Kapral v. U.S., 97-5545

Decision Date25 June 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-5545,97-5545
Citation166 F.3d 565
PartiesMichael KAPRAL, Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Marcia G. Shein, National Legal Services, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Appellant.

George S. Leone, Office of U.S. Attorney, Newark, NJ, for Appellee.

Before: GREENBERG, ALITO and McKEE Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

We are asked to decide when a criminal conviction becomes "final" within the meaning of the limitations provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court ruled that the period of limitations begins to run when a defendant can no longer take a direct appeal as of right. For the reasons that follow, we rule that a conviction does not become "final" under § 2255 until expiration of the time allowed for certiorari review by the Supreme Court. Appellant Michael Kapral did not file a petition for certiorari, but he filed his § 2255 motion within one year of the date on which his time to seek certiorari review expired. We hold that his filing was timely, and we will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

Kapral pled guilty to income tax evasion, and conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at least 700 grams of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release on May 25, 1995. We affirmed the judgment of conviction on February 13, 1996. Kapral did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

On April 29, 1997, Kapral filed a counseled motion under § 2255 in which he claimed that his prior counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the resulting plea was therefore not a knowing and intelligent one. The district court did not reach the merits of Kapral's claims, however, as the court ruled that his motion was untimely filed. Under § 2255, a motion must be filed within one year of "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." The district court interpreted that language to mean that a defendant must file within one year of the date on which this court affirms the defendant's conviction and sentence. Since Kapral filed his motion more than one year after we affirmed on direct review, the district court dismissed his motion with prejudice. We granted Kapral's request for a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(a) and 2255. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See, e.g., Stiver v. Meko, 130 F.3d 574, 577 (3d Cir.1997).

II. Discussion
A.

Section 2255 provides in relevant part:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

This provision creates a statute of limitations for federal defendants who attempt to collaterally attack their conviction and/or sentence pursuant to § 2255. See Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 619 n. 1 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that the one-year requirement for bringing a motion under § 2255 is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling, not a jurisdictional bar). It was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which was signed into law on April 24, 1996. In Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.1998), we held that " § 2255 motions filed on or before April 23, 1997, may not be dismissed for failure to comply with § 2255's one-year period of limitation," id. at 112, and we further held that, under the principles set forth in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), a pro se prisoner's § 2255 motion is deemed filed at the moment it is delivered to the prison officials for mailing. See 134 F.3d at 113. Although Kapral is incarcerated, his motion was mailed by counsel and received by the district court clerk's office on April 29, 1997, which was after the Burns deadline. Accordingly, his motion is subject to the terms of § 2255's one-year limitation period. 1

Thus, we are called upon to decide when a "judgment of conviction becomes final" within the meaning of § 2255, which is an issue of first impression for this Court. The district court held that finality occurs when a court of appeals affirms the judgment of conviction on direct review even if the defendant subsequently files a timely petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari review. The district court reasoned that certiorari is discretionary and granted in relatively few cases, and noted that "challenges by state and federal prisoners to their convictions and confinement[ ] are granted review only .45% of the time." Kapral v. United States, 973 F.Supp. 495, 498 n. 6 (D.N.J.1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court then drew a distinction between an appeal as of right and a discretionary appeal. Since the latter was so infrequently granted, the district court reasoned that a defendant's conviction was final when the defendant no longer had a right (as opposed to a hope) of further review. The district court stated:

The Court [ ] declines to define final judgment of conviction based on a prisoner's petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari. In contrast to the direct appeal of right, petitioning for certiorari constitutes a discretionary appeal. In exercising this discretion, the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in sentencing cases. In addition, having exercised the appeal of right, the petitioner has had a fair opportunity to present his federal claims in an appellate forum. Therefore, a judgment perfected by appeal may fairly be deemed a final judgment from which the § 2255 statute of limitations begins to run.

Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the district court based its definition of "final judgment" upon the improbability of successful discretionary appeal and the fair opportunity for review afforded by termination of appeals as of right. 2 The district court further opined that "an equitable tolling" of the limitations period would apply if the Supreme Court grants a defendant's petition for certiorari review. See id. at 499 n. 7.

Kapral argues that a defendant has a right to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari review and that the time needed to do so cannot be omitted from considerations of finality. Accordingly, Kapral contends that the § 2255 clock begins to tick only after the 90-day period to file a certiorari petition has expired. If a certiorari petition is timely filed, he argues, the clock would start to tick when the Supreme Court either denies certiorari or affirms the judgment of conviction on the merits. Notably, the government agrees with Kapral that if a defendant timely seeks certiorari review, the judgment of conviction does not become final until the Supreme Court denies certiorari or affirms on the merits. Appellee's Br. at 18-20. The government urges that we affirm, however, on the ground that when a defendant, like Kapral, chooses not file a certiorari petition, his judgment of conviction becomes final on the date this court affirms it on direct review. Id. at 20-24.

B.

"We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself." Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). Here, neither "judgment of conviction" nor "final" is expressly defined in § 2255. We consider these terms seriatim.

In federal criminal practice, "judgment of conviction" refers to a formal document, signed by the trial judge and entered by the clerk of the district court, that sets forth "the plea, verdict or findings, the adjudication, and the sentence." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 843 (6th ed.1990) (quoting Rule 32(b)(1), the predecessor to Rule 32(d)(1), in defining "judgment of conviction"). Under Rule 32(d)(1), a judgment of conviction "includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence." Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) ("[T]he sentence is a necessary component of a 'judgment of conviction.' "). A judgment of conviction is entered only after the trial court has completed the sentencing process, see Howard v. United States, 135 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir.1998), and thus the term is commonly understood to refer to both the conviction and sentence.

Under § 2255, a defendant is permitted to collaterally attack both the conviction and sentence. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) ("[C]riminal defendants are entitled by federal law to challenge their conviction and sentence in habeas corpus proceedings."). We have no reason to doubt that Congress used the term "judgment of conviction" in § 2255 in accordance with this well-settled meaning. Thus, § 2255's limitation period begins to run on the date on which the defendant's conviction and sentence become "final."

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