Kaminski v. N.J. Dep't of Military & Veterans Affairs
| Decision Date | 13 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 18-1424 (KM) (MAH) |
| Parties | TANYA KAMINSKI, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFFAIRS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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Plaintiff Tanya Kaminski ("Kaminski") brings suit against three groups of defendants:
Her Complaint asserts nine causes of action, including a claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") against all defendants. The State Defendantsremoved this action from state court, citing this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Now before the Court are Kaminski's motion to remand the action to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, and for reimbursement of just costs and fees, as well as separate motions of the State Defendants, the CWA Defendants, and the Individuals to dismiss this removed action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons stated below, I will deny Kaminski's motion to remand. I will partially grant the motions of the State Defendants, CWA Defendants, and Individuals to dismiss the complaint. Finally, I will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Kaminski's remaining state law claims.
On November 22, 2017, Kaminski filed a civil complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County against the State Defendants, CWA Defendants, and Individuals. It alleges as follows:
The plaintiff, Tanya Kaminski, was employed by the DMVA and the Youth Challenge Academy ("Academy") as a teacher. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2). The Academy is a school located in Fort Dix, New Jersey, which is operated by the DMVA. (Id. at ¶ 2). Kaminski worked at the Academy for eight years until she was terminated. (Id. at ¶ 1).
On October 28, 2015, Kaminski "learned that she was pregnant and reported it to her employer at the Academy." (Id. at ¶ 15). According toKaminski, upon learning of her pregnancy, the "Defendants . . . with discriminatory intent, embarked upon a plan to deprive [Kaminski] of her rights and to terminate her employment in violation of her rights" to employment and maternity leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19). Part of that plan, says Kaminski, included "Defendants using their positions of power to influence students to file false complaints as a ploy and pretext to unlawfully terminate" her. (Id. at ¶ 19). She alleges that Defendants urged students to complain about her in writing, "reviewed and edited their writings" (id. at ¶ 20), and "met with students on multiple occasions to make sure that their statements met with their narrative" (id. at ¶ 22).
Kaminski was a member of CWA International Union, specifically CWA Local 1038. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with DMVA, (id. at ¶ 3), she filed a grievance in connection with her termination. The union represented Kaminksi against the DMVA during the grievance and arbitration process. (Id. at ¶ 3-5). Kaminski alleges that at her arbitration proceeding, the CWA Defendants "failed to advance the argument that the purpose of the termination was to deprive [Kaminski] of her rights, allowing improper matters to be considered, failing to call material witnesses, and did not adequately and fairly represent [Kaminski] during the proceedings." (Id. at ¶ 23).
That Complaint asserts nine claims, only one of which (the Fifth) invokes federal law:
(Compl. ¶¶ 29-81 (emphasis added)).4
The Complaint seeks the entry of an Order declaring the opinion and award of the arbitrator vacated, damages for lost front and back pay, punitivedamages, damages for pain and suffering, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and "[s]uch other relief as this Court may deem equitable and just."
On January 2, 2018, a copy of the Complaint and Summons was served upon the State Defendants. (Notice of Removal ¶ 3) (citing Exhs. B, C, and D). On February 1, 2018, the State Defendants filed a Notice of Removal based on this court's federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim. (Id. at ¶ 2 ). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The CWA Defendants consented to the removal of the action. (Id. at ¶ 6).5
One week later, on February 8, 2018, the State Defendants and the CWA Defendants filed separate motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 2, 3). On March 2, 2018, Kaminski filed her opposition to the defendants' motions to dismiss, (ECF No. 6), slightly out of time. 6 On March 5, 2018, the CWA Defendants filed a reply to Kaminski's opposition to its motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 8), which is now fullybriefed and ripe for decision. On April 2, 2018, Defendants Ragucci, Hayes and Knight joined the State Defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 13).
Meanwhile, on February 27, 2018, Kaminski filed a motion to remand the case to state court and award just costs and fees incurred as a result of the improper removal. (ECF No. 4). The Complaint, she says, must be remanded because the Eleventh Amendment bars this court from hearing claims against the State, (id. at 2-5); because the State is not a "person" amendable to suit under § 1983, (id. at 8); and because this Court should abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (id. at 6-7). The State Defendants and CWA Defendants oppose Kaminski's motion to remand. (ECF Nos. 9, 10).
Because the motion to remand implicates this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, I will address it first.
Defendants removed this case pursuant to the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. "[T]he party asserting federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of showing, at all stages of the litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court." Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007). Removal is strictly construed and doubts are resolved in favor of remand. See Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil action from the state court if the case could have been brought originally in federal court.
A district court has original jurisdiction through one of two means: diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which is not applicable here, or federal-question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Id.
Here, the State Defendants filed their Notice of Removal based on this court's federal-question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal ¶ 2). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Specifically, the State Defendants maintain that this Court has federal question jurisdiction because Kaminski has asserted claims under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"). (Notice of Removal ¶ 2). Kaminski, however, argues that this case must be remanded to state court "on the basis of no federal jurisdiction." (ECF No. 4-1, Pl. Br. 2).
On its face, the Complaint pleads that the defendants violated Kaminski's constitutional rights by depriving her of her alleged "rights to employment and maternity leave and in violation of her rights with discriminatory intent." (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19). Count Five, which may be read as a two-part § 1983 claim, asserts that (1) the Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Kaminski of said constitutional rights, and (2) the Defendants engaged in this deprivation together, as a conspiracy. (Id.). A § 1983 claim, of course, presents a federal question. Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 897 (3d Cir. 1987); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004); Manor Investments, Ltd. v. Pharmacy Operations, Inc., No. CIV.A. 09-1178, 2010 WL 9912483, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2010).
Count Five, although it is the only federal-law count in the Complaint, presents a sufficient basis for original jurisdiction, and therefore for removal.
The Eleventh Amendment incorporates a general principle of sovereign immunity which bars citizens from bringing suits for damages against any state in federal court.7 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.89, 100-101 (1984); Kelley v. Edison Twp., No. 03-4817, 2006 WL 1084217, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2006) (citing Bennett v. City of Atl. City, 288 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (D.N.J. 2003)). Kaminski argues that the case must be remanded because, under...
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