Kaplan v. State, 82-867

• Citation: 451 So.2d 1386
• Decision Date: 13 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-867,82-867
• Parties: Dennis Scott KAPLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

Page 1386

451 So.2d 1386

Dennis Scott KAPLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 82-867.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Fourth District.

June 13, 1984.

William Snow Frates and Lauri B. Waldman of Frates, Beinstock & Sheehe, Miami, and Windsor, Bernstein & Byrne, Plantation, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Lydia M. Valenti, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

HURLEY, Judge.

Dennis Kaplan was convicted of sexual battery. ¹ The trial court withheld imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on three years' probation with the special condition that he serve 120 days in the county jail. On appeal, the defendant complains that the trial court erred in applying Florida's rape victim shield statute ² to limit cross-examination of the victim. We disagree.

The victim in this case accompanied her boyfriend to a bar. While there, she became upset with her boyfriend for paying attention to other female patrons and, in response, she struck up a conversation with the defendant. After a short time, she agreed to leave with the defendant to go to another bar. When they found that the second bar was closed, the victim asked to be driven back to the first bar. The defendant, however, drove in the opposite direction and eventually pulled into an open field. There he beat the victim about the head and chest and committed vaginal and anal penetration. The defendant then drove off, leaving the victim in the field. She immediately walked to the nearest house and asked the occupant to call the police.

The examining physician testified that the victim had a bleeding abrasion in her anus. In addition, the doctor observed dried blood on her right temple and left elbow. Her lip was swollen, her breasts had black and blue marks and, on the inner part of her arms, there were three-inch marks. Both of her knees were scraped and reddened.

During a proffer outside the jury's presence, the defense elicited from the victim that, in addition to her boyfriend with whom she had resided for three years, she had engaged in sexual intercourse with three men. She knew two of the men for substantial periods of time before engaging in sexual intercourse. She met the third man in a bar and had sex on their second date. The trial court ruled the foregoing evidence inadmissible because it did not constitute a pattern of similar conduct.

Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part:

Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 794.011. However, ... when consent by the victim is at issue, such evidence may be admitted if it is first established to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent.

To fulfill the requirements of the statute, it must be established that the victim engaged in a pattern of conduct or behavior extremely similar to the defendant's version of the encounter. The term "pattern" denotes repetitive or frequent conduct. McElveen v. State, 415 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). One episode is not sufficient. Hodges v. State, 386 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Moreover, the pattern must be so distinctive and so closely resemble the defendant's version of the encounter that it tends to prove that the complainant consented to the acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented. Cf. State v. Wilhite, 58 N.C.App. 654, 294 S.E.2d 396 (1982), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 129, 297 S.E.2d 403 (1982), remanded for resentencing, 308 N.C. 798, 303 S.E.2d 788 (1983). Only when these statutory requirements are met does the probative value of the evidence outweigh its prejudicial impact.

An analysis of the proffered evidence in this case shows that one incident remotely resembled the defendant's account. But, as indicated in Hodges, supra, "one episode of sexual intercourse ... hardly establishes a 'pattern of conduct or behavior' on the part of the victim ...." Id. at 889. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the evidence because it was devoid of any logical tendency to prove or disprove the defense of consent.

It is important to note that Florida's rape victim shield statute does not exclude evidence that is otherwise admissible. Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), is merely a codification of this jurisdiction's rule of relevance as it applies to the sexual behavior of a sexually battered victim. We recognize, however, that the defendant's right to full and fair cross-examination, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, may limit the statute's application when evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is relevant to show bias or motive to lie. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981); State v. Jalo, 27 Or.App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In this respect, we have carefully examined the defendant's contention that the excluded evidence was relevant to establish the victim's motive. We find, however, that his claim is without merit. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly excluded the evidence under the rape victim shield statute. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.

WALDEN, J., dissents with opinion.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge, concurring specially:

Cynics could call this, as they could any other period of time past, the age of apathy and complacency. Others take the tentative, positive steps of shaking their heads at the evidentiary episodes of insensitivity and sighing: "Gee, that's a shame." Still others, having recognized, at the root, a "business as usual" attitude that permeates the fabric of government, the professions, commerce and social structures, keep chipping away at this huge societal slug.

Women of the third category, aware they are fully capable of competing equally with men in the exercise of intellectual and emotional leadership, have appropriately chipped away at the anachronistic apathy of males to the violation of the bodily and mental dignity of females. In the realm of dialogue over rape and sexual battery, results do not come easy. Men control the legislatures and the courts.

I quail at the harm done women by network television's sensationalized coverage of the gang rape of a woman in a bar in New Bedford, Massachusetts, and ensuing court proceedings. Before the exploitation of the victim in that case for the lascivious entertainment of New Englanders to watch, rape was unquestionably the least likely to be reported of the serious crimes. Now those that engage in rape must be gleeful in the realistic expectation that sexually battered women, heretofore hesitant to come forward and be subjected to the stress of a criminal prosecution, will for certain elect to suffer in silence after being violated.

The reaction of basically male legislators to the legitimate demands of the females who are the potential victims of rape is as varied as the water in each state. In 1974, the Florida Legislature, by 74-121, Laws of Florida, revised Chapter 794, Florida Statutes. It changed the name of the crime from rape and carnal knowledge to sexual battery, and eliminated the death penalty except for crimes against children under twelve by assailants over seventeen. It further expressed the social value judgment of Floridians' legislative representatives by codifying the admissibility, in a limited fashion, of prior sexual conduct of the victim with persons other than the accused.

The legislation has been the subject of criticism in one law review student note and has been mentioned in one comprehensive law review article. The former, Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform But Bias Against The Victim Still Prevails, 30 University of Florida Law Review 419 (1978) suggests, with respect to that portion of the statute dealing with prior sexual activity:

While some other states are modernizing their rules of evidence concerning the prior sexual activity of the victim, Florida has failed to follow the trend of reform. Instead the Florida Legislature has produced a careless codification of some of the case law and judicial custom. Furthermore, the new statute is silent with respect to reputation evidence concerning the victim's chastity, with the result that case law must be followed.[ ³ Not only are there substantive defects in section 794.022(2) of the Florida Statutes, but flaws in form are present as well.

Id. at 435 (footnotes omitted). The latter, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Columbia Law Review 1 (1977), by Vivian Berger, Assistant Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, reviews all of the "rape shield" statutes which had been enacted as of that time, from those of Louisiana and Michigan, which have a strict exclusionary preference, to those of Texas and New Mexico at the other end of the spectrum. She adds:

California, in a pattern followed by some other states, prohibits--with only two exceptions--the introduction of this proof in order to show that the woman consented. The Act however, cautions that nothing within the law "shall be construed to make inadmissible any evidence offered to attack the credibility of the complaining witness ...." Florida, by contrast, states a general rule of exclusion for proof of the victim's sexual conduct with third parties, but provides for admission under certain conditions when the victim's consent is placed in issue; impeachment is not referred to at all.

Id. at 35-36 (footnotes omitted). ⁴ Professor Berger's article concludes with a proposed model statute.

The...