Kansas City v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WERTZ
• Citation: Kansas City v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 360 P.2d 29, 187 Kan. 701 (Kan. 1961)
• Decision Date: 04 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 42066,42066
• Parties: KANSAS CITY, Kansas, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Merck & Company, Inc., Girten Sales Company, Board of Tax Appeals of the State of Kansas, Board of Trustees of Quindaro Township, R. W. Jensen, County Clerk of Wyandotte County, Kansas, and V. R. Donegan, County Treasurer of Wyandotte County, Kansas, Appellees.

Page 29

360 P.2d 29

187 Kan. 701

KANSAS CITY, Kansas, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Merck & Company, Inc. Girten Sales Company, Board of Tax Appeals of the State of Kansas, Board of Trustees of Quindaro Township, R. W Jensen, County Clerk of Wyandotte County, Kansas, and V. R Donegan, County Treasurer of Wyandotte County, Kansas, Appellees.

No. 42066.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 4, 1961.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In the absence of statutory provision therefor, district courts are without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonjudicial acts of administrative officials or boards.

2. In the absence of special statutory provision for appellate review of nonjudicial acts of administrative officials or boards, relief by persons aggrieved by abuse of power or by unauthorized exercise of power by such officials or boards is to be found in such equitable remedies as quo warranto, mandamus or injunction.

3. The provisions for appeal to the district court from a final order of the board of tax appeals, under G.S.1957 Supp., 74-2426, are applicable only to such matters as are appealed to that board from the orders of the director of revenue or the director of property valuation (G.S.1957 Supp., 74-2437 and 74-2438) and have no application to orders made by the board of tax appeals on original applications for relief of tax grievances under the provisions of G.S.1949, 79-1702.

Leo J. Moroney, City Counselor, Kansas City, argued the cause, and C. W. Brenneisen, Jr., City Atty., and Joseph T. Carey and Joseph A. Bukaty, Deputy City Attys., Kansas City, were with him on the briefs, for appellant.

Robert F. Bennett, Prairie Village, argued the cause, and Robert F. Lytle, Prairie Village, was on the brief, for appellees Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and Merck & Co., Inc.

Ervin G. Johnston, Kansas City, was on the brief for appellee Girten Sales Co.

James J. Lysaught, Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee Board of Trustees of Quindaro Township.

Jean Evans, Topeka, was on the brief for appellee Board of Tax Appeals.

WERTZ, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the trial court sustaining appellees' motions to dismiss appellant's attempted appeal from an order of the board of tax appeals on the ground that the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain such appeal. The appellant, the city of Kansas City, will hereinafter be referred to as the city, and the appellees named in the title will be referred to as appellees or taxpayers, as applicable. The pertinent facts follow.

In February, 1956, the city, by ordinance, annexed an industrial district in which the taxpayers' property was located. This property was placed on the tax assessment rolls of the city and a levy was made against it. The mentioned taxpayers paid their taxes in accordance with the levy. Subsequent to the passage of the annexation ordinance, a quo warranto proceeding was filed in this court attacking the validity thereof. This court declared the ordinance invalid. State ex rel. Martin v. City of Kansas City, 181 Kan. 870, 317 P.2d 806.

In July, 1957, in conformity with G.S.1949, 79-1702, the taxpayers caused to be filed with the board of tax appeals their applications for relief from tax grievances, praying for a modification of the levy and a return of the taxes assessed and paid by virtue of the annexation. Subsequent to our mentioned decision holding the ordinance invalid, the board of tax appeals, on May 28, 1958, entered its orders under the mentioned statute, finding, in substance, that the tax levied by the city was wrongful and the property upon which it was levied was outside the corporate limits of the city, and ordered the county treasurer to refund to the taxpayers the taxes collected from the illegal levy by the city. On June 4, the city attempted to appeal to the district court of Wyandotte county from the orders of the board of tax appeals. Its notice of appeal was filed under the provisions of G.S.1957 Supp., 74-2426.

Motions to dismiss were lodged against the appeal on various grounds, among which was that the district court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and was without appellate power to review the action of the board of tax appeals. These motions were sustained and the appeal was dismissed, from which orders the city appeals to this court.

The determinative question in this case is whether there is a right to appeal to the district court from an order of the board of tax appeals made on an original application for relief from a tax grievance filed under G.S.1949, 79-1702, and if not, whether G.S.1957 Supp., 74-2426 authorizes appeals from orders made under section 79-1702. Attention is invited to the pertinent portion of G.S.1957 [187 Kan. 703] Supp., 74-2439, which transferred jurisdiction from the state commission of revenue and taxation to the board of tax appeals.

Apart form the general appellate jurisdiction of the district court over all inferior tribunals exercising judicial powers conferred by the civil code (G.S.1949, 60-3301), that court has no inherent appellate jurisdiction over the official acts of public boards or public officers. Where the latter do not transcend their statutory powers or do not act fraudulently or oppressively, their official acts cannot be challenged in court, except where the legislature has made some special provision for a judicial review. In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 140 Kan. 465, 467, 37 P.2d 7.

However, the courts are always open to hear meritorious complaints against illegal or...