Kalin v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange
Decision Date | 08 March 1982 |
Docket Number | Docket Nos. 54535,INTER-INSURANCE,54536 |
Citation | 112 Mich.App. 497,316 N.W.2d 467 |
Parties | , 35 A.L.R.4th 354 Roman C. KALIN and Patricia Kalin, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DETROIT AUTOMOBILEEXCHANGE, Defendant, and Michigan Mutual Liability Company, Defendant-Appellant. DETROIT AUTOMOBILEEXCHANGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Roman C. Kalin, Jr., Defendant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Franklin, Petrulis, Lichty & Mellon, P.C. by James T. Mellon and Steve J. Weiss, Troy, for Roman and Patricia Kalin.
Dickinson, Mourad, Brandt, Hanlon & Becker by Clair W. Hoehn, Detroit, for Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange.
Joselyn, Rowe, Jamieson, Grinnan, Callahan & Hayes, P.C. by Edward F. Mattingly and Ellen C. Glovinsky, Detroit, for Michigan Mut. Ins. Co.
Before MAHER, P. J., and WALSH and RILEY, JJ.
Plaintiffs Roman C. Kalin, Jr., and Patricia Kalin filed suit against defendants Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange (DAIIE) and Michigan Mutual Insurance Company (Michigan Mutual) seeking no-fault benefits for injuries sustained in an accident which occurred on March 31, 1978. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment against either defendant. The circuit court granted the motion against Michigan Mutual and ordered each defendant to pay half of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees. Michigan Mutual appeals as of right from the order granting summary judgment.
This case concerns the proper analysis, under the no-fault act, 1 of situations in which a parked vehicle and a moving vehicle are both involved in an accident. For the purpose of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated to the following facts:
Recently, in Gutierrez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 110 Mich.App. 126, 312 N.W.2d 181 (1981), this Court addressed a similar situation involving a parked vehicle and a moving vehicle. According to Gutierrez, where a claimant suffers accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a moving motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, the additional involvement of a parked vehicle is irrelevant to the issue of whether such a claimant is entitled to recover no-fault benefits. 2 Under this approach, analysis of an accident under the parked vehicle exclusion 3 is unnecessary unless there is no causal connection between the use, etc., of a moving vehicle and the injury. Clearly, the Legislature did not intend the parked vehicle exclusion to apply to accidents involving both a parked vehicle and a moving vehicle except where the involvement of the moving vehicle is merely incidental or fortuitous.
In order to recover no-fault benefits, a claimant must establish that he has suffered accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. M.C.L. § 500.3105; M.S.A. § 24.13105, Dowdy v. Motorland Ins. Co., 97 Mich.App. 242, 250-251, 293 N.W.2d 782 (1980), Shinabarger v. Citizens Mutual Ins. Co., 90 Mich.App. 307, 314-315, 282 N.W.2d 301 (1979), lv. den. 407 Mich. 895 (1979). Turning to the case at bar, we have no difficulty concluding that plaintiff's injuries arose out of the operation of a moving motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 4 Hence, under the analysis set forth in Part I, plaintiff is entitled to recover no-fault benefits; the involvement of a parked vehicle is irrelevant.
Since we have concluded that plaintiff is entitled to no-fault benefits, it is necessary to determine which defendant insurance company is responsible for those benefits. We turn first to M.C.L. § 500.3115(1); M.S.A. § 24.13115(1), which provides:
Section 3115 is inapplicable if plaintiff is deemed an "occupant" of his employer's vehicle. It is therefore necessary to review the relevant case law on the "occupancy" issue.
In Nickerson v. Citizens Mutual Ins. Co., 393 Mich. 324, 328-331, 224 N.W.2d 896 (1975), the Supreme Court interpreted the term "occupying", as used in an automobile insurance policy, to embrace situations in which a claimant was not in physical contact with a vehicle when injured. Nickerson involved an automobile insurance policy which provided coverage for injuries sustained by any "assured" while "occupying the insured automobile". The term "occupying" was defined in the policy as "in or upon or entering into or alighting from".
Plaintiff Nickerson, a passenger in an insured vehicle, helped to push the vehicle to the side of the road after it stalled. A passing motorist was flagged down to provide assistance, and Nickerson, who had returned to the vehicle, exited from his vehicle once again and walked around to the front of the car. At this point, a third vehicle struck the stalled vehicle from behind, pushing it into Nickerson, who sustained severe injuries.
The Court concluded that Nickerson had been "occupying" the vehicle at the time of the accident, for a number of reasons:
(3) "language in an insurance policy is to be strictly construed against the insurer"; 6 and
(4) "unquestionably '[Nickerson] was in contact with the automobile at the time of his injury'." (Citation omitted.) 7
Nickerson is distinguishable from the present case on several grounds. First of all, and most significantly, Nickerson involved interpretation of an insurance policy and not construction of a statute. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Nickerson, language in an insurance policy is to be strictly construed against the insurer. 8 The strong policy considerations which justify strict construction of insurance policies are absent in the case at bar in which this Court is confronted with the construction of a statutory priority provision. "It is axiomatic that words in a statute are to be interpreted according to their commonly accepted meanings * * *." (Citation omitted.) Production Credit Ass'n. of Lansing v. Dep't. of Treasury, 404 Mich. 301, 312, 273 N.W.2d 10 (1978).
Secondly, the insurance policy interpreted by the Nickerson Court defined the term "occupying" as "in or upon or entering into or alighting from". Nickerson was undoubtedly "upon" the insured car when he was injured; 9 thus he was clearly entitled to recover under the plain language of the policy. In contrast, the no-fault act contains no such definition of the term "occupant". Consequently, we must interpret the word "occupant" according to its commonly accepted meaning. Production Credit Ass'n of Lansing, supra.
Finally, we are not convinced that plaintiff was an "occupant" of his employer's vehicle even under the Nickerson standard. The Nickerson Court concluded that Nickerson was an "occupant" due to "(1) his immediate prior 'occupying' of the insured vehicle, and (2) his suffering of an injury arising out of the use or repair of the same automobile". 10 We do not believe that plaintiff's injuries were sustained "immediately" after occupying his employer's vehicle, as in Nickerson. Plaintiff had gone back and forth between the store and his truck twice and was on his third trip to the store when he was struck by a moving vehicle. In contrast, Nickerson was injured almost immediately after leaving the insured vehicle.
Several panels of this Court have addressed the "occupancy" issue under the no-fault act. Ottenwess v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 84 Mich.App. 292, 269 N.W.2d 570 (1978), rev'd. in part 408 Mich. 164, 289 N.W.2d 708 (1980), involved a claimant who was fatally injured while examining or attempting to repair a company dump truck. ...
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