Kane v. Titus

• Decision Date: 22 June 1911
• Parties: KANE v. TITUS.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

80 A. 453

81 N.J.L. 594

KANE

v. TITUS.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

June 22, 1911.

Error to Supreme Court.

Frank J. Kane was convicted of a violation of the automobile law of 1908, and his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and from the original conviction and its affirmance he brings writ of error. Affirmed.

John W. Harding and Charles T. Terry (John W. Griggs, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Edmund Wilson, Atty. Gen., and Nelson B. Gaskill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

GUMMERE, C. J. The plaintiff in error, a resident of the state of New York, while driving his automobile along the highways of this state, on his way from his place of residence to a town in the state of Pennsylvania, was arrested for violating the fifteenth and sixteenth sections of the automobile law of 1908 (P. L. 1908, p. 613), by not having registered his machine, or paid the fee required for doing so; and by not having filed with the Secretary of State a duly executed instrument constituting that official his attorney, upon whom all original process in any action or legal proceeding brought against him, and arising out of the operation of his automobile within the state, might be served. His prosecution for this offense followed his arrest, and resulted in a conviction. Upon a review of that conviction by the Supreme Court, there was an affirmance; the court considering that the case was governed by its deliverance in Cleary v. Johnston, 74 Atl. 538. The plaintiff in error, by the present writ, attacks the legality of the original conviction, and of its affirmance.

The first contention made in his behalf is that the automobile law of 1908 is invalid, because the license fees exacted by it are not limited to the cost of registration and inspection, and the act is therefore intended as a revenue measure. In Cleary v. Johnston, supra, the proofs submitted were not considered by the court to be demonstrative that the statute was a revenue measure; the court, however, pointed out that if such was conceded to be its object the law was nevertheless not invalid on that account, for the reason that the imposition of license fees for revenue purposes was clearly within the sovereign power of the state. We agree with counsel of the plaintiff in error that the proofs taken in the present case satisfactorily show that the present automobile law is a revenue measure, but hold, in accordance with the view expressed by the Supreme Court and above adverted to, that in passing it the Legislature was fully within the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. The former decisions of our courts upon this subject are fully cited in the opinion in the Cleary Case, and a re-citation of them by us is unnecessary.

It is further contended by the plaintiff in error that, conceding the power of the Legislature to impose license fees upon its own citizens for the purpose of raising revenue, the statute under consideration, because it imposes such fees upon nonresidents passing through the state, and engaged in interstate commerce, violates the commerce provision of the federal Constitution, and is therefore, to that extent, void; that plaintiff in error was so engaged at the time of his arrest; and that for this reason his conviction should be set aside.

We are willing to assume, in the discussion of this point, that the claim of the plaintiff in error that at the time of his arrest he was engaged in interstate commerce is justified by the fact. This being so, the important question remains whether the act of 1908 is to any extent a regulation of commerce between the states, within the meaning of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. That it affects interstate commerce is true. But state laws may do this without being obnoxious to the constitutional provision appealed to. For example, a state may erect, or authorize the erection, of wharves along the banks of its navigable rivers which are used for commerce between the states, and charge, or authorize to be charged, wharfage fees for the privilege of receiving and landing thereon passengers and freight which come from other states, without infringing upon that provision. The imposition of such charges, although affecting interstate commerce, is nevertheless a legitimate exercise of state power....