Kaplan v. Kaplan
| Decision Date | 14 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:10-cv-237-FtM-38CM |
| Parties | ALEXANDER L. KAPLAN, Plaintiff, v. LEON KAPLAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Leon Kaplan's Renewed Motion for Final Disposition (Doc. #204) filed on March 17, 2014. Plaintiff Alexander L. Kaplan filed his Opposition to Defendant's Motion (Doc. #205) on March 26, 2014. This motion is now ripe for review.
Decedent Mack Kaplan died testate on July 28, 2006, and probate began one month later in In re Estate of Mack Kaplan, No. 06-843-CP-02-LDM (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct). After considering competing petitions from Defendant and Plaintiff, the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County, Florida (hereinafter "probatecourt") appointed Defendant as the personal representative of the estate. Extensive and contentious litigation followed. (Doc. #184 at 1 n.1).
On April 21, 2010, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendant for breach of fiduciary duty, violation of Florida's "Prudent Investor Rule," and negligent retention of counsel. (Doc. #1; Doc. #43). Each wrong alleged by Plaintiff occurred during Defendant's administration of the estate. After lengthy discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment (Doc. #120) on April 20, 2012. The Court, however, stayed this action until the probate court entered final judgment. (Doc. #184).
On May 14, 2013, the probate court entered an Order Approving Interim and Final Accountings. (Doc. #192-1). Defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment (Doc. #192), arguing that the probate court disposed of all objections Plaintiff could have raised to Defendant's administration of the estate, including those raised in the First Amended Complaint (Doc. #43). Defendant also noted that Plaintiff's time to appeal the probate court's order had expired. To that end, Defendant requested that the Court lift the stay and dismiss the case on grounds of res judicata. The Court, however, denied Defendant's motion (Doc. #192) because the probate court had not entered final judgment. The case was stayed until such entry. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed the stay order to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. #190).
While this action was on appeal, Defendant served Plaintiff with the estate's final accounting and a petition for discharge in the probate court. (Doc. #192-3, Doc. #192-4, Doc. #192-5). The final accounting disclosed each of the estate's assets and expenses. (Doc. #192-3). Plaintiff's only objection to the final accounting concerned the amount and propriety of the attorneys' fees. (Doc. #192-6). After a properly noticed hearing, theprobate court entered an Order Approving Interim and Final Accounting, which overruled Plaintiff's objection. (Doc. #192-1, Doc. #192-8). Plaintiff did not appeal, and the time to do so has expired.
Defendant then filed another motion for summary judgment (Doc. #192) in this Court on September 18, 2013. The Court again denied Defendant's motion because the probate court had not entered a final judgment. (Doc. #202). As a result of the Court's order, Defendant renewed his petition for discharge, which the probate court granted on February 26, 2014. (Doc. #204-1). Plaintiff did not challenge the probate court's final judgment, and his time to do so has expired.
On March 17, 2014, Defendant filed a Renewed Motion for Final Disposition as to the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. #204). In his Motion, Defendant notes that the probate court entered an Order of Discharge (Doc. #204-1), releasing him from liability. Defendant also points out that Plaintiff did not challenge this final judgment. Since the probate matter is considered rendered under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), Defendant requests that the Court lift the stay and dismiss this case on grounds of res judicata.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Similarly, an issue of fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In deciding whether the moving party has met this initial burden, the Court must review the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Whatley v. CNA Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999). Once the Court determines that the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts and the non-moving party must present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial that precludes summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "The evidence presented cannot consist of conclusory allegations, legal conclusions or evidence which would be inadmissible at trial." Demyan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11 th Cir. 1991)). Failure to show sufficient evidence of any essential element is fatal to the claim and the Court should grant the summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Conversely, if reasonable minds could find a genuine issue of material fact then summary judgment should be denied. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992).
As stated, Defendant moves for summary judgment based on the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata bars parties to an action from relitigating matters that were, or could have been, litigated in an earlier suit. The doctrine facilitates "the conclusive resolution of disputes" by reducing "the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[ing] judicial resources, and foster[ing] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions." Montana v. United States, 440U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979). In accordance with these principals, res judicata bars a claim whenever (1) a court of competent jurisdiction has (2) rendered a final judgment on the merits in another case involving (3) the same parties and (4) the same cause of action. See Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Fraser v. Se. First Bank of Jacksonville, 417 So. 2d 707, 710 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (). When considering the fourth requirement, a court must determine if the Rubbermaid, 193 F.3d at 1239 (citation omitted).
Here, the parties do not dispute the first three elements. Rather, they square off as to whether the causes of action before the probate court and this Court are the same. Defendant maintains that he cannot be individually liable because the probate court properly resolved each allegation in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. #204 at 5-6) In contrast, Plaintiff emphasizes that he is suing Defendant in his individual capacity and that the probate court only addressed matters as they related to Defendant in his capacity as the personal representative of the estate. (Doc. #205 at 2). According to Plaintiff, "the probate judge refused Defendant's request to be discharged from personal liability." (Id. (emphasis in original)). Plaintiff further argues that Defendant misleadingly asserts that the probate court disposed of all of his claims in this action. (Id.).
Under Florida law, the probate court may enter an appealable final order discharging the personal representative after receiving evidence that the estate has been fully administered and properly distributed. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.400(e); see also Fla. Stat.§ 733.901(1) (). Once discharged, actions against the personal representative in his capacity as the representative and individually are barred. See Fla. Stat. § 733.901(2). However, a personal representative is released from individual liability only if he discloses to the probate court the disposition of the disputed estate assets. See Van Dusen v. Southeast First Nat'l Bank of Miami, 478 So. 2d 82, 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (). In other words, "the price of immunity is disclosure." Id. Thus, after the closing of probate, a federal action remains only with respect to those matters that the personal representative did not disclose, the beneficiaries did not know about, and the probate judge did not adjudicate. See Kaplan v. Kaplan, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1311 (M.D. Fla. 2013) ().
In accordance with the above principles, the Court finds that Defendant properly disclosed to the probate court the disposition of the estate's assets that Plaintiff challenges in this action. In Counts 2 and 4 of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached his fiduciary duties as the personal representative of the estate by (1) submitting improper "bills for travel, hotel, food, etc."; (2) billing "double" for guardianship costs; (3) abandoning Decedent's "valuable personal property"; (4) failing to pay Decedent's pharmacy bill timely; (5) failing to pay Decedent's...
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