O'Kane v. Apfel
Decision Date | 23 August 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-2572,99-2572 |
Citation | 224 F.3d 686 |
Parties | (7th Cir. 2000) James O'Kane, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 97 CV 6589--Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Posner and Williams, Circuit Judges.
In 1993, James O'Kane applied for disability benefits. The Social Security Administration denied his application. After unsuccessfully appealing his claims administratively, O'Kane filed suit against Kenneth S. Apfel, the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), asking the district court to reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge who denied O'Kane's benefits claims. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied O'Kane's motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment. O'Kane now appeals, and we affirm.
On February 17, 1993, O'Kane applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. sec.sec. 416(i), 423, 1382, on the basis of his alcoholism. On May 6, 1993, the Social Security Agency ("Agency") denied O'Kane's application for benefits. For the next four years, O'Kane continued to pursue his claims through administrative channels. At each step, his claims were denied.
Meanwhile, Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1996 to prohibit the payment of social security disability benefits based on an applicant's alcoholism or drug addiction. See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847. The Act now provides that "[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subchapter) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." 42 U.S.C. sec. 423(d)(2)(C).
On September 18, 1997, after exhausting his administrative remedies, O'Kane timely filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. O'Kane moved for summary judgment on the ground that the decision to deny him benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner, in his motion for summary judgment, argued solely that the 1996 amendments to the Act ("Amendments") barred O'Kane's 1993 benefits application.
The district court ruled in the Commissioner's favor. The court found that the Amendments apply to claims for benefits pending in the Agency as of March 29, 1996 and bar O'Kane, as a matter of law, from receiving disability benefits. The district court's decision to grant the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment presents a pure question of law, which we review de novo, accepting as true all of O'Kane's evidence and drawing in his favor all reasonable inferences. See Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1999).
The dispute in this case centers around the Amendments' effective date provision. The Amendments
apply to any individual who applies for, or whose claim is finally adjudicated by the Commissioner of Social Security with respect to, benefits under [this subchapter] based on disability on or after [March 29, 1996], and, in the case of any individual who has applied for, and whose claim has been finally adjudicated by the Commissioner with respect to, such benefits before [March 29, 1996], such amendments shall apply only with respect to such benefits for months beginning on or after January 1, 1997.
42 U.S.C. sec. 405 (note) (emphasis added). O'Kane argues that "on or after March 29, 1996" applies to the date of an applicant's disability. Under this "disability interpretation," O'Kane would be entitled to benefits based on his alcoholism from the time he applied for them,1 February 17, 1993, until March 29, 1996. The Commissioner argues, on the other hand, that "on or after March 29, 1996" modifies the clause "who applies for" and the clause "whose claim is finally adjudicated by the Commissioner." Under this "adjudication interpretation," O'Kane would not be entitled to any benefits because his claims were not finally adjudicated prior to March 29, 1996.
The Third and Eighth Circuits have adopted the adjudication interpretation. See Adams v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1998); Torres v. Chater, 125 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1997).2 Before today, we had not decided whether to adopt either the adjudication or the disability interpretation. See Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1999) ( ). Today, we adopt the adjudication interpretation.
The plain language of the Amendments supports the adjudication interpretation. When interpreting congressional statutes, we first look at the plain language of the statute because that is the best way to determine congressional intent. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1245 (7th Cir. 1993) ( ).
The disability interpretation muddles the second half of the effective date provision.3 We agree with the Third Circuit that concluded:
O'Kane argues that there is no reason to insert "based on disability" into the second half of this effective date provision. He claims that the second category simply carves out a limited exception to the first category where eligibility is pegged to the date of disability. He contends that the exception creates a limited grace period for those individuals whose claims were finally adjudicated prior to March 29, 1996--they are eligible to receive benefits until January 1, 1997. Finally, O'Kane asserts that the date of disability is not relevant to this exception.
We are not convinced by O'Kane's argument. Both clauses of the effective date provision are parallel in structure. Apart from Congress' use of "such" in the second clause to avoid repetition, both clauses have precisely the same grammatical and textual structure. Consequently, if O'Kane is going to argue that the effective date modifies disability in the first clause, then the date must also modify disability in the second clause. The result makes little, if any, sense. For example, it is impossible to determine whether benefits are due for alcoholism disabilities between March 29, 1996 and January 1, 1997. Consequently, we find that the adjudication interpretation is the clearer approach. Accord Adams, 149 F.3d at 846; Torres, 125 F.3d at 171.
The disability interpretation would make the "finally adjudicated" language superfluous. Courts should interpret statutes so as to "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word." In re Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp., 63 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1995). If the date of disability governs, then the date of final adjudication is irrelevant. O'Kane argues that the term "finally adjudicated" makes clear that the Amendments do not simply apply to those who apply for post-March 1996 benefits but also to those who have already been declared eligible to receive post-March 1996 benefits. O'Kane's interpretation, however, would create more superfluous language. If the disability interpretation is correct, Congress could have simply stated that the Amendments apply to individuals who are claiming disability benefits under this subchapter for claims after March 29, 1996. See Torres, 125 F.3d at 170-71 ( ).
O'Kane counters that the adjudication interpretation renders superfluous at least two phrases of the effective date provision. First, the adjudication interpretation renders superfluous the phrase "who applies for." Under the adjudication interpretation, the availability of benefits depends upon the date a claim is adjudicated. Consequently O'Kane argues that the date on which one applies is irrelevant. While O'Kane may be technically correct, the phrase "who applies for" is useful for differentiating the statute's two clauses. For claimants who have filed but not had their claims finally adjudicated, the Amendments are effective on March 29, 1996. The Amendments are not effective until January 1, 1997, however, for a filed claim that has been finally adjudicated.
Second, O'Kane claims that the adjudication interpretation renders the phrase "based on disability" superfluous. The adjudication interpretation precludes benefits to any individual "whose claim is finally adjudicated by the Commissioner . . . on or after March 29, 1996." This interpretation reads the same with or without the phrase "based on disability." This phrase is useful, however, because the relevant subchapter of the Act includes not only disability benefits but also other types...
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Case Index
...denied, 528 U.S. 944 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999), 4th-99 Mittelstedt v. Apfel , 204 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 2000), 8th-00 O’Kane v. Apfel , 224 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000), 7th-00 Pettit v. Apfel , 218 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. July 18, 2000), 8th-00 § 301.2. Alcoholism or Drug Addiction as a Ma......
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Issue topics
...the “adjudication interpretation” of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847. O’Kane v. Apfel , 224 F.3d 686, 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2000). This Act provides that an individual shall not be considered disabled if alcoholism or drug addiction would “be a......
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Issue Topics
...the “adjudication interpretation” of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847. O’Kane v. Apfel , 224 F.3d 686, 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2000). This Act provides that an individual shall not be considered disabled if alcoholism or drug addiction would “be a......
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Table of cases
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