Kanjuka v. Metrohealth Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 12 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 79995.,79995.
• Citation: 783 N.E.2d 920,2002 Ohio 6803,151 Ohio App.3d 183
• Parties: KANJUKA, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. METROHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

783 N.E.2d 920

151 Ohio App.3d 183

2002 Ohio 6803

KANJUKA, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. METROHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.^*

No. 79995.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Decided December 12, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Leonard F. Lybarger, Cleveland, for appellant.

Duvin, Cahn & Hutton, Brett S. Krantz and Jon M. Dileno, Cleveland, for appellee.

ANNE L. KILBANE, Judge.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from and order of Visiting Judge Robert Lawther that granted appellee and cross-appellant Metro-Health Medical Center's ("Metro-Health's") motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial, following a $122,000 jury verdict for appellant and cross-appellee Brigitte Kanjuka on her claims of defamation. She claims that it was error to direct a verdict on her claims of slander per se; JNOV should not have been granted on her claims of defamation per quod; and it was error to take away her verdict. MetroHealth asserts that it should have been granted summary judgment on its assertion of qualified privilege. We reverse and enter judgment for Kanjuka.

{¶ 2} Beginning in 1991, Kanjuka worked as a staff nurse specializing in the care of chemotherapy patients at the Metro-Health Cancer Care Center (the "Center"). In 1997, she was promoted to Practice Coordinator, where she primarily supervised and scheduled staff nurses for the Center and the Infectious Disease Department, in addition to performing clinical duties when needed. Initially, her supervisor was Dr. Susan Carter, the Director of the Center, but, as the department grew and restructured, she reported to Operations Manager Nancy Haas, who reported to Administrator Jeffrey Johnston, who then reported directly to Dr. Carter.

{¶ 3} Beginning in early 1999, Haas began to informally address concerns she had with Kanjuka over the way she scheduled overtime for the nurses and approved vacation days, resulting in staff shortages. Haas also was concerned with Kanjuka's tardiness in completing employee evaluations. In July 1999, she instituted a Performance Improvement Plan for Kanjuka to help identify and address what she saw as deficiencies in her job performance. Against this backdrop, there was an incident in the front lobby of the Center on August 9, 1999, where Haas noticed a staffing shortage and, according to Kanjuka, abusively and publicly berated her in front of patients and others. Haas, hired in 1998, was seen by some of the staff at the Center as overbearing and inappropriately, publicly, and abrasively critical of employees in the presence of patients and their families. Dr. Carter contended that, overall, there had not been many complaints about her and that she was an exceptional administrator. Because Dr Carter would not be available until later that day, Kanjuka went to see Johnston to complain about Haas's behavior.

{¶ 4} According to Kanjuka, when she conveyed her concerns about Haas's managerial style, he suggested that perhaps she was unsuited for management and should investigate whether any suitable alternative positions were available through Metro Health's Human Resource Department. Johnston, however, claimed that Kanjuka resigned her position as Practice Coordinator at this time, and Haas stated that, later that day, Kanjuka told her she was resigning. Kanjuka steadfastly denied ever resigning and, at a meeting with Dr. Carter later that day, was assured that the situation would be taken care of. The following day, however, she was informed by Dr. Carter and Haas that she would have to give them a written resignation for her file. Haas, Dr. Carter, and Kanjuka had separate and collective meetings over the course of the next week that, depending on which of the three women's statements one believes, either resulted in assurances that Kanjuka would remain the Practice Coordinator or reinforced her need to secure another position. Meanwhile, Haas presented Kanjuka with a letter confirming receipt of her oral resignation.

{¶ 5} Because of these events, various employees, including Dr. Edward Mansour, one of the Center's oncologists, sometimes saw Kanjuka crying at the Center. It is undisputed that later in August 1999, Dr. Carter unambiguously told her that it had been decided that she was going to be replaced. Kanjuka was generally well liked by both the physicians for whom she scheduled nurses and the nurses working under her. All who knew her overwhelmingly respected her clinical care-providing skills, cancer-care-related charity work outside the Center, dedication to the Center and ability to relate to, and empathize with, the patients and their families. Consequently, the news that she was leaving the Center caused quite a disruptive buzz. According to MetroHealth, Kanjuka was fueling rumors that she was being "forced out" of the Center by a malicious administration, while the administration seemed to be indicating that she had voluntarily resigned due to acknowledged difficulty in performing the duties of an administrator. Because of all the uncertainty and gossip these events were generating, the environment at the Center became increasingly tense, and Dr. Carter decided, in order to clear the air, to hold a meeting with the physicians, and another with the nurses and other secretarial staff who worked with Kanjuka.

{¶ 6} On August 27, 1999, to explain the reason for her departure, Dr. Carter and Haas met with approximately eleven physicians who regularly interacted with Kanjuka and explained that her resignation resulted from performance deficiencies. The meeting was heated; some of the physicians disputed the validity of the statement and accused Dr. Carter or Haas of forcing Kanjuka to leave. Dr. Mostafa Salim claimed that Dr. Carter indicated that part of the source of Kanjuka's difficulties was "a psychiatric problem" or "depression."

{¶ 7} On August 30, 1999, Dr. Carter met with thirteen to fifteen nurses and other nonphysician personnel and claimed that she told the group only that Kanjuka had resigned, that she was very "sad" or "depressed," and that they should help her through this difficult transitional period. However, according to nurses Diane Wolf, Barbara Ruda, and Susan Harwood, Dr. Carter had spoken of Kanjuka's "depression" or told them that she was "very depressed." In addition, all three attributed statements by Dr. Carter to the effeet that Kanjuka was either having problems coming to work on time or "found it hard to get up in the morning and come to work, and that had to stop." All three contended that each understood these comments to mean that Kanjuka was suffering from a mental illness.

{¶ 8} Following these meetings, Kanjuka stated that Juliana Matts and Tyler Tribec, staff members that she neither knew very well nor often talked with, approached her to console her about her "condition," or tell her how "brave" she was being. She transferred as a staff nurse to another MetroHealth department and contended that her new co-workers were not friendly and made her uncomfortable by their aloofness.

{¶ 9} Kanjuka filed suit against Metro-Health and Dr. Carter, alleging slander per se, slander per quod, and invasion of privacy. Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold, originally assigned to the case, granted the MetroHealth and Dr. Carter's joint motion for summary judgment on her invasion of privacy claim, but denied their motion for summary judgment on defamation claims and further ruled that neither could utilize the "qualified privilege doctrine" as a defense to slander. Kanjuka settled her claims against Dr. Carter, and the trial against only MetroHealth was reassigned to the visiting judge.

{¶ 10} Before trial commenced the judge stated that, while he felt that a "qualified privilege" defense should be available to MetroHealth, he felt constrained to exclude it because of Judge Saffold's earlier ruling. At the close of Kanjuka's case-in-chief, he granted Metro-Health a directed verdict on any claims rooted in defamation per se, and the jury, at the conclusion of trial, awarded Kanjuka $122,000 in compensatory damages on her defamation per quod claims. Through interrogatory answers, the jury explicitly found that the statements it found to be defamatory related to Kanjuka's "depression" and "tardiness." The judge then granted MetroHealth's post-trial motion for JNOV, or in the alternative, a new trial, and these cross-appeals follow.¹

{¶ 11} Kanjuka's assignments of error state:

{¶ 12} "I. The trial court erred in granting defendant a directed verdict regarding plaintiff's claim of slander per se."

{¶ 13} "II. The trial court erred in granting defendant MetroHealth Medical Center judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to appellant's claim of defamation per quod."

{¶ 14} Under Civ.R. 50(A)(4), a court may properly grant a motion for directed verdict when, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, it finds that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion on a determinative issue, and the conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.² Review of the grant or denial of a motion for directed verdict is de novo.³ In evaluating the grant or denial of a JNOV, a reviewing court applies the same test as that applied in reviewing a motion for a directed verdict.⁴

{¶ 15} Defamation is a false publication that injures a person's reputation, exposes him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame, or disgrace, or affects him adversely in his trade or business.⁵ The essential elements of a defamation action are a false statement, that the false statement was defamatory, that the false defamatory statement was published, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant acted with the required degree of fault.⁶ There are two forms of defamation: libel or slander. Generally, slander refers to...