Kaneaiakala v. Frink
| Decision Date | 25 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 20-00409 JAO-RT |
| Parties | BRONSON KANEAIAKALA, #A1052859, Petitioner, v. MARTIN FRINK, Warden, Saguaro Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Before the Court is Petitioner Bronson Kaneaiakala's ("Petitioner") Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Amended Petition"). ECF No. 5. Specifically, Petitioner challenges his conviction in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawai'i for Burglary in the First Degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 708-810(1)(c). For the following reasons, the Petition is DENIED. Any certificate of appealability is DENIED.
On January 26, 2015, Petitioner was charged by Felony Information with Burglary in the First Degree, in violation of HRS § 708-810(1)(c). ECF No. 10-2 at 1.
On June 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress Identification of the Defendant ("Motion to Suppress"), arguing that the circuit court should suppress all evidence related to Mari Laraway's ("Laraway") field show-up identification of Petitioner. ECF No. 10-3 at 1-2. The parties applied the same legal standard to Petitioner's challenge to the admissibility of eyewitness identification based on an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure: whether the pretrial identification procedure was "impermissibly suggestive" and, if so, whether the witness's identification is sufficiently reliable such that it is worthy of presentation to and consideration by the jury. Id. at 5 (quoting State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 383, 391, 894 P.2d 80, 88 (1995)); ECF No. 10-4 at 4 (same) (additional citations omitted). The parties further agreed that in determining the reliability of the witness's identification, the circuit court should consider the following five factors: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) thewitness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the suspect; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and confrontation. ECF No. 10-3 at 5 (citing State v. Padilla, 57 Haw. 150, 154, 552 P.2d 357, 360 (1976)); ECF No. 10-4 at 5 (citing State v. Araki, 82 Hawai'i 474, 485, 923 P.2d 891, 902 (1996)). These factors were first articulated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and were adopted by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in State v. Padilla.
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Motion to Suppress on September 1 and 8, 2015. ECF No. 10-7 at 1. Testifying through a Japanese language interpreter, Laraway stated that at around 12:30 p.m. on January 24, 2015, she called 911 because she saw a man entering an apartment through a window at the building where she resided while walking from her apartment to her car parked on the street. ECF No. 10-5 at 6, 9, 20-21. Laraway first saw the man at a distance of about four meters (which is just over 13 feet), crouching behind a hedge next to a bicycle and by the road. Id. at 15-16. She was able to see the side of his face — approximately half of it — but never saw his full face. Id. at 16-17, 35-36. Laraway noticed a rolled-up window screen, which she thought was unusual. Id. at 17. Laraway testified that she would be able to recognize the man again if she saw him and when asked, identified Petitioner, who was present in the courtroom, as the man. Id. at 17, 19.
Laraway initially observed that the man had short curly hair, a scruffy face, was not Black, and appeared to be Caucasian with light brown suntanned skin. Id. at 20. Laraway recalled that the man was wearing a white or light blue shirt with long sleeves. Id. at 22. The man was also wearing a hat with a brim that Laraway believed was covering a portion of the front of his face. Id. at 34-35. Laraway testified that during the 911 call, she described the man as a "skinny [B]lack guy" wearing a light blue t-shirt, and was not asked about his hair or face. Id. at 36-37, 63.
While communicating with a police officer telephonically sometime between 12:30 and 3:00 p.m., Laraway did not describe the man she had identified earlier. Id. at 38, 40, 64. When Laraway returned home at some point after 3:00 p.m., police officers onsite informed her that they had apprehended a possible suspect in the laundromat in her apartment building and asked her to participate in a field show-up outside. Id. at 23-24, 42-43. Laraway identified Petitioner at the field show-up, while he was handcuffed and standing shirtless 10 to 15 feet away, with the left side of his face over his shoulder in view. Id. at 25-26, 44. Laraway informed the police officers that she was "[p]retty sure" that the man at the field show-up was the man she had seen earlier that day based on his body, the complexion of his skin, the structure of his face, and his hair color. Id. at 25-26, 49. The police officers did not ask Laraway to identify anyone else. Id. at 45.Laraway admitted on cross-examination that it "may be possible" that she would have difficulty distinguishing between two people with similar body shapes and complexions without seeing their faces. Id. at 50.
Following her visual identification of Petitioner, Laraway completed a suspect description form indicating that the man wore long pants and a long-sleeved shirt. Id. at 23, 46. During her testimony, Laraway stated that she selected the wrong descriptors and instead recalled that the man wore short pants and possibly a short-sleeved shirt. Id. at 66-67. On the form, Laraway described the man's facial hair as "scruffy." Id. at 71-72. Laraway also selected 5'6" to 5'8" to describe his height, based on her observations of him standing next to police officers, because she had not seen him standing upright earlier in the day. Id. at 74-75. In her written statement, Laraway represented that she was "almost positive" that the man she identified for the police was the man she had seen earlier that day. Id. at 76.
Laraway told a detective later that evening that she had bad eyesight and was not wearing her glasses when she identified Petitioner. Id. at 47-48. Laraway testified that without her glasses, she can see a person's general shape and outline, as well as colors, but has difficulty seeing details. Id. at 48-49. According to Laraway, her glasses are for seeing at far distances, so she uses them while drivingto read street name signs, not for viewing traffic signs or watching television.1 Id. at 60-61. Laraway confirmed that she was able to get a good look at the man from 10 to 15 feet away even though she was not wearing her glasses. Id. at 32, 62.
Honolulu Police Department Officer Kanoa Hose ("Officer Hose") also testified at the suppression hearing. ECF No. 10-6 at 5-6. Officer Hose first encountered Petitioner, who was naked, in the apartment building's laundry room. Id. at 13. Another police officer was already present. Id. at 15. Officer Hose thought Petitioner matched the dispatcher's description of the suspect as a local male. Id. at 39-40, 43. Officer Hose found a light blue, long-sleeved dress shirt and black shorts near Petitioner. Id. at 16-17.
Officer Hose later asked Laraway whether she would be able to recognize the man she observed near the apartment window. Id. at 18. She responded affirmatively, so he queried whether she would be willing to participate in a field show-up, and she agreed. Id. Officer Hose did not inform Laraway that the apprehended man was the man she saw earlier nor that he had burglarized the apartment. Id. at 19.
Officer Hose estimated that no more than 40 feet separated Laraway and Petitioner at the field show-up. Id. at 21. Officer Hose recalled that Laraway wasable to see Petitioner from a slight angle, and that after looking at him for five to ten seconds, she identified him as the man she had seen earlier, without expressing the level of certainty in her identification. Id. at 22-24. During defense counsel's cross examination of Officer Hose, the prosecutor stipulated that the field show-up was impermissibly suggestive and proceeded on reliability. Id. at 31, 33.
The circuit court orally denied the Motion to Suppress. Applying the Padilla/Biggers factors it concluded that despite the impermissibly suggestive identification procedure, Laraway's identification of Petitioner was sufficiently reliable based on the totality of the circumstances: (1) opportunity to view the suspect — Laraway was able to get a "good look" at the man during the middle of the day, from four meters away, and was able to see his build, complexion, and clothing; (2) degree of attention — Laraway observed the screen of the apartment rolled up, observed a bicycle next to the man, thought it was unusual that a man was crouched by the hedge near the window, immediately did not recognize the man, and was alarmed enough to call 911; (3) accuracy of the prior description of the suspect — Laraway described the man as a skinny Black male and identified articles of clothing such as a shirt, cap, and shorts; (4) level of certainty — Laraway was "pretty sure" that Petitioner was the man she previously observed based on his complexion, body shape, and hair, and while acknowledging the possibility that two people with a similar body shape and complexion could lead toa potential misidentification, she was certain Petitioner was the man she saw earlier; and (5) length of time between crime and confrontation — approximately two hours lapsed between Laraway's 911 call and her identification of Petitioner. Id. at 54-56.
On October 27, 2015, the circuit court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Identification of Defendant. ECF ...
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