Kaolin Workers Union v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1433 C.D. 2015,1433 C.D. 2015
• Citation: 140 A.3d 748
• Parties: KAOLIN WORKERS UNION, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

140 A.3d 748

KAOLIN WORKERS UNION, Petitioner

v.PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.

No. 1433 C.D. 2015

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 11, 2016.

Decided June 15, 2016.

Samuel L. Spear, Philadelphia, for petitioner.

Carolyn M. Sargent, Harrisburg, for respondent.

W. James Young, Springfield, VA, for intervenor Roberto Morales.

Jennifer E. Will, Harrisburg, for intervenor Kaolin Mushroom Farms, Inc.

BEFORE: MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge, and RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, and ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge, and P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, and PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, and ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, and MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge.

OPINION BY Judge ANNE E. COVEY.

Kaolin Workers Union (Union) petitions this Court for review of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board's (Board) July 21, 2015 order dismissing the Union's exceptions and finalizing the Nisi Order of Decertification. The sole issue before this Court is whether the Board erred by adopting the three-year contract bar provision¹ contained in Pennsylvania's Public Employe Relations Act (PERA)² and applying it to an action filed under the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act (PLRA).³

On September 15, 2014, Roberto Morales (Morales), an employee of Kaolin Mushroom Farms (Employer), filed a Petition for Decertification (Petition) with the Board under the PLRA, alleging that 30% or more of Employer's employees no longer desired to be represented by the Union, and requesting the Board to schedule a hearing and order an election pursuant to Section 7(c) of the PLRA.⁴ The Petition was accompanied by a Showing of Interest to support Morales' contention that at least 30% of the eligible employees desired to decertify the Union as their bargaining representative. On September 24, 2014, the Board Secretary (Secretary) dismissed the Petition as untimely. The Secretary stated that, pursuant to Section 7(c) of the PLRA, the Petition was barred by the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which expires on October 2, 2016.

On October 14, 2014, Morales and Employer each filed timely exceptions with the Board challenging the Petition's dismissal. Morales alleged in his exceptions that the parties' CBA is effective from August 3, 2009 through October 2, 2016, and that allowing the parties' seven-year contract to bar the Petition would be an unreasonable limit on the employees' associational rights under the PLRA. Both Morales and Employer urged the Board to apply a three-year contract bar to the present matter and allow an election to be held. On October 31, 2014, the Union filed a Charge of Unfair Labor Practices against Employer.

On November 4, 2014, the Union filed a Response to Exceptions alleging that Morales and Employer conceded that the Petition was barred by the parties' CBA. The Union further asserted that the Board is not authorized to adopt a three-year contract bar in contravention of Section 7(c) of the PLRA. On November 18, 2014, citing to the Board's previous adoption of the three-year contract bar under the PLRA and the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act, commonly referred to as Act 111,⁵ the Board remanded the matter to the Secretary with the direction to order a hearing. On November 24, 2014, the Secretary issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing setting December 23, 2014 as the hearing date for the Union's unfair labor practice charge. The hearing was continued at the parties' request. On January 5, 2015, the Board received a letter from the Union withdrawing the charge.

On January 23, 2015, the Board issued an Order and Notice of Hearing directing that a prehearing telephone conference (Conference) be held on February 11, 2015, and a hearing be held on March 10, 2015 before a Board Hearing Examiner concerning Morales' Petition. During the February 11, 2015 Conference, the parties agreed to consider entering into a memorandum of agreement for the conduct of an election (Memoranda). On March 2, 2015, Employer, Morales and the Union filed identical Memoranda which each executed, wherein, they stipulated to the bargaining unit composition, the election site, the ballot position, the eligibility list, and other matters pertaining to the conduct of the election. On March 6, 2015, the Board issued an Order and Notice of Decertification Election directing that a secret ballot election be conducted on March 19, 2015 among Employer's eligible employees to ascertain whether the employees wished the Union to continue to be their exclusive bargaining representative.

On March 19, 2015, a Board election officer conducted the election. The election results were 67 votes for the Union and 94 votes for No Representative. On March 27, 2015, the Board issued a Nisi Order of Decertification certifying the election's results and decertifying the Union as the exclusive representative of the Employer's employees within the stipulated bargaining unit. On April 14, 2015, the Union filed timely exceptions with the Board challenging the Board's adoption of a three-year contract bar contrary to Section 7(c) of the PLRA, and its Order remanding the matter for a hearing and decertification election. In its exceptions, the Union reiterated the arguments it had set forth in its November 4, 2014 exception response. On May 6, 2015, Employer timely responded to the exceptions. On July 21, 2015, the Board dismissed the Union's exceptions and finalized the Nisi Order of Decertification. The Union appealed to this Court.⁶

Initially, Section 2 of the PLRA expressly provides in pertinent part:

(b) Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employes to organize and bargain collectively removes certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, encourages practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours or other working conditions, and tends to restore equality of bargaining power between employers and employes.

(c) In the interpretation and application of [the PLRA] and otherwise, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and to protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection, free from the interference, restraint or coercion of their employers.

(d) All the provisions of [the PLRA] shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of this purpose.

43 P.S. § 211.2 (emphasis added). Further,

[C]ourts will not review the actions of governmental bodies or administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power; they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into the details of the manner adopted to carry them into execution ... [T]he mere possession of discretionary power by an administrative body does not make it wholly immune from judicial review, but the scope of that review is limited to the determination of whether there has been a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency's duties or functions. That the court might have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of the agency is not a sufficient ground for interference; judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative discretion.

[Pa. Soc. Servs. Union, Local 668 v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 481 Pa. 81, 392 A.2d 256 (1978) ] (quoting ... In re Petition of Acchione , 227 A.2d 816, 820 (1967) ). The Board's determination in discharging its duty under PERA is entitled to a measure of deference from reviewing courts.

Ass'n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Faculties v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 607 Pa. 461, 8 A.3d 300, 304–05 (2010).

The Union argues that the last sentence of Section 7(c) of the PLRA requires a contract bar until the end of the current CBA which, in this case, would be October 2, 2016. Section 7(c) of the PLRA provides in its entirety:

Whenever a question arises concerning the representation of employes[,] the [B]oard may, and, upon request of a labor organization, or an employer who has not committed an act herein defined as unfair labor practice, or any group of employes in an appropriate unit representing by petition [30%] or more of the employes of that unit, shall investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives who have been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the [B]oard shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under [S]ection [8 of the PLRA, 43 P.S. § 211.8 ], or otherwise, and may utilize any suitable method to ascertain such representatives, except that if either party to the controversy so requests, a secret ballot of employes shall be taken within twenty days after such request is filed. Any certification of representatives by the [B]oard shall be binding for a period of one year, or for a longer period if the contract so provides, even though the unit may have changed its labor organization membership.

43 P.S. § 211.7(c) (emphasis added).

The Board maintains that the term of “one year or ... longer ... if the contract so provides,” refers to the Union's original certification and does not reset with every new contract. Id. The Board explained that the purpose of the one-year contract bar or longer if the contract so provides is to give the newly elected union at least a year to bargain with the employer without fear of a rival union coming in and pushing it out before the newly elected union has had an opportunity to bargain for a CBA. The Board specifically opined that “Section 7(c) of the PLRA does not set forth a maximum limit on the number of years that a contract may bar a representation petition.” Board Final Order at 2 (emphasis added). Based upon...