Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prod.S Co., 2008-0857.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Citation: 125 Ohio St.3d 250,2010 Ohio 1027,927 N.E.2d 1066
• Docket Number: No. 2008-0857.,2008-0857.
• Parties: KAMINSKI, Appellee,v.METAL & WIRE PRODUCTS COMPANY, Appellant, et al.
• Decision Date: 23 March 2010

125 Ohio St.3d 250
927 N.E.2d 1066
2010 Ohio 1027

KAMINSKI, Appellee,
v.
METAL & WIRE PRODUCTS COMPANY, Appellant, et al.

No. 2008-0857.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Feb. 18, 2009.
Decided March 23, 2010.

927 N.E.2d 1067

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

927 N.E.2d 1068

Syllabus of the Court

R.C. 2745.01 does not violate Section 34 or 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. ( Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107, limited.)

Jeffries, Kube, Forrest & Monteleone Co., L.P.A., David A. Forrest, Jarret J. Northup, and Bradford D. Zelasko, Cleveland; and Dennis A. DiMartino, Newton Falls, for appellee.

Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Irene C. Keyse-Walker, and Benjamin C. Sassé, Cleveland, for appellant.

Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, and Marc J. Jaffy, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO.

Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, Cleveland, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.

927 N.E.2d 1069

Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., Theodore A. Bowman, and Russell Gerney, Toledo, urging affirmance for amicus curiae UFCW Local 911 and AFSCME Local 2415.

Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Todd A. Nist, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio.

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Carolyn A. Taggart, Cincinnati, and J.H. Huebert, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.

Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey; Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor; and Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Thomas R. Sant, Columbus, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Self-Insurers Association, Ohio Chapter of National Federation of Independent Business, and Ohio Manufacturers Association.

White, Getgey & Meyer Co., L.P.A., David P. Kamp, and Carl J. Stich Jr., Cincinnati, supporting neither side for amicus curiae Amantea Nonwovens, L.L.C.

CUPP, J.

{¶ 1} This appeal and a companion case, Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01, an employer intentional-tort statute enacted by Am.H.B. No. 498, effective April 7, 2005. 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5533. For the reasons that follow, we hold that R.C. 2745.01 violates neither the plain language nor the plain meaning of Sections 34 or 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. We find the construction of Sections 34 and 35 set forth in Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107, to be inconsistent with other decisions of this court, including decisions subsequent to Johnson. Moreover, the provisions of the statute we review herein are significantly different from those of the statute reviewed in Johnson. Therefore, while we do not specifically overrule the decision in that case, we limit its reach to apply only to the statutory provisions that were then at issue. Because the judgment of the court of appeals in the case sub judice was based on Johnson's flawed interpretations of Sections 34 and 35, we must reverse.

{¶ 2} In Stetter, 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, also decided this day, we uphold the constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01 in the face of challenges on other grounds. The net result of these two decisions is to confirm the constitutional validity of R.C. 2745.01. We therefore apply the statute to this case and consider the record in light of the statutory standards for an employer intentional tort. We agree with the trial court that summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted as a matter of law pursuant to R.C. 2745.01. Accordingly, we reinstate the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} On June 30, 2005, plaintiff-appellee, Rose Kaminski, was working as a press operator at the Salem, Ohio metal fabrication manufacturing facility of defendant-appellant, Metal & Wire Products Company (“Metal & Wire”). The automatic press that Kaminski operated used a coil of rolled steel fed into the press to produce stamped, flat pieces. In operating the press, Kaminski's job was to ensure that the coil feed ran smoothly, shut the press down if it jammed, and verify that the stamped pieces met required specifications. When the coil of steel was used up,

927 N.E.2d 1070

she would summon a supervisor, who would load a new coil into place with a forklift.

{¶ 4} When Kaminski's press ran out of steel on June 30, she searched for her shift's supervisor to load another coil, but she was unable to find him. Kaminski enlisted a co-worker who had loaded coils in the past to load the new coil. The co-worker used the right fork of a forklift to lift a coil, which was about five feet tall and weighed about 800 pounds.

{¶ 5} To properly load the coil onto Kaminski's press, the coil had to be switched from the right fork to the left fork. To accomplish the switch, the co-worker had to lower the coil to the floor, back the forklift away from it, and then pull forward again with the left fork positioned to pick up the coil.

{¶ 6} When the coil is off the fork, it can become unsteady. The co-worker was at first reluctant to have Kaminski, a small woman who was about the same height as the coil, steady the coil in an upright position while he backed away from it and repositioned. However, the two eventually agreed that Kaminski would hold the coil because the supervisor was not there and because the co-worker believed that Kaminski wanted to do it.

{¶ 7} With Kaminski steadying the coil, the co-worker backed the forklift away and then pulled forward. Rather than going cleanly into the coil's opening, the fork bumped the coil. Kaminski was unable to control the coil. It wobbled and then fell onto Kaminski's legs and feet, injuring her.

{¶ 8} Kaminski applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for her injuries. She was unable to return to work at Metal & Wire as a press operator due to the injuries. After receiving paychecks until March 2006, she was eventually discharged from employment because no other position was available. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Kaminski's workers' compensation benefits were ever terminated.

{¶ 9} About two months after the incident, on August 29, 2005, Kaminski filed a lawsuit in which she alleged that Metal & Wire had committed an employer intentional tort under R.C. 2745.01. Additionally, Kaminski specifically asserted that R.C. 2745.01 “in its entirety is unconstitutional” under this court's precedent, and she alleged that Metal & Wire had committed a common-law employer intentional tort. Metal & Wire answered and asserted a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that R.C. 2745.01 is constitutional.

{¶ 10} Metal & Wire moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim. The trial court granted the motion, declaring the statute constitutional and holding that it therefore applied to Kaminski's claim. Metal & Wire then moved for summary judgment on Kaminski's complaint. The trial court granted that motion, determining that Kaminski had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Metal & Wire's conduct fell within the statutory criteria necessary to commit an employer intentional tort.

{¶ 11} On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals agreed with Kaminski's first assignment of error and held that R.C. 2745.01 is unconstitutional in its entirety. It based its decision upon decisions of this court interpreting prior employer intentional-tort statutes. 175 Ohio App.3d 227, 2008-Ohio-1521, 886 N.E.2d 262, ¶ 34. The court of appeals declined to consider Kaminski's further arguments that the statute is unconstitutional on new grounds never before addressed, reasoning that “[b]ecause R.C. 2745.01 is unconstitutional based on Sections 34 and 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution” pursuant to those

927 N.E.2d 1071

decisions, “further analysis here is unnecessary.” Id. at ¶ 38.

{¶ 12} The trial court had considered Kaminski's claims only under the employer intentional-tort statute. However, the court of appeals proceeded to consider at length whether her claims met the criteria for a common-law employer intentional tort. It held that Kaminski had presented sufficient evidence under the common-law test to survive summary judgment, and it remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 46-85.

{¶ 13} We accepted Metal & Wire's discretionary appeal for review of three propositions of law.¹ 119 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2008-Ohio-3880, 891 N.E.2d 768. The first proposition urges us to overrule the precedent relied upon by the court of appeals in holding R.C. 2745.01 unconstitutional. The second proposition asserts that R.C. 2745.01 does not violate Sections 34 and 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The third proposition asserts that the court of appeals should have remanded the cause to the trial court upon its holding that the statute is unconstitutional, rather than itself considering whether the facts constituted a common-law employer intentional tort.

II. History and Development of Employer Intentional-Tort Law in Ohio

{¶ 14} Any analysis of the development of Ohio's case law regarding employer intentional torts necessarily centers on Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. That section provides:

{¶ 15} “For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment, laws may be passed establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory contribution thereto by employers, and administered by the state, determining the terms and conditions upon which payment shall be made therefrom. Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation,...