Kapps v. Wing

Decision Date04 April 2005
Docket NumberDocket No. 04-1271-cv(CON).,Docket No. 03-9117-cv(L).
Citation404 F.3d 105
PartiesEileen KAPPS, Geraldine Boyland, Alice Costello, Joan Ford, Joanne Karl and Margaret Riley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Brian J. WING, as Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance of the New York State Department of Family Assistance, Jason A. Turner, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services and Jerry Cammarata, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Youth and Community Development, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Peter Vollmer, Law Offices of Vollmer and Tanck, Jericho, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Grace Goodman, Assistant Corporation Counsel for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York (Larry A. Sonnenshein, of counsel), New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellants Cammarata and Turner.

Oren L. Zeve, Assistant Solicitor General for Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York (Michael S. Belohlavek, Deputy Solicitor General, of counsel), New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Wing.

Before: CALABRESI, B.D. PARKER, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge.

Defendants appeal from the judgment of the district court (Gershon, J.) granting plaintiffs partial summary judgment, and entering an award of declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court based its judgment on findings that, in the administration of New York's Home Energy Assistance Program ("HEAP"), defendants violated the procedural requirements of the federal Due Process Clause, and the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Act ("the LIHEAA" or "the Act"). See Kapps v. Wing, 283 F.Supp.2d 866 (E.D.N.Y.2003). We conclude that plaintiffs' due process arguments have merit, and accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court, insofar as it found violations of due process in defendants' administration of the HEAP program. We do not, however, address the district court's alternate holding that the LIHEAA creates individually enforceable rights. Resolving this question would require us to address difficult issues. And, since the substantive relief awarded by the district court is fully supported by the finding of a due process violation, we leave these issues to another day.1

I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework

Congress enacted the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Act ("LIHEAA") in 1981 in response to the rising costs of oil-based energy. See Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir.1995). LIHEAA was intended to, and has since its passage, assisted the states in providing home energy assistance to low income families. Id. Participating states are given a block grant, which may be used for two primary purposes: 1) to assist poor families in meeting their regular heating2 costs ("regular HEAP benefits"); and 2) to intervene in energy crises to prevent any interruption in needy households' heat ("emergency HEAP benefits"). See 42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(1). While state LIHEAA programs must comply with certain federal statutory requirements, the states are, as a general matter, afforded substantial discretion in defining the specific contours of their LIHEAA program. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 8624 (setting forth the requirements for participating in the LIHEAA block grant program).

Levels of LIHEAA funding are set by Congress on an annual basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 8621. Allocated funds are distributed among participating states on the basis of a complicated statutory formula. See 42 U.S.C. § 8623. States may, but need not, choose to supplement federal funds with state monies, in order to ensure that all eligible households are provided with benefits. New York, like some other states, has opted not to supplement federal funds, and hence provides benefits only to the extent that federal funding is available in any given program year. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. § 97[2]; see also Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 16.27[3].

New York's Home Energy Assistance Program ("HEAP") was created by the New York State Legislature in 1983, in order allow the state to take advantage of the LIHEAA block grant program. Like many of New York's other social services programs, HEAP is administered jointly by the state and by local social service districts. At the state level, the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") annually sets standard eligibility criteria and benefits levels for the forthcoming year. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 393.4(c). The OTDA is also responsible for establishing a "program year," within which all HEAP applications must be received. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 393.3(a). Local social service districts are responsible for the actual processing of HEAP applications, and for notifying applicants of benefits eligibility. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 393.2. Social service districts may also contract with community organizations, known as "alternative certifiers," to process local applications for HEAP benefits. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 393.2(b).

Under regulations passed by the OTDA, there are two categories of households which may be eligible for regular HEAP benefits: 1) "[c]ategorically income eligible households"; and 2) "[i]ncome tested households." See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. &amp Regs. tit. 18, § 393.4(c). "Categorically eligible" households are those that include at least one household member who receives at least one of several specified federal or state benefits. See id. Households that are not categorically eligible may qualify for HEAP benefits by demonstrating income eligibility, in accordance with standards set by the state on an annual basis.3 Id. Once found eligible, a household's HEAP benefits allocation is determined in accordance with a complicated payment matrix, or point system. Id. This "payment matrix" takes into account such factors as family income, the energy burden ratio of the household, the amount of federal funds allocated for the year, and the presence of "vulnerable" household members.4 See id.; see also Ex. 39, Decl. of Peter Vollmer, No. 98 CIV 7734, Kapps v. Wing, 283 F.Supp.2d 866 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (reproduction of the defendants'"Heating Benefit Calculation Worksheet").

The regulations in effect at the time of the district court's decision required the defendants to process all HEAP applications within 30 business days.5 See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 393.5. Historically, however, actual processing times have deviated considerably from this regulatory goal. During the pendency of this litigation, average processing times for New York City HEAP applications have varied between 21 and 122 days. At the time that the parties briefed the motion for summary judgment in the district court, most, but not all, New York City applications were being processed within the 30 day period mandated by the state.

HEAP applicants are notified of the granting or the denial of HEAP benefits in a notice issued by the social service district or by the alternative certifier. N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 393.5(a). If the applicant has been found ineligible for benefits, this notice usually, but not always, includes very basic information on why benefits have been denied. Applicants who have been found eligible for HEAP benefits are sometimes informed of the amount of benefits they will receive. But, apart from that, they are given no information, other than that their benefits application has been approved. In all cases, the notice advises applicants that they can obtain further information in a number of ways, including by calling the social service district, or by setting up a meeting with a benefits specialist.

Ordinarily, applicants have 60 days from the date of the HEAP notice, during which they may request an administrative "fair hearing" to challenge the agency's eligibility and/or benefits level determination. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 393.5(e). Under state regulations, however, fair hearings may not be requested more than 105 days after the close of the HEAP program year. Id. As such, when HEAP applicants receive notice of the grant or denial of HEAP benefits more than 105 days after the termination of the program year, they are totally foreclosed from seeking a fair hearing. And, those applicants who receive notice of HEAP eligibility more than 45 days after the close of the program year will have less than the full 60 days within which to request a fair hearing.

B. Facts / Procedural History

Named plaintiffs Eileen Kapps, Geraldine Boyland, Alice Costello, Joan Ford, Joanne Karl and Margaret Riley filed this action in 1998. In their complaint, they alleged various violations inter alia of the LIHEAA and of the federal Due Process Clause in the defendants' administration of the New York City HEAP program. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs contended below that the denial of the right to a fair hearing (by virtue of the operation of the 105 day rule, when combined with delays in providing notification of benefits) violated due process and the LIHEAA. Plaintiffs also claimed that the HEAP notices — by failing to provide information on how the applicant's benefits eligibility and allotment was calculated — did not meet the requirements of due process.

Plaintiffs named as defendants Brian J. Wing, the Commissioner of the OTDA, Jason A. Turner, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services6 ("DSS"), and Martin Oesterreich7, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Youth and Community Development ("DYCD") (which is the city agency that coordinates the participation of alternative certifiers). Plaintiffs sought to represent themselves, and all other applicants for regular HEAP benefits in the City of New York who had been denied...

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