Kalman v. Cortes
Decision Date | 30 June 2010 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-684. |
Citation | 723 F.Supp.2d 766 |
Parties | George KALMAN v. Pedro A. CORTES, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Mary Catherine Roper, ACLU of PA, Thomas H. Lee, II, Dechert Price Rhoads, Matthew Bleich, Conrad O'Brien, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Barry N. Kramer, PA Office of Attorney General, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Blasphemy, which is generally defined as the act of insulting or showing contempt or a lack of reverence for God or something considered sacred, is a religious concept which has existed for thousands of years. As an example, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, blasphemy appears in the Bible in Leviticus 24, where the unnamed son of an Israelite mother and Egyptian father who blasphemed the Lord was brought before Moses, and whose punishment was stoning and death. Other books of the Bible describe the ruthless Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar, as a serial blasphemer. Continuing as a religious concept in music and literature, the very same Nebuchadnezzar, with the Italian name “Nabucco” in Verdi's opera, not only denounces God, but declares himself a deity. See Theodore L. Gentry, Nabucco 1842, in Encyclopedia of the Romantic Era, 1760-1850 781, 781 (Christopher John Murray ed., 2003) () . Decades later, the Nobel Prize-winning Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw irreverently wrote: “All great truths begin as blasphemies.” Annajanska, The Bolshevik Express (1918).
In the present case, Plaintiff George Kalman commenced this action challenging the constitutionality of Section 1303(c)(2)(ii) of Title 15 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (the “Blasphemy Statute”), which prohibits corporate names containing “[w]ords that constitute blasphemy, profane cursing or swearing or that profane the Lord's name.” Plaintiff asserts that the Blasphemy Statute violates the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff, who sought to name his film company “I Choose Hell Productions LLC,” challenges the statute both on its face and as applied, seeking a declaratory judgment that it violates his constitutional rights, a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from enforcing it against Plaintiff or anyone else, and an award of actual damages and attorney's fees. Presently before the Court are the parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, and no material facts are disputed by the parties. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion will be granted, and Defendant's motion will be denied.
On February 18, 2009, Plaintiff Kalman filed his Complaint (Doc. No. 1) against Defendant Pedro A. Cortes, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in his official capacity, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Blasphemy Statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Blasphemy Statute, and an award of actual damages and attorney's fees. 1 On April 16, 2009, Defendant Cortes filed a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue (Doc. No. 4), to which Plaintiff responded on May 13, 2009 (Doc. No. 6). On July 23, 2009, the Court held Oral Argument on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and on July 28, 2009, issued an Opinion and Order denying the motion. ( Kalman v. Cortes, 646 F.Supp.2d 738 (E.D.Pa.2009) (Baylson, J.).) On August 10, 2009, Defendant Cortes filed his Answer (Doc. No. 13) to Plaintiff's Complaint. The parties then engaged in and completed extensive discovery.
On December 21, 2009, both parties filed Cross Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 17, 21). On December 24, 2009, an amici curiae brief was filed in support of Plaintiff by the Jewish Social Policy Action Network, the Unitarian Universalist Association, the Rev. Larry W. Smith, and the Rev. Nathan Walker (Doc. No. 23.) Regarding Plaintiff's summary judgment motion (Doc. No. 21), Defendant Cortes responded on January 19, 2010 (Doc. No. 25), and Plaintiff replied on February 8, 2010 (Doc. No. 30). Regarding Defendant's summary judgment motion (Doc. No. 17), Plaintiff responded on January 19, 2010 (Doc. No. 26), and Defendant replied on February 8, 2010 (Doc. No. 29). Oral Argument was held on the cross motions for summary judgment on April 1, 2010. Having been fully briefed and argued, the motions are now ripe for disposition.
B. Parties' Contentions
Plaintiff Kalman argues that the Blasphemy Statute is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and asks the Court to permanently enjoin both Defendant and Pennsylvania's Department of State from enforcing it. Plaintiff argues that the Blasphemy Statute violates the Establishment Clause because it has a non-secular purpose, its principal or primary effect advances religion, and it fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion. Plaintiff also argues that the Blasphemy Statute violates the Free Speech Clause because it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and is unconstitutionally vague.
Defendant Cortes argues that the Blasphemy Statute does not violate the Establishment Clause because its purpose and effect is to protect the public from offensive, indecent, and profane expression, and because there is no excessive government entanglement with religion. Defendant also argues that the Blasphemy Statute is constitutional because it is appropriately tailored to serve the legitimate end of regulating commercial speech. In the alternative, Defendant argues that the Blasphemy Statute is constitutional under the Free Speech Clause because it governs speech in a non-public forum and is both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, because it addresses unprotected classes of speech, namely, obscenity and profanity, and because it is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This same standard applies when there are cross motions for summary judgment. See Princeton Ins. Co. v. Converium Reinsurance (N. Am.) Inc., 344 Fed.Appx. 759, 761 (3d Cir.2009); see also Se. Pa. Transit...
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