Kamuck v. Shell Energy Holdings GP, LLC., Civil No. 4:11-CV-1425
| Decision Date | 25 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 4:11-CV-1425 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | EDWARD KAMUCK, Plaintiff, v. SHELL ENERGY HOLDINGS GP, LLC., SHELL ENERGY HOLDINGS LP, LLC, and SWEPI, LP (d/b/a SHELL WESTERN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION, LP) Defendants. |
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
In its current posture this case presents an unusual circumstance. The plaintiff who has brought this action, Edward Kamuck, has becomes estranged from his counsel, who has withdrawn from the case. Kamuck, who has for the past two years been proceeding pro se has also essentially boycotted his own litigation, failing to comply with discovery demands, discounting court orders, declining to litigate the claims which he has brought and generally "playing possum" when litigation demands are thrust upon him. Fattah v. Beard, 214 F. App'x 230, 233 (3d Cir. 2007). Insteadof fulfilling his responsibilities as a litigant Kamuck has, sadly, simply insisted that the defendants should settle this case on terms that he deems favorable.
This dilatory behavior has now persisted for two years despite repeated and explicit warnings from this Court that the failure to actively, and properly, litigate this matter may result in the dismissal of this case. Moreover, the dispositive summary judgment motion filed by the defendants, which has never been fully and adequately addressed by Kamuck, exposes the legal and factual bankruptcy of Kamuck's claims. In this setting where the plaintiff has, in effect, abandoned his own litigation by failing over the past two years to abide by court orders, comply with discovery, and adequately respond to dispositive motions, and the plaintiff's claims now fail on their merits, we are now compelled to conclude that dismissal of this matter is warranted.
On August 3, 2011, the plaintiff, Edward Kamuck, acting through counsel filed this civil complaint. (Doc. 1.) The well-pleaded facts set forth in the plaintiff's initial counseled complaint recited that Kamuck was a totally disabled Vietnam War veteran. (Doc. 1, ¶1.) In December of 2009, Kamuck purchased a 93 acre tract of land in rural Tioga County. (Id., ¶17.) This tract of land was part of a larger property formerly known as the Copp property. (Id., ¶8.) The Copp Property was a 323 acre property in Tioga County, which was subject to the Copp Lease, an Oil and Gas Lease, a leasewhich permitted removal of mineral resources, contained a ten-year primary term and, if certain mineral extraction activities were initiated during that primary term, provided the Lessee with a fee simple determinable. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-10.) The Copp Lease also provided the Lessee with a right to unitize the Copp Lease with other leases for production from the Onondaga, Oriskany, or deeper formations. (Id. at ¶ 13.) The rights conferred by the original Copp Lease, however, did not reach, or speak to, extraction of natural gas from Marcellus Shale formations. When the Copp Property was later subdivided into 5 properties, including the land purchased by the plaintiff, each property owner took the property subject to mineral rights conferred by the Copp Lease. ( Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18.)
By 2010, the defendants were lessees under the Copp Lease, and sought to expand their mineral rights to include extraction of natural gas from Marcellus Shale formations. Towards that goal, the defendants approached each of the owners of a property subdivided from the original Copp Property and asked these property owners to execute an Amendment and Ratification ("Amendment") to the Copp Lease, authorizing the extraction of these Marcellus Shale resources on the property owner's land, subject to a unitizing agreement. (Id., Exhibit 8.) All of the property owners who held lands formerly encompassed by the Copp Lease signed the Amendment to the Copp Lease with one exception-the plaintiff, Edward Kamuck. Accordingly, those adjoining properties are subject to the Copp Lease, as amended, and thedefendants have commenced drilling and extraction of natural gas from these properties under the terms of the amended Copp Lease. Because Kamuck refused to enter into the Amended Copp Lease, the original 10-year lease on his property expired by its own terms on June 12, 2011.
The defendants then began natural gas extraction from the Marcellus Shale deposits found beneath the properties of adjoining land owners who had signed the Copp Lease addendums, using a technique called "fracking"1, in which wells are drilled and shale deposits are fractured by pumping chemicals known as "fracking fluid" into the wells, thus releasing the natural gas trapped within the shale deposits.
After defendants commenced Marcellus Shale extraction and production on these adjoining properties, on August 3, 2011, Kamuck filed this civil complaint. (Doc. 1.) In his complaint, Kamuck alleged that the activities of the defendants, who are using "fracking" technology to extract natural gas from Marcellus Shale on these adjoining properties, was conducted in a manner that was harmful both to the plaintiff and his property. Kamuck's initial, counseled complaint then brought ten separate claims, sounding both in contract and in tort. Thus, Kamuck brought a claim against the defendants for breach of contract under the Copp Lease, (Id., Count 1); for breachof a duty of good faith and fair dealing (Id., Count 2); declaratory judgment counts seeking declarations interpreting and invalidating aspects of the Copp Lease and amendments, (Id., Counts 3,4 and 5); a claim for anticipatory trespass, (Id., Count 6); a count alleging that the defendants' activities constitute a private nuisance, (Id., Count 8); a count alleging negligence by the defendants in their Marcellus Shale drilling operations, (Id., Count 9); and a count asserting strict liability based upon the theory that natural gas extraction through "fracking" is an ultra hazardous activity, (Id., Count 10).
The defendants moved to dismiss this complaint in its entirety, alleging that none of Kamuck's tort or contract claims state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc.11.) In addition, the defendants filed a motion to strike a series of averments from the complaint relating to punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and claims for emotional distress. (Doc. 13.) Following briefing of these issues, in April of 2012, the motion to dismiss was granted with respect to the plaintiff's contract-based claims, as well as the plaintiff's anticipatory trespass claim, negligence per se claim, and gross negligence claim, but denied with respect to Kamuck's negligence,strict liability and nuisance claims, the sole surviving claims in this lawsuit. (Doc. 39.) Upon the consent of the parties, this matter was then reassigned to the undersigned for trial. (Doc. 40.)
What then followed was the slow disintegration of Kamuck's case. While we initially set discovery and pretrial schedules for this case which would have completed discovery in 2012, those efforts were hobbled by an increasingly dysfunctional relationship between the plaintiff and his attorney. By January of 2013, this relationship was irretrievably broken, with the plaintiff refusing to speak with his own counsel or even look at counsel during the course of a mediation conducted by the Court on January 25, 2013. (Doc. 66.) Presented with Mr. Kamuck's increasingly erratic conduct and stubborn refusal to co-operate or communicate with his own counsel, we granted plaintiff's counsel leave to withdraw and directed Mr. Kamuck to report to us by April 22, 2013, regarding his efforts to obtain new counsel. (Doc. 67.)
We then, sadly, began receiving communications from Mr. Kamuck which suggested that his expectations for this litigation were wholly divorced from reality. Specifically, Mr. Kamuck adopted a posture that would repeat itself throughout this litigation, a posture in which he reported that he was unable to retain counsel, suggested that he was unwilling or unable to conduct discovery, and failed to meet litigation deadlines, but persisted in requesting that we schedule further mediation efforts on his behalf, efforts that were unavailing given the plaintiff's unwillingness to compromise his position. (Docs. 68 and 70.)
Mr. Kamuck's approach to this litigation, which entailed neither advancing nor retreating, soon began to effect the scheduling of this case to the profound prejudice of the defendants. Thus, we were compelled to extend the deadline for preparation of a case management schedule in May 2013 due to delays on Mr. Kamuck's part in participating in this process, something he was required to do. (Docs. 72 and 74.) Despite providing Mr. Kamuck with an extension of time in which to participate in the formulation of a case management plan, when the extended deadline for submission of this plan arrived, Mr. Kamuck once again declined to participate in this process, and the defendants were compelled to unilaterally submit a proposed case management plan. (Doc. 75.)
In May 31, 2013, we conducted a case management conference with Mr. Kamuck and defense counsel. (Doc. 91, ¶¶53 and 54.) In order to eliminate any prejudice to Mr. Kamuck, at that time we directed the defense to provide the plaintiff with a complete set of the discovery materials previously given to Kamuck's former counsel, and the defense complied with this direction. (Id.) We also stressed to Mr. Kamuck the importance of his compliance with all discovery and litigation obligations, even if he proceeded pro se and while he was continuing his search for new counsel. (Id.) On June 11, 2013, we then set a case management schedule which called for completion of discovery , including expert discovery, by October 28, 2013.(Doc. 77.) We also instructed Mr. Kamuck, who was now proceeding pro se, on his responsibilities as a litigant to comply with court orders.
What followed then were several months of apparent indifference and...
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