Kan. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. State

• Decision Date: 20 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 114,135,114,135
• Citation: 387 P.3d 795
• Parties: Kansas National Education Association, Appellant, v. State of Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

387 P.3d 795

Kansas National Education Association, Appellant,

v.State of Kansas, Appellee.

No. 114,135

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed January 20, 2017

Jason Walta, of National Education Association, of Washington, DC, argued the cause, and Kristen Hollar and Lubna Alam, of the same agency, and David M. Schauner, of Kansas National Education Association, of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for appellant.

Stephen R. McAllister, solicitor general, argued the cause, and Jeffrey A. Chanay, chief deputy attorney general, M.J. Willoughby, assistant attorney general, Cheryl L. Whelan, assistant attorney general, Dwight R. Carswell, assistant solicitor general, Bryan C. Clark, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Biles, J.:

The Kansas Constitution straightforwardly limits legislative authority by providing that "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject, except appropriation bills and bills for revision or codification of statutes." See Kan. Const. art. 2, § 16. Known as the one-subject rule, this prohibition has existed since statehood to prevent a form of legislative mischief called "logrolling" in which unrelated matters that might not have enough support on their own are combined to entice the necessary votes to secure passage of the whole. See Philpin v. McCarty, Supt., 24 Kan. 393, 402 (1880) ("Ofttimes a matter of merit and commanding general confidence was yoked to something unworthy, and by this union the latter was carried through on the strength of the former."). In this case, we must decide whether 2014 Senate Substitute for House Bill No. 2506, entitled "[an act] concerning education," violates the one-subject rule.

H.B. 2506 was quickly enacted in response to this court's decision declaring portions of the state's public school finance laws unconstitutional. See Gannon v. State , 298 Kan. 1107, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (holding State failed to equitably fund public education). H.B. 2506 had a sweeping scope. It cancelled prior appropriations to several varied state agencies, appropriated more than $130,000,000 in general state aid and supplemental state aid to the Department of Education for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, and gave smaller sums to state universities. L. 2014, ch. 93, secs. 6–7. It also made substantive and technical changes to the state's public school financing statutes. See L. 2014, ch. 93, secs. 35–44, 46–47.

Of particular concern in this appeal, the bill amended the Teacher Due Process Act, K.S.A. 72–5436 et seq ., to remove many elementary and secondary public school teachers from long-standing statutory protections regarding the termination or nonrenewal of their annual employment contracts. See L. 2014, ch. 93, secs. 50, 53. The Kansas National Education Association, a statewide organization of teachers, claims its members have been injured by those revisions and seeks to remedy the injury by attacking the legislation's validity under the one-subject rule. KNEA argues H.B. 2506 violates Article 2, § 16 because it contains both appropriations and substantive general legislation.

We hold that KNEA made allegations sufficient to support its standing to bring this lawsuit and that its claim is ripe. On the merits, we hold that Article 2, § 16 does not forbid combining appropriations and general legislation into a single bill, so long as all provisions of that bill address the same subject. We hold further that H.B. 2506's provisions relate to one subject—education. We affirm the district court, which came to the same conclusions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to its pleadings, KNEA is "the state-level affiliate for 361 local education employee organizations, which represent approximately 19,800 current public school teachers in Kansas." Its mission "is to promote quality public schools, strengthen the profession of teaching, and improve the well-being of KNEA members." The association filed this lawsuit shortly after H.B. 2506 became effective, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Teacher Due Process amendments are unenforceable because H.B. 2506 violated the Kansas Constitution's one-subject rule and asking for an injunction "preventing implementing and/or enforcement of the [amendments]." No individual association members are named as parties.

The State promptly moved to dismiss under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–212(b)(1) and (6). It argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the lawsuit did not present a case or controversy. Specifically, the State asserted KNEA lacked standing to file suit and that the constitutional claim it was pursuing was not ripe, i.e ., premature. The State also argued the association's one-subject rule claim failed on the merits. KNEA filed a competing motion for summary judgment. The district court rejected the State's standing and ripeness challenges but agreed KNEA failed to state a claim as a matter of law because H.B. 2506 did not violate Article 2, § 16. KNEA appealed.

We granted an unopposed motion to transfer the case from the Court of Appeals. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 20–3017 (permitting motion to transfer case from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court). Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 60–2101(b) (providing Supreme Court has jurisdiction over matter transferred under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 20–3017 ).

KNEA's challenge requires us to decide: (1) whether KNEA has standing to advance this constitutional challenge on its members' behalf; (2) whether the controversy is ripe for judicial decision on the constitutional question because suit was filed before any school district had applied the revised teacher due process provisions against any KNEA member; and (3) if the first two questions resolve in KNEA's favor, whether H.B. 2506 violates the one-subject rule.

STANDING AND RIPENESS

Judicial power is limited to "actual cases and controversies." State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius , 285 Kan. 875, 898, 179 P.3d 366 (2008) ("[D]espite the differences between our Kansas Constitution and the Constitution of the United States, both limit the judicial power to actual cases and controversies."). As elements of a case or controversy, standing and ripeness are components of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sierra Club v. Moser , 298 Kan. 22, 29, 310 P.3d 360 (2013) ("[S]tanding is a component of subject matter jurisdiction."); Sebelius , 285 Kan. at 896, 179 P.3d 366 (noting ripeness as a prerequisite of subject matter jurisdiction). KNEA does not allege injury to itself, but sues instead on its members' behalf, so its standing turns on whether it represents a member who could have brought the suit individually.

The district court denied the State's motion to dismiss on standing and ripeness grounds, but the State did not cross-appeal from those adverse rulings even though it discusses standing and ripeness in its brief. Nevertheless, subject matter jurisdiction can be raised any time, by any party, or by the court on its own motion. See Kansas Bldg. Industry Workers Comp. Fund v. State , 302 Kan. 656, 678, 359 P.3d 33 (2015) (standing issue " ‘may be raised at any time’ "); Sierra Club , 298 Kan. at 29, 310 P.3d 360 ("[A]ny party, or the court on its own motion, may raise [standing] at any time."). Consequently, we will consider the district court's standing and ripeness rulings despite the State's failure to cross-appeal. See Sebelius , 285 Kan. at 898, 179 P.3d 366.

Standard of review

Whether a party has standing to request a declaratory judgment concerning the constitutionality of legislation and whether the issue is ripe are questions of law. See Solomon v. State , 303 Kan. 512, 519, 364 P.3d 536 (2015) (reciting standard of review applicable to district court's resolution of standing and ripeness claims in action seeking declaratory judgment that legislation violated separation of powers under state constitution); Sierra Club , 298 Kan. at 29, 310 P.3d 360 ("The issue of whether a party has standing in a judicial action, like other jurisdictional issues, presents a question of law.").

Additional background

Before July 1, 2014, state law had long provided what was commonly termed a "Due Process Procedure" for "tenured" teachers, i.e. , those who had "completed not less than three consecutive years of employment, and been offered a fourth contract...." K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72–5445(a)(1). A "teacher" was defined as "any professional employee who is required to hold a certificate to teach in any school district, and any teacher or instructor in any area vocational-technical school or community college." K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72–5436(a). Among the protections conferred on qualifying teachers was the right to notice, including "[a] statement of the reasons for the proposed nonrenewal or termination ... and ... a statement that the teacher may have the matter heard by a hearing officer upon written request...." K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72–5438(a).

Upon invoking the right to a hearing, a qualifying teacher had corresponding rights to: (1) participate in selecting the hearing officer; (2) have an attorney present at the hearing, as well as testify and cross-examine witnesses; (3) obtain a written opinion containing the hearing officer's findings of fact and determination of the issues; and (4) appeal the decision to district court. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72–5438(b) –(d) ; K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72–5439 ; K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72–5443. Kansas courts had held this statutory scheme precluded a school district from terminating or nonrenewing a "tenured" teacher absent good cause, even though the statutory provisions themselves did not expressly require it. Gillett v. U.S.D. No. 276 , 227 Kan. 71, 78, 605 P.2d 105 (1980).

The Gillett court viewed good cause as an inherent requirement in the statutory scheme and held courts in this jurisdiction "must require a board of education to show good cause" to justify a tenured teacher's dismissal or nonrenewal in order to ...