Kansas City v. Eagan

• Decision Date: 08 February 1902
• Docket Number: 12,466
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Parties: KANSAS CITY, FORT SCOTT & MEMPHIS RAILROAD COMPANY v. MARK EAGAN

67 P. 887

64 Kan. 421

KANSAS CITY, FORT SCOTT & MEMPHIS RAILROAD COMPANY v. MARK EAGAN

No. 12,466

Supreme Court of Kansas

February 8, 1902

Decided January, 1902.

Error from Miami district court; JOHN T. BURRIS, judge.

Judgment reversed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. PRACTICE, DISTRICT COURT -- Pleadings Sent with Jury. When the pleadings in a case are lengthy and complex, and made up of multifarious allegations of fact in forms of expression difficult for the ordinary mind to understand, it is error for the court, without defining the issues, to send the pleadings with the jury for them to determine the points in controversy between the parties.

2. PRACTICE, DISTRICT COURT -- Sufficient Exception. An exception to an instruction which contained the following statement to the jury: "You will receive with these instructions the pleadings in the case, the second amended petition of the plaintiff, the amended answer of the defendant, and the reply of the plaintiff," is a sufficient exception to the act of sending the pleadings with the jury.

3. RAILROADS -- Measure of Damages. In an action for damages for personal injuries negligently inflicted, it is material error to permit the plaintiff to prove that he has a family, consisting of a wife and children.

Pratt Dana & Black, for plaintiff in error.

Frank H. Sheridan, for defendant in error.

DOSTER C. J. SMITH, POLLOCK, JJ., concurring.

OPINION

DOSTER, C. J.:

This was an action brought by Mark Eagan against the Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis Railroad Company, to recover damages for injuries received by him at the hand of the company's employees while riding as a passenger on one of its trains. The plaintiff got on the train at Kansas City to go to Hillsdale. A drunken man likewise got aboard at Kansas City. He was disagreeable in his conduct in the coach in which he was riding and was removed by the trainmen to another coach. The plaintiff was in that coach. The drunken man made efforts to return to the coach from which he had been taken, but the trainmen took hold of him and prevented him. In endeavoring to restrain him a scuffle ensued, and the drunken man and one of the trainmen fell over on the plaintiff and injured him, for doing which suit was brought. The plaintiff alleged in his petition, and offered evidence tending to prove, that the trainmen threw the drunken man over on him. That act was averred to be negligent and wrongful; and the further allegation was made that the defendant wrongfully and negligently failed to put the drunken man off the train, so as to relieve the other passengers of the annoyance, disgust and danger of his presence. A verdict and judgment were rendered in plaintiff's favor, from which error has been prosecuted.

The court, in its instructions to the jury, stated in general terms that it was the duty of the company to exercise care for the protection of its passengers from injury, and to secure them safety and comfort while traveling in its cars, and that if a passenger should be injured by the wrongful or negligent act of the company's employees a recovery therefor could be had, but it wholly failed to define or state to the jury the issues in controversy between the plaintiff and defendant. In several instructions the jury were told that if, in their judgment, certain matters had been proved by one or the other of the parties, a recovery could or could not be had, but these instructions were as to specific matters, and did not purport to be general statements of the points in controversy to which the consideration of the jury should be limited. Instead of defining the issues, the court stated to the jury, in one of his instructions, that he sent with them the pleadings in the case, specifying such papers by name. This, in our judgment, was error. The plaintiff's petition covers seven lengthy typewritten pages of the record. Its allegations are prolix and redundant in the extreme, specifying in great detail and with much adjective condemnation many acts of wrongful conduct and negligent omission of duty on the part of the company's employees. Generalized, all these allegations amounted to averments of a negligent failure to eject the drunken man from the train, and, instead of doing so, wrongfully throwing him over upon plaintiff, but they were stated at such length, in such variety of manner, and in such subsidiary and incidental and inter-related forms of expression, and with so much of tautology and repetition, that a jury could not become otherwise than confused and, perhaps, misled by reading the paper.

While the main allegations of the petition in respect of the negligence and wrongful conduct of the defendant were as to its failure to eject the drunken man, and the throwing him upon plaintiff, yet other acts of negligence and wrong were charged, such as that the company's employees wrongfully permitted the man to get aboard the train, knowing he was in an intoxicated condition, and also wrongfully provoked and irritated him by striking and beating him, and refusing to allow him the possession of his traveling valise. Some evidence was offered in support of at least three, if not all, of the allegations of negligence and wrongful conduct, but what one or more of them presented the meritorious issues of the case under the evidence, or whether all of them presented meritorious issues, the court entirely failed to state.

The unquestioned rule is that it is the duty of the court to define the issues to the jury and not leave them to conjecture the controverted points to be determined. In accordance with that rule, it has been repeatedly held to be error to refer the jury to the paper pleadings to learn the issues between the parties. Such holdings would seem to be manifestly sound, because it is the province of the court, not the jury, to interpret the pleadings.

In 11 Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, page 154, it is said:

"Although there are some decisions which hold that it is not error to read the pleadings to the jury or to refer them to the jury in order that they may determine what are the issues in the case, and other decisions holding that, though not erroneous, such practice is not commendable, the clear weight of authority is to the effect that it is the province and duty of the court to state specifically to the jury what issues are raised by the pleadings, and that it is erroneous to refer the jury to the pleadings to ascertain for themselves what the issues were; that the construction of the pleadings and the issues raised thereby are questions for the court alone to determine, and not for the jury.

"The difficulty which even learned judges often encounter in defining the issues as joined in the pleadings is argument sufficient in support of the rule. It would not conduce to a full and fair trial that jurors, inexperienced in such matters, were left to determine the issues from the pleadings."

In Burns v. Oliphant, 78 Iowa 456, 43 N.W. 289, it was said:

"The necessity of the judge defining the issues is too apparent to be questioned, and however pressing the demands may be upon the time of the court, a plain and concise statement of the issues should always be given to the jury.

"The case of Myer v. Moon, 45 Kan. 580, 26 P. 40, practically announces the doctrine contended for here, for while in that case the court referred the jury to the pleadings for the terms of a contract therein set out, yet the court stated the issues in its charge.

"It is the province of the court to determine the issues and state them to the jury, and not leave them to ascertain the effect of the pleadings...