Kaplan v. Cnty. of Orange

• Decision Date: 23 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-CV-1382 (KMK),20-CV-1382 (KMK)
• Citation: 528 F.Supp.3d 141
• Parties: Frederick KAPLAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

528 F.Supp.3d 141

Frederick KAPLAN, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al., Defendants.

No. 20-CV-1382 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed March 23, 2021

Eugene M. Bellin, Esq., New York, NY, Counsel for Plaintiff.

Richard A. Ashman, Esq., Michelstein & Ashman, PLLC, New York, NY, Counsel for Plaintiff.

Harold L. Moroknek, Esq., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman and Goggin, Rye Brook, NY, Counsel for Defendants Town of Warwick, Alton S. Morley, Frederick M. Hoffman, Shawn Tetzlaff, and Thomas E. Maslanka.

Nadia E. Niazi, Esq., Finkelstein Blankinship Frei-Pearson & Garber LLP, White Plains, NY, Counsel for Defendants Town of Warwick, Alton S. Morley, Frederick M. Hoffman, Shawn Tetzlaff, and Thomas E. Maslanka.

Louis U. Gasparini, Esq., Schwab & Gasparini, PLLC, White Plains, NY, Counsel for Defendants Access: Supports for Living Inc., Laura Altieri, and Jane Doe.

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:

Frederick Kaplan ("Plaintiff") brings this Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the County of Orange (the "County"), Darcie M. Miller ("Miller"), Access: Supports for Living Inc. ("Access Inc."), Laura Altieri ("Altieri"), Jane Doe ("Doe"), the Town of Warwick (the "Town"), Alton S. Morley ("Morley"), Frederick M. Hoffman ("Hoffman"), Shawn Tetzlaff ("Tetzlaff"), and Thomas E. Maslanka ("Maslanka" and, collectively, "Defendants"). Before the Court are two Motions To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, one on behalf of Access Inc., Altieri, and Doe (the "Access Defendants"), (see Dkt. No. 37), and one on behalf of Morley, Hoffman, Tetzlaff, Maslanka, and the Town (the "Town Defendants"), (see Dkt. No. 39). For the following reasons, Access Defendants’ Motion is granted, and Town Defendants’ Motion is denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint and are taken as true for the purposes of resolving the instant Motions.

This case revolves around an incident that took place on March 13, 2019, when police forcibly removed Plaintiff from his home and took him to a local hospital, where he was detained out of concern for his mental health. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 41–42, 52–59 (Dkt. No. 1).) Plaintiff alleges that his removal and detention were based on false information provided by an employee of Access Inc., a private organization working in conjunction with the County. (See id. ¶ 41.) The Court will outline the relationship between Access Inc. and the County before summarizing the events of March 13.

1. Access Inc.’s Mobile Mental Health Team

At some point prior to the events in question, the County entered into an agreement with Access Inc., a corporation organized under New York law. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.) The purpose of this agreement was for Access Inc. "to perform certain services on behalf of" the County's Department of Mental Health. (Id. ¶ 13.) Pursuant to this agreement, the County authorized Access Inc. to operate a "Mobile Mental Health Team" that would assess "persons possibly in need of immediate hospitalization due to mental disease or defect." (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that the County "delegated responsibility" for making such determinations to Access Inc. and Altieri, who served as the assistant director of the Mobile Mental Health Team operated by Access Inc. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.)

2. Plaintiff's Removal and Detention

Plaintiff alleges that on March 13, 2019, Altieri "falsely informed" Miller, the Commissioner of the County's Department of Mental Health, that Plaintiff "was exhibiting behavior indicating that he was in immediate need of care and treatment for a mental illness which was likely to result in serious harm to himself or to others." (Id. ¶¶ 8, 41.) Pursuant to § 9.45 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law ("MHL"), Miller issued an "Authorization for Custody/Transportation of a Person Alleged to be Mentally Ill" (the "Removal Order"). (Id. ¶ 42.) The Removal Order identified Altieri as the source of information regarding Plaintiff's behavior. (Id. ¶ 43.) Although the Removal Order also identified Altieri "as a licensed psychologist, registered professional nurse[,] or certified [s]ocial [w]orker currently responsible for providing treatment services to [P]laintiff," (id. ¶ 44), Plaintiff alleges that Altieri "never provided treatment services" to him, and thus, the representation contained in the Removal Order was false, (id. ¶¶ 45–46).

On March 13, after Miller issued the Removal Order, Altieri delivered it to the Town of Warwick Police Department (the "Town Police"). (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff alleges that Miller, along with Altieri and an unidentified employee of Access Inc. ("Jane Doe"), (id. ¶ 23), asked the Town Police to arrest Plaintiff, (id. ¶ 50). Plaintiff further alleges that Altieri "importuned" Morley, Hoffman, Tetzlaff, and Maslanka (the "Individual Town Defendants")—each of whom served as police officers for the Town Police, (see id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 31, 33)—"to seize and arrest" Plaintiff and transport him to Orange Regional Medical Center ("Orange Regional"), (id. ¶ 51).

On the same day, Altieri, Doe, and Individual Town Defendants entered Plaintiff's property and forcibly entered his residence. (Id. ¶¶ 52–53.) Individual Town Defendants allegedly forced Plaintiff to the ground, sat on his back to prevent him from standing, and then handcuffed and arrested him. (Id. ¶¶ 54–56, 58.) Plaintiff alleges, without elaboration, that Altieri and Doe also "participated" in his seizure and arrest. (Id. ¶ 57.) Plaintiff emphasizes that none of these Defendants had a "valid warrant issued by a disinterested judicial officer authorizing [his] arrest." (Id. ¶ 60.) After Plaintiff had been arrested, Morley and Tetzlaff transported him to Orange Regional, (id. ¶ 59), where Altieri "importuned" physicians "to detain [him] ... indefinitely," allegedly "despite [a] lack of probable cause to believe that he was a danger to himself or to others," (id. ¶ 61). Plaintiff was involuntarily held at Orange Regional for approximately six hours before being released. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 62.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 18, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Miller and the County ("County Defendants") filed an Answer on March 23, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 20.) After receiving an extension of time to respond to the Complaint, (see Dkt. No. 15), Altieri and Access Inc. filed a pre-motion letter regarding their proposed motion to dismiss on April 13, 2020, (see Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiff responded on April 20, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 26.) Meanwhile, on April 17, 2020, the Court granted Town Defendants’ request for an extension of time to respond to the Complaint, (see Dkt. No. 25), and, on May 19, 2020, Town Defendants filed a pre-motion letter regarding their proposed motion to dismiss, (see Dkt. No. 30). Plaintiff responded on May 26, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 32.)

The Court held a pre-motion conference on June 3, 2020 and adopted a briefing schedule for Defendants’ respective motions. (See Dkt. No. 36; Dkt. (minute entry for June 3, 2020).) Access Defendants filed their Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers on July 8, 2020, (see Dkt. Nos. 37–38), and Town Defendants filed same on July 10, 2020, (see Dkt. Nos. 39–40). Plaintiff filed his Opposition on August 31, 2020. (See Dkt. Nos. 41–43.) Town Defendants filed their Reply on September 24, 2020, (see Dkt. No. 46), and Access Defendants filed their Reply on September 30, 2020, (see Dkt. No. 47). On December 1, 2020, Access Defendants filed a letter notifying the Court of recent supplemental authority from the Northern District of New York, (see Dkt. No. 48), and Plaintiff responded on December 2, 2020, (see Dkt. No. 49).

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his [or her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed," id. ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) )); id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (" Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept...