Kaku Nagano v. McGrath

Decision Date04 April 1951
Docket NumberNo. 10192.,10192.
Citation187 F.2d 759
PartiesKAKU NAGANO v. McGRATH, Atty. Gen.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit


C. Lysle Smith, Edward R. Johnston, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Harold I. Baynton, Department of Justice, Office of Alien Property, Washington, D. C., Otto Kerner, Jr., U. S. Atty, Chicago, Ill., James L. Morrisson, Geo. B. Searls, James D. Hill, Ralph S. Spritzer, Irwin A. Seibel, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before DUFFY, FINNEGAN and LINDLEY, Circuit Judges.

LINDLEY, Circuit Judge.

The District Court having allowed defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff appeals. Consequently, our only question is whether, by the averments of the complaint, a good and sufficient cause of action was presented.

The averments are in substance as follows: Plaintiff, a native of Japan, is a permanent resident of the United States, and has resided within this country for a period in excess of seven consecutive years following 1915, when she first entered, and has never relinquished that residence. She is married to Shinsaku Nagano, likewise a native of Japan, who immigrated to the United States as a permanent resident in the year 1906 and whose permanent residence, both legally and physically, has continued at all times in Chicago, Illinois. Plaintiff has been but temporarily in Japan, without intending at any time to abandon or relinquish her permanent residence in the United States. She is not an enemy or an ally of an enemy or a national of a designated enemy country within the meaning of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 1 et seq.

The suit is brought against the Attorney General as successor to the Alien Property Custodian for the purpose of establishing plaintiff's ownership in certain shares of stock of The Fuji Trading Company, which have been taken over by the Custodian on the ground that plaintiff is a national of Japan, a designated enemy country.

The Fuji Trading Company is an Illinois corporation having its principal place of business in Chicago, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of certain oriental food products. The enterprise was founded in 1910 by plaintiff's husband and has been carried on since that date under his sole management and direction. It is a leading company within the United States in terms of volume and reputation of product as compared with others engaged in the same line of business. The corporation was organized in 1912, and since that time, the husband has been its president and majority stockholder.

Prior to January 3, 1932, the total capital stock of the company consisted of 10,000 shares of common stock, ownership of which was as follows: Shinsaku Nagano, 6210 shares, plaintiff, 3780 shares, and the brother of plaintiff, one Miya, 10 shares. On January 3, 1932, the corporation declared a stock dividend of 5000 shares payable to the holders of record in proportion to their then holdings. Notwithstanding the direction of the resolution that the stock be delivered proportionately to the then existing stockholders, a single certificate for 5000 shares was issued in the name of the wife. However, this certificate was retained in the possession of the husband and never actually or constructively delivered to plaintiff, who had, until approximately the time she instituted this suit, no knowledge of the stock dividend or of the issuance of the certificate in her name; such knowledge as she has in this respect has come to her solely through information given her by her attorney.

The averments as to plaintiff's residence in and absence from the United States are as follows: In January, 1914, plaintiff, then residing in Tokyo, married Shinsaku Nagano, then a permanent resident of the United States. Following the birth of a daughter, Masako, in Japan in November, 1914, plaintiff immigrated to the United States in January, 1915, as a permanent resident, leaving her daughter in the care of plaintiff's mother. In 1916, a son, Shigeo, was born to plaintiff and her husband in Chicago. In 1919, plaintiff, her son, and her husband went to Japan on a voyage, having for its purpose the husband's recuperation from a severe attack of influenza which he had sustained during an epidemic occurring that year. While they were in Japan, another daughter, Takako, was born. After completion of their visit, the father, mother and son returned to Chicago, leaving the two daughters in the care of their grandmother. Plaintiff then continued to reside in Chicago with her husband until 1924.

In 1924, the daughter Takako's illness necessitated a visit to Japan by plaintiff and her husband. On this occasion they decided that plaintiff should remain in Japan as long as necessary to provide a Japanese education for the two daughters and for the American-born son, the latter's oriental education being deemed necessary in order to prepare him to take his place in his father's importing business. The daughters remained in Japan largely because of lack of marriage prospects except among their own race; they finished their education and reached marriageable ages in 1932 and in 1937. In Japan such marriages are arranged for by the parents and a friend acting as intermediary, who is called a match-maker. The presence of the parent with the daughter is indispensable. Contrary to the hopes of the father and mother, the anticipated marriages could not be arranged because so many of the young men were away in the army. This was at a time when Japan was engaged in military activities in Manchukuo. Finally, in 1941, Takako's marriage was arranged, but Masako is still unmarried and is past the age ordinarily acceptable for marriage. The United States Immigration Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C.A. § 145 et seq., removed any right to bring the daughters to the United States during the years in which plaintiff was obliged to remain in Japan.

During all this period the husband remained physically present in and a permanent resident of the United States at Chicago. Plaintiff has at all times considered her home to be with her husband in Chicago, and has consistently retained her constant intention to return to her husband and her American residence at the earliest date possible. In the meantime, plaintiff's husband has visited her in Japan every year since her departure from the United States in the year 1924, save only for the years 1932 and 1933, during which she was in the United States, and save also for the war years, commencing in 1942. Plaintiff has at all times remained loyal to the United States and has not engaged in trade with Japan or participated in the Japanese war effort with Japan. During the war she was inactive and lived with her unmarried daughter in their cottage in Shizuoka. Her absence, because of these circumstances, she avers was only temporary and involuntary, occasioned by family obligations and not for the purpose of trading with Japan or for the purpose of residing in Japan.

In addition to the averments mentioned, the record contains an order of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, August 11, 1950, in which the Assistant Commissioner, Adjudications Division, held that there was ample evidence of record to support the conclusion reached by the Board of Special Inquiry and the American Consular Service that plaintiff was then returning to America from a temporary visit abroad; that she had never voluntarily relinquished her domicile in the United States and that she was entitled to enter this country "as a returning resident."

The District Court held as a matter of law that the facts averred were sufficient to bring her within the definition of an enemy contained in Section 2 of the Trading with the Enemy Act; that her long stay in Japan was such as to make of her a "resident within" the territory of an enemy nation, regardless of the possibility that her domicile remained at all times in the United States where her husband had his domicile. The court was of the opinion that the alleged family necessity relied on by plaintiff as justification for her long stay in Japan, was not sufficient to exempt her from the correct connotation of the word "enemy." Accordingly, it decided that a valid cause of action was not stated.

The court considered also Section 12 of the War Claims Act of 1948 (Public Law 896, 80th Congress, 2nd Sess.) which amended the Trading with the Enemy Act by adding thereto Section 39, which, defendant claims, prevents recovery by plaintiff because she is a national of Japan. However, it did not consider this section relevant to a case brought under Section 9(a) of the Act and held that the suit must fall, under the provisions of Section 9(a), because she was an enemy, but not because of the provisions of the new Section 39.

Upon appeal, plaintiff urges that the court erred in finding that, under the averments of the complaint, plaintiff is an enemy within the meaning of the Trading with the Enemy Act so that she may not maintain an action under Section 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, to recover her property vested by the Alien Property Custodian.

The Government contends that the court rightfully held that plaintiff was barred from bringing her action and renews its contention that, under Section 39, plaintiff is absolutely barred from maintaining any action as a citizen of Japan.

Section 2 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended, U.S.C.A. Title 50 Appendix, defines "enemy" as: "Any individual * * * of any nationality, resident within the territory * * * of any nation with which the United States is at war * * *." Section 7(c) provides for the seizure of enemy property belonging to or held for the benefit of an enemy, by the Alien Property Custodian; Section 9(a) that "Any person not an enemy * * * claiming any interest, * * * in any money or other property which...

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