Kalispell Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Trustees

• Decision Date: 28 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. DA 10–0348.,DA 10–0348.
• Parties: KALISPELL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA–MFT, and William Hartford, Petitioners and Appellees,v.BOARD OF TRUSTEES, KALISPELL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, Respondent/Counter Claimant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

361 Mont. 115

255 P.3d 199

191 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2681

269 Ed. Law Rep. 287

2011 MT 154

KALISPELL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA–MFT, and William Hartford, Petitioners and Appellees,

v.BOARD OF TRUSTEES, KALISPELL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, Respondent/Counter Claimant and Appellant.

No. DA 10–0348.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued April 15, 2011.Submitted April 26, 2011.Decided June 28, 2011.

For Appellant: Jeffrey M. Hindoien (argued); Kaleva Law Offices; Helena, Montana.For Appellees: Karl J. Englund (argued); Karl J. Englund, P.C.; Missoula, Montana.Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[361 Mont. 115] ¶ 1 The Board of Trustees (Board) for Kalispell High School District No. 5 (District), appeals the order entered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, compelling arbitration of a grievance filed by William Hartford (Hartford). Hartford's grievance alleges his employment as a teacher was terminated “without just cause” in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. We affirm.

¶ 2 Did the District Court err by compelling arbitration of Hartford's grievance under the collective bargaining agreement?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Hartford was a high school science teacher. Hartford's employment with the District began in the 1999–2000 school year and continued through the 2007–2008 school year. He was tenured. On May 29, 2008, Hartford and the Board entered into a written contract governing Hartford's employment for the 2008–2009 school year (the Teacher's Contract). At that time, Hartford was properly certified as a teacher. He held a teaching certificate valid from July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2008. Paragraph 3 of the Teacher's Contract provides: “It is understood that the Teacher either holds a valid teaching certificate under the laws of Montana or will have obtained such certificate before October 1 of the year this contract is executed, otherwise, this contract is voidable at the option of the District.”

¶ 4 In effect for school years 2007–2009 was a collective bargaining agreement, entitled “Comprehensive Agreement” (CBA), which was entered into between Kalispell School District No. 5 and the Kalispell Education Association (KEA), an affiliate of MEA–MFT. Article 1.1 of the CBA states the agreement is entered into “pursuant to and in compliance with the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Law Title 39, Chapter 31, Revised Codes of Montana, as amended ... to provide the conditions of employment for teachers during the duration of this Agreement with respect to wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment.” Article 2.1 states “the District recognized the Kalispell Education Association as the Exclusive Representative of the appropriate unit.” Article 2.2 states:

Appropriate Unit: The Association shall represent members of the appropriate unit which shall consist of all teachers and long-term substitute teachers of the District who are certificated in Class I, II, IV, or V as in Section 20–4–106, specialists requiring a license under the laws of the State of Montana, and whose positions call for or require such certification....

Article 5 of the CBA is entitled Teacher and Exclusive Representative Rights, and Article 5.6 provides “[n]o teacher shall be disciplined, reprimanded, reduced in rank or compensation, discharged, or deprived of any professional advantage without just cause.” ¹ Article 13, as required by § 39–31–306(5), MCA,² CONTAINS A GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE THAT CULMINATES IN FINAL AND BINDING arbitration of unresolved grievances. A grievance must be submitted in writing to a designee of the District under Article 13.6, and if not first resolved through informal discussion, may be appealed through various levels to the Superintendent of Schools and then the Board of Trustees. CBA, Arts. 13.7.1 through 13.7.3. “In the event that the parties are unable to resolve a grievance, it may be submitted to arbitration as defined herein,” under Article 13.8.1.

¶ 5 On June 30, 2008, Hartford's Montana teaching certificate expired by his inadvertence in failing to renew it. Because no party was aware of the expiration, Hartford began teaching in the fall of 2008 as usual. At some point prior to November 4, 2008, the county superintendent notified the District that Hartford's teaching certificate had expired. The District's superintendent notified Hartford of the expiration of his certification and informed him he was no longer eligible to receive compensation under his Teacher's Contract, pursuant to § 20–4–202, MCA. Hartford continued to teach at the District as a non-certified substitute teacher, and the Board took no further action on Hartford's Teacher's Contract. On December 11, 2008, the high school principal terminated Hartford's employment. Seven days later, Hartford obtained a new teaching certificate, with a validation date of July 1, 2008, and effective until June 30, 2011.

¶ 6 In January 2009 Hartford sought to file a grievance, alleging that he had been terminated “without just cause” in violation of Article 5.6 of the CBA. The District superintendent, and later the Board, denied Hartford's request to grieve the issue, claiming the matter did not constitute a valid grievance under the CBA on grounds that Hartford was not a member of the bargaining unit at any point during his employment in the fall of 2008, he was not a “teacher” as defined under Montana law during his employment in the fall of 2008, and he had not validated his employment status as a “teacher” in the fall of 2008 as required by § 20–4–202, MCA. Hartford and the KEA attempted to advance the grievance process to arbitration pursuant to Article 13.8 of the CBA, but the District refused to participate.

¶ 7 In August 2009 Hartford and the KEA filed a petition to compel arbitration in the District Court. The District opposed the petition and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, followed by a motion for summary judgment, requesting a determination that § 20–4–201, MCA, prohibits a Montana school district from entering into or maintaining an employment contract with an individual as a teacher when the individual does not possess a valid Montana teaching certificate, and that therefore the Teacher's Contract became void as a matter of law the moment Hartford ceased to possess his teaching certificate. Hartford and the KEA also sought summary judgment.

¶ 8 The District Court entered an order granting Hartford and the KEA's motion and denying the same for the District, reasoning “[t]he School District's arguments that once Mr. Hartford's certification expired all previously applicable contracts and rights evaporated is not supported by statute and case law. His employment contract continued without interruption as it had not been voided by the Trustees.” The court reasoned the Teacher's Contract and the CBA “were both subject to law which include provisions for those situations where a teacher, qualified by education and training, did not have a current registered certificate.” The court stated that “[i]ronically” Hartford had obtained a new certificate seven days after dismissal that was retroactive to July 1, 2008, “thereby vitiating the District's arguments that he was excluded from the collective bargaining agreement.” The District Court concluded “the dispute falls under the umbrella of the Comprehensive Agreement,” and ordered the matter submitted to arbitration as provided in the CBA. The District appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Edwards v. Cascade Co. Sheriff's Dept., 2009 MT 451, ¶ 38, 354 Mont. 307, 223 P.3d 893. When no dispute exists as to the material facts, we review whether the court correctly applied the law. Edwards, ¶ 38. We review a district court's conclusions of law regarding arbitrability to determine whether they are correct. Missoula Co. High Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Trustees, 259 Mont. 438, 440, 857 P.2d 696, 697 (1993); see also Higgins Dev. Partners, LLC v. Skanska U.S.A. Bldg., Inc., 2009 MT 287, ¶ 12, 352 Mont. 243, 216 P.3d 199 (citing Ratchye v. Lucas, 1998 MT 87,¶ 14, 288 Mont. 345, 957 P.2d 1128).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Did the District Court err by compelling arbitration of Hartford's grievance under the collective bargaining agreement?

¶ 11 The Uniform Arbitration Act (the Act) is generally applicable to labor agreements. Section 27–5–113, MCA; Missoula Co., 259 Mont. at 441, 857 P.2d at 698. Section 27–5–115, MCA, of the Act states, in pertinent part:

Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration. (1) On the application of a party showing an agreement described in 27–5–114 and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the district court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration; but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of that issue raised and shall order arbitration if it finds for the applying party or deny the application if it finds for the opposing party.

...

(5) An order for arbitration may not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or good faith or because no fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have been shown.

“It is essential to keep in mind ... that arbitration is a matter of contract....” Greater Missoula Area Fedn. of Early Childhood Educators v. Child Start, Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 25, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881 (citing Solle v. Western States Ins. Agency, 2000 MT 96, ¶ 22, 299 Mont. 237, 999 P.2d 328). When a court is asked to compel arbitration of a dispute, “the threshold inquiry is whether ...