'the state reaches out its strong arm and makes the insane its wards, regardless of the care which they may receive at home or the wishes of those upon whom they are dependent for their support. . . . The state asserts its right for the reason an insane person may often need more than a mere maintenance. He often needs restraint, confinement, medical attendance, and peculiar care and treatment. Society is entitled to be protected and relieved against him, and when this is so the state very properly takes charge of him and makes him its ward.'

"We know of no principle of equity or justice that under these circumstances would imply a contract by the husband to answer for the treatment of his wife, furnished by the state in the interest of the general public. It would seem that the public thus benefited should defray all expenses incurred for its protection. . . . The husband has already twice paid for the maintenance of the insane hospital. This was upon his property. If he is required to pay for the treatment of his wife, this payment is just as much a compulsory contribution to the maintenance of the insane hospital as was either of the others. It is in fact another form of taxation for the same purpose. The right to levy taxes can only be justified as being necessary for the performance of its functions by the state. No tax can be legally levied for any purposes foreign to those functions, and, even that far, taxation is tolerated only from the necessities of the case. The collection of unnecessary revenue by the state is not taxation. It is robbery. The plaintiff in error has already paid his full proportion toward the maintenance of the insane hospital. More than that the authorities can not constitutionally exact." (Pages 288, 289.)

Of this case it is said in a note in 20 L.R.A. 850:

"The above case seems to be substantially a pioneer on the question involved. The reasoning on the subject of repeated taxation of the same person seems to leave a question whether or not this repetition of burdens is not more apparent than real. If the county reimburses the state for certain patients the expense for them first paid by the state would appear to be in reality only a loan or advancement which did not constitute a real burden on the taxpayers under state taxation. The same would be true as to the reimbursement of the county by payments from relatives. In other words, what a taxpayer paid in one form would seem to relieve him from a corresponding burden in another form, so that in reality he would in the final event have to...