Kangley v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 29 April 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-3856,85-3856 |
| Citation | 788 F.2d 533 |
| Parties | Muriel KANGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Manza, Moceri, Gustafson & Messina, P.S., John S. Glassman, Michael S. Manza, Tacoma, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee.
Gene S. Anderson, U.S. Atty., Marie G. Creson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tacoma, Wash., for defendant-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.
Before WRIGHT, CANBY and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
The United States (government) appeals from the district court's award of $145,855.60 to Muriel Kangley (Kangley) in her Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action. The government assigns error to a number of the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because we find one of the government's claims dispositive of this appeal, we do not address its other claims.
On January 6, 1982, Kangley went to Madigan Army Medical Center (MAMC) near Tacoma, Washington, to talk to someone in the office of the Staff Judge Advocate about a patient in the hospital. She entered a hall known as Ramp 1 and walked down the hall to the JAG office. As a result of her meeting in the JAG office, Kangley was upset. She departed the JAG office and walked back down Ramp 1. As she was doing so, she slipped and fell, severely injuring herself.
A door that leads outside is located along the side of Ramp 1 between the two ends of the ramp. A mat is permanently affixed to the floor just inside that door. Kangley walked across this mat on her way down the hall. As she stepped off the mat, her foot slipped out from under her and she fell.
Two officers assigned to the hospital testified that they found Kangley lying on her back with her head and shoulders on the mat and her feet extending off the mat. They both testified that they did not see any water, ice, or snow on the floor near Kangley and that her pants did not appear to be wet. Kangley testified that her pants became wet after she fell and that both the floor and the mat felt cold and wet.
Under the FTCA, tort actions against the United States are governed by the "law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) (1982). This accident occurred near Tacoma, Washington. We therefore apply Washington state law to this case.
The general rule in Washington for injuries caused by a transitory unsafe condition on property is that the owner or occupier of a building is liable for the injuries if it or its employees caused the unsafe condition or if it has actual or constructive knowledge that an unsafe condition exists. Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash.2d 39, 44, 666 P.2d 888, 893 (1983); Hemmen v. Clark's Restaurant, 72 Wash.2d 690, 692, 434 P.2d 729, 732 (1967). Constructive knowledge exists if the unsafe condition has been present long enough that a person exercising ordinary care would have discovered it. Pimentel, 100 Wash.2d at 44, 666 P.2d at 893; Hemmen, 72 Wash.2d at 692, 434 P.2d at 732. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition.
Further, Washington cases make it clear that the mere presence of water on a floor where the plaintiff slipped is not enough to prove negligence on the part of the owner or occupier of the building. See, e.g., Brant v. Market Basket Stores, 72 Wash.2d 446, 433 P.2d 863 (1967); Merrick v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 67 Wash.2d 426, 407 P.2d 960 (1965). To prove negligence, the plaintiff must prove that water makes the floor dangerously slippery and that the owner knew or should have known both that water would make the floor slippery and that there was water on the floor at the time the plaintiff slipped. See Brant, 72 Wash.2d at 451-52, 433 P.2d at 866-67.
The district court found that the government knew or should have known that the floor where Kangley slipped was unreasonably dangerous at the time she fell. The government claims that there is no evidence in the record to support this finding.
The court's finding on this issue raises two questions for our review: (1) Whether the government actually knew that a dangerous condition existed or (2) whether the government had constructive knowledge of the existence of a dangerous condition. We review both of these questions for clear error. The first is a question of fact. The second is a question of application of law to facts in...
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