Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Commission

• Decision Date: 06 January 1951
• Docket Number: KANSAS-NEBRASKA,37924,37920,Nos. 37921,s. 37921
• Citation: 170 Kan. 341,225 P.2d 1054
• Parties: NATURAL GAS CO., Inc. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION et al. NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION et al. PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE CO. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1054

225 P.2d 1054

170 Kan. 341

KANSAS-NEBRASKA NATURAL GAS CO., Inc. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION et al.

NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION et al.

PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE CO. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION et al.

Nos. 37921, 37920, 37924.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 6, 1951.

M. F. Cosgrove, of Topeka, and James D. Conway, of Hastings, Neb., and D. B. Lang, of Scott City, were on the briefs, for appellant Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Company, Inc.

Mark H. Adams, of Wichita, and Lawrence I. Shaw, of Omaha, Neb., and A. M. Fleming, of Garden City, on the briefs, for appellant Northern Natural Gas Company.

Louis R. Gates, of Kansas City, and Mark H. Adams, of Wichita, and Edw. H. Lange, of Kansas City, Mo., on the briefs, for appellant Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company.

Jay Kyle, General Counsel, State Corporation Commission, of Topeka, R. C. Woodward, Special Counsel, of El Dorado, and Howard T. Fleeson and Dale M. Stucky, both of Wichita, of counsel, for appellees.

HARVEY, Chief Justice.

In their motion for rehearing counsel for appellants contend that since the large percentage of the gas produced or purchased by appellants in the Hugoton gas field is transported in interstate commerce and sold for resale in other states the authority to determine a wellhead value of gas and to make a price fixing order is vested in the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 et seq., and not in the State Corporation Commission, citing Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 331 U.S. 682, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 91 L.Ed. 1742, as having fully determined the matter. The point is not well taken and the case cited does not support that view. The opinion cited and the opinions in the same case in the inferior courts clearly demonstrate the contrary. The case originated by a complaint filed in 1939 by the Louisiana Public Service Commission with the Federal Power Commission, complaining of rates for the sale of gas in Louisiana, transporting it interstate by the Interstate Natural Gas Company. On December 5, 1939, the Federal Power Commission enlarged the scope of the investigation to include the reasonableness of all of Interstate's wholesale and transportation rates under the provisions of the Natural Gas Act. The cities of New Orleans and Baton Rouge were permitted to intervene. Pursuant to notice and after pretrial conferences hearings were had in June and July, 1942. Pending the consideration of the matter Interstate voluntarily reduced rates for the sale of its gas. After a full investigation of the matter the Federal Power Commission made an order requiring Interstate to file a new schedule of rates and charges for the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce to its customers for resale for ultimate consumption, in amount not less than $1,100,345 annually, computed upon the amount of gas sold in 1941. (See F.P.C., Vol. 3, pp. 416 to 435.) It appears this schedule of rates reduced the price to the other pipe line companies from 7.39 cents to 4.66 cents per M.c.f. The Interstate petitioned the United States Circuit Court of Appeals to review that part of the order. The court's opinion is reported in 5 Cir., 156 F.2d 949, 951. There Interstate contended, (1) 'that the sales were not within, but were expressly excluded from, the jurisdiction of the commission; and (2) that the order as to them is confiscatory.' On the first point Interstate relied on the language of the act and what it called 'authorized statements of commission representatives', and 'legislative history'. The court said:

'On the jurisdictional point, we think the language employed in the bill as it finally passed, 'The provisions of this act shall apply * * * to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption, and to natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale' leaves in no doubt that the sales in question are within its purview. That they are sales in interstate commerce, we think is settled by the authorities. That the gas was sold for resale for ultimate public consumption, we think may not be doubted. (This was conceded before the Federal Power Commission, see 3 F.P.C. 419.) This being so, the exception of the statute that it shall not apply to 'any other * * * sale of natural gas' is unavailing to petitioner, for if the sale is the kind named in the first quoted clause, it certainly cannot be 'any other sale'.'

There is further discussion on this point in which the court cites Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 127 F.2d 153, and Canadian River Gas Co., 324 U.S. 581, at pages 602-603, 65 S.Ct. 829, 839, 89 L.Ed. 1206. The court pointed out that the portion of the petitioner's brief devoted to legislative history shows that it does not distinguish between the Lee bill, House Bill No. 11,662, proposed in 1936 but never passed and the bill which became the law now under review, and said:

'Legislative history 'cannot be resorted to for the purpose of construing a statute cantrary to the natural import of its terms. * * * If the language be clear, it is conclusive.' (Citing cases.) Certainly the legislative history of a bill that was not adopted cannot be resorted to to construe a bill that was. * * *

'The...