Kansas City Elec. Supply Co. v. Bomar Elec. Co., Inc., KCD

• Decision Date: 02 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. KCD,KCD
• Citation: 581 S.W.2d 411
• Parties: KANSAS CITY ELECTRICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation, and Rensenhouse Electric Supply Company, Inc., a corporation, Appellants, v. BOMAR ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., Price Brothers Realty Company, a corporation, Sam Price and Steven Price, d/b/a Price Development Company, Donald B. Steele, Trustee, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a corporation, Respondents. 29873.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 411

581 S.W.2d 411

KANSAS CITY ELECTRICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation, and Rensenhouse Electric Supply Company, Inc., a corporation, Appellants, v. BOMAR ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., Price Brothers Realty Company a corporation, Sam Price and Steven Price, d/b/a Price Development Company, Donald B. Steele, Trustee, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a corporation, Respondents.

No. KCD 29873.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

April 2, 1979.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

May 1, 1979.

Application to Transfer Denied June 19, 1979.

Leo T. Schwartz, Kansas City, for appellant Kansas City Elec. Supply co.

Wm. J. Hill, Kansas City, for appellant Rensenhouse Elec. Supply Co., Inc.

James P. Jouras, Kansas City, for respondents.

Before SOMERVILLE, P. J., and DIXON and TURNAGE, JJ.

SOMERVILLE, Presiding Judge.

This appeal stems from an "equitable" mechanics' lien proceeding brought under Sections 429.270-429.340, RSMo 1969, by Kansas City Electrical Supply Company and Resenhouse Electric Supply Company, Inc., electrical supplies "materialmen", as plaintiffs, against (a) Bomar Electric Company, Inc., a defendant by reason of being the electrical subcontractor, (b) Price Brothers Realty Company, a defendant by reason of being the property owner, (c) Sam Price and Steven Price, d/b/a Price Development Company, defendants by reason of being the primary contractor, and (d) Donald B. Steele and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, defendants by reason of being the trustee and cestui que trust, respectively, of a deed of trust on the property.

Plaintiff materialmen sought money judgments against Bomar Electric Company, Inc. (Bomar) for electrical supplies sold to the latter and purportedly used in the construction of the Willow Creek Apartments, an apartment complex erected on real estate owned by Price Brothers Realty Company, and to have said money judgments adjudicated as mechanics' liens on said real property and buildings comprising the apartment complex and that they be declared to be "prior, senior and superior to all rights, titles, interests and estates" of the various defendants.

Following a bench trial a money judgment in the total sum and amount of $8,638.49 ("$7,046.17 principal and $1,592.32 interest") was rendered and entered in favor of Kansas City Electrical Supply Company and against Bomar, and a money judgment in the total sum and amount of $10,242.64 ("$8,579.11 principal and $1,663.53 interest") was rendered and entered in favor of Resenhouse Electric Supply Company, Inc., and against Bomar. However, the trial court refused the request of plaintiff materialmen to have their respective money judgments established and enforced as mechanics' liens against the real property and buildings situate thereon.

Bomar, for all practical purposes, acceded to the money judgments rendered and entered against it, as it took no appeal. Plaintiff materialmen however timely appealed and in doing so vigorously take issue with the trial court's rejection of their money judgments as enforceable mechanics' liens. The trial court's reasoning for doing so, as disclosed by certain recitations in the judgment rendered and entered, was twofold: (1) the materials purportedly furnishing the basis for the claimed mechanics' liens were not sufficiently described or itemized so as to constitute a "just and true account" within the requirements of Section 429.080, RSMo 1969; and (2) plaintiff materialmen failed to prove that the electrical supplies respectively sold by them to Bomar were used in the construction of the apartment complex in question.

The two points relied upon by plaintiff materialmen on appeal lend themselves to being paraphrased as charging the trial court with error for rejecting perfection and enforcement of their money judgments as mechanics' liens for the reasons recited in the judgment.

It is unnecessary to address both points raised on appeal because the trial court judgment must be affirmed if it was properly reached for either of the recited reasons. Snadon v. Gayer, 566 S.W.2d 483, 491-92 (Mo.App.1978); and Simpson v. Spellman, 522 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Mo.App.1975). Heeding this principle, the court will confine its opinion to the law and evidence appertaining to the trial court's finding that plaintiff materialmen failed to prove that the electrical supplies respectively sold by them to Bomar were used in the construction of the apartment complex in question. In doing so, it should be borne in mind that the scope of review undertaken by this court is tightly circumscribed since it must comport with the following standard laid down in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976): "(T)he decree or judgment of the trial court will be sustained by the appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the...