Kane v. City of Flint

Decision Date09 March 1955
Docket NumberNo. 4,4
Citation69 N.W.2d 156,342 Mich. 74
PartiesGilbert L. KANE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF FLINT, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Appellee. Carl DELLING et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF FLINT, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Herbert W. Devine, Arthur C. Elliott, Cline & George, Flint, for plaintiffs and appellants. Richard C. Fruit, Flint, of counsel.

Weiss & Damm, by John T. Damm and Arthur Weiss, Flint, for defendant and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

BOYLES, Justice.

This appeal calls for construction of certain provisions in the charter and ordinances of the city of Flint. Plaintiffs, who are city firemen and policemen, brought suit against the city for additional compensation to which they claimed they were entitled, denied them by the city. Circuit Judge George B. Hartrick, presiding in Genesee county heard the case without a jury and entered judgment of no cause for action. The plaintiffs appeal.

The Flint city charter provides for a city commission and vests in it the power to prescribe the compensation of all officers and employees of the city, as follows:

'Section 8. Powers of Commission. The [city] commission shall be and constitute the legislative and governing body of the city and shall possess full power and authority to enact such ordinances and adopt such resolutions as it shall deem proper for the purpose of enforcing and exercising any or all of the powers possessed by the city.'

'Section 51. Compensation. The compensation of all elective and appointive officers and of all employees of the city, including all election officials shall be prescribed by the commission by ordinance, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.'

In 1935 an amendment to the charter provided for a civil service commission, its powers and duties to include the following (Sec. 236[a]):

'It shall classify with the co-operation of the various department heads, all the offices and positions of employment, showing for each class established the class title, the duties performed and the responsibilities involved in each class, the minimum qualifications to be required of future applicants seeking employment and the standard scale of compensation as set by the city commission, and various boards appointed by the city commission. Like classifications of work are to receive like compensation.'

Plaintiffs base their claim wholly on the concluding sentence of the above section. They claim they are not receiving like compensation for like classifications of work. Apparently, plaintiffs consider 'compensation' to mean 'salaries' or 'wages.'

In 1943 the city commission adopted a 'Uniform Pay Ordinance, * * * fixing the compensation to be paid employees and appointive officers for their services to the city of Flint.' It sets up a uniform schedule of wage rates, differentiating between salaries to be paid, according to the number of years of service. In sections 9, 17 and 18 it sets up additional special provisions for firemen and policemen. Those who are under the pension or insurance benefit plan, or eligible therefor, are to be paid no premium pay for night work, but only 'straight time' for hours of work over normal work week; if they had been employed 1 year or more prior to July 1, 1943, they should receive compensation at the 2-year service completion rate or $130 above their annual rate of August 18, 1943, whichever was higher. The ordinance also differentiates as to compensation between firemen drivers and firemen privates, and as to policemen classified as 'patrolmen PO-6,' as to their rates of compensation, depending upon the length of service.

There is no denial of the authority of the city commission to fix the compensation of firemen and policemen, as thus differentiated, unless it be the above provision in the civil service amendment to the city charter on which plaintiffs rely: 'Like classifications of work are to receive like compensation.' As stated, it occurs in the 1935 amendment to the city charter creating a civil service commission and defining its powers and duties (Sec. 236[a]).

The city commission, in fixing the 'compensation' to be paid to firemen and policemen took into consideration certain benefits afforded them by the city which were not shared in by other city employees. Under sections 202-211 of the city charter provisions were made for a retirement pension for life for firemen and policemen who had served as such for 25 years or who were totally disabled in the discharge of duty. Their monthly pension during life was fixed at 1/2 of the monthly salary held at the date of retirement. Other pension provisions were therein made for partial disability for firemen and policemen who sustained injuries or contracted disease or illness by reason of their occupation, and also for life pension for a surviving widow, and pensions for their children or other dependents. A provision therein authorizes the city commission to raise by taxes the money necessary to pay these pensions. A 1947 amendment, called the 'Gabriel Plan,' provides that the then pension provisions should not apply to one employed after May 15, 1947, or one who elected within 6 months to accept a certain other pension plan provided for city employees. However, plaintiffs declined to come under the provisions of the so-called 'Gabriel Plan' and their claims for compensation in the case at bar are from July 1, 1943, to April, 1946 (the date of the 'Gabriel Plan'), and then to April 1, 1947.

There would seem to be an apparent conflict in the charter provisions and ordinances, resulting in discrimination between firemen, and also between policemen, as to their compensation, unless they are read and construed together, in the light of certain facts and circumstances. The provision in the civil service amendment (Sec. 236[a]) on which the plaintiffs wholly rely, must be read and construed in connection with other provisions of the charter. The civil service commission, under that amendment, was given the power to classify all the offices and positions of employment. In so doing, the authority of the civil service commission to classify employees was limited by the concluding sentence of said section 236(a) that 'Like classifications of work are to receive like compensation.' Thereon the plaintiffs wholly place their claim that they have not been receiving the compensation to which they are entitled.

However, that provision does not deprive the city commission of its power to fix the compensation of all officers and employees of the city. The city commission, in fixing the compensation to be paid to firemen and policemen, took into account various benefits they were receiving at city expense, not commission to other city employees. The city commission considered at length and evaluated the benefits to the firemen and policemen provided for by the retirement pension plan, which provides for retirement pension benefits. The 'Gabriel Plan' also allows firemen and policemen to elect to substitute it for their earlier retirement pension plan. Furthermore, the city commission also provides a group insurance policy of $1,000 for each fireman and policeman, increased to...

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9 cases
  • Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • May 27, 2014
    ...by municipalities are a matter of local concern); Gildersleeve v. Lamont, 331 Mich. 8, 12, 49 N.W.2d 36 (1951) ; Kane v. City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 77–78, 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955) ; Olson v. Highland Park, 312 Mich. 688, 695, 20 N.W.2d 773 (1945).3 Consequently, our review of relevant post-Le......
  • Mich. Coal. of State Emp. Unions v. State
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 29, 2015
    ...addressing “compensation” in other contexts, as well as the Court of Appeals below, recognize this. See, e.g., Kane v. City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955) (addressing municipalities' authority to define pensions as compensation). However, we are here concerned with the entire ......
  • Williams v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Detroit, 2347
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • December 23, 1968
    ...Supra, p. 179, 247 N.W., p. 147. See, also, Philbrick v. Dust (1914), 178 Mich. 605, 607, 146 N.W. 175. Cf. Kane v. City of Flint (1955), 342 Mich. 74, 79, 69 N.W.2d 156. While § 7 (see footnote 2) confers upon the commission powers and duties 'necessary to carry out the provisions hereof,'......
  • Mich. Coal. of State Emp. Unions v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • August 13, 2013
    ...the time of ratification). When the 1963 Constitution was considered, SERA had been in place for twenty years. In Kane v. City of Flint, 342 Mich. 74, 83, 69 N.W.2d 156 (1955), our Supreme Court upheld the city's authority to take into account the additional retirement pension benefits gran......
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