Kar Kare Owners Group of Florida v. Chason
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | LETTS |
| Citation | Kar Kare Owners Group of Florida v. Chason, 356 So.2d 851 (Fla. App. 1978) |
| Decision Date | 14 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1848,77-1848 |
| Parties | KAR KARE OWNERS GROUP OF FLORIDA, LTD., a Florida Limited Partnership, MBS Management Corp., a Florida Corporation, General Funding Corporation, a North Carolina Corporation, First National Bank in Shelby, North Carolina, John R. Swaim and Garl W. Swaim, jointly and severally, Petitioners, v. John M. CHASON, Respondent. |
Dennis R. Long, of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, for petitioners.
Douglas C. Fulton, of Wearn & Fulton, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
We are concerned here with the refusal of the trial court to set aside a final summary judgment upon motion to do so, based on allegations of ignorance of the progress of the litigation, claimed by the losing parties. We affirm.
This case comes to us upon a petition for common law certiorari, which method we conclude to be procedurally erroneous, because an order denying a motion to vacate a final judgment is a final appealable order. Crystal Lake Golf Course, Inc. v. Kalin, 252 So.2d 379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). The respondent argues, also incorrectly, that the available appellate review here, should have been by interlocutory appeal. It is an order denying a motion to vacate a default judgment which is appealable as an interlocutory matter under Fla.App. Rule 4.2. 1 See also Travelers Insurance Company v. Bryson, 341 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The order before us is an order denying a motion to vacate a summary final judgment and thus a plenary appeal is the appropriate remedy. Crystal Lake Golf Course, supra.
Notwithstanding these technical defects, we accept jurisdiction and treat this as a full appeal under the authority of Roper v. Roper, 336 So.2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
We do not, however, consider the question of whether there were issues of fact precluding the granting of summary judgment in the first place. The summary judgment itself has not been appealed and thus is not the issue brought before us. The issue appealed, simply stated, is whether the motion to vacate stated sufficient grounds to require the trial judge to grant the motion and whether his failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. We conclude that it did not.
The grounds set forth in the motion command attention. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b) provides that the court may grant relief to a party on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; and the appellant attempts to set forth, by affidavits and by direct testimony, at the hearing, all of these. The main ones included:
(1) He changed addresses and didn't get his mail (except by some stroke of providence, the final judgment).
(2) He didn't know his attorney had been granted leave to withdraw from the case.
(3) His attorney, upon withdrawal, had given the court, the old address, from which he (Swaim) had moved.
(4) That he had had no communication with, or from, his former attorney for approximately 11 months, knew nothing of what was going on and his attorney at all times had his telephone number.
We are not privy to what went through the trial judge's mind regarding the credibility of these various explanations, but they were largely uncontroverted. Nonetheless, we are struck by two facets of this case that prevent us from being able to say that the trial judge abused his discretion.
First, at the hearing on the motion to vacate and set aside, opposing counsel said:
This representation, by an officer of the court (as to what opposing counsel in turn had represented at a previous hearing when he sought to withdraw) went unrefuted and unchallenged despite the fact that the attorney who withdrew was present and testified. The appellant has not brought us a record of what actually transpired at the motion to withdraw. However, if the withdrawing attorney did tell the court that his clients knew he was withdrawing and if the judge was reminded of that fact upon the making of the above quoted representation, then we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to set aside the judgment.
There is a second reason why we will not disturb the ruling of the trial judge. We do not believe that the conduct of the defendants constituted excusable neglect under Fla.Civ. Rule 1.540(b).
The record reveals that right from the beginning of this lawsuit, the defendants repeatedly failed to abide by the court's procedures and rulings. Nonetheless, they had direct continuous contact with their former counsel, up through May 6th, 1976, when the answers to the interrogatories were finally filed in response to an order granting sanctions against them. It does not appear that this is a spurious...
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Ray v. THOMSON-KERNAGHAN & CO. LTD.
...corporation's lawyers was reasonable and excusable in light of the totality of circumstances.1 See Kar Kare Owners Group of Florida, Ltd. v. Chason, 356 So.2d 851, 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (cannot say that trial judge abused discretion in failing to find party's excuses for failing to respon......
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Scott v. Walker
...its discretion in denying the motion. Claffey v. Serafino, 338 So.2d 270 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); See also Kar Kare Owners Group of Florida, Ltd. v. Chason, 356 So.2d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Consequently, we affirm the trial court's order denying Scott's motion to vacate the HOBSON, Acting C. J.......
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County Nat. Bank of North Miami Beach v. Sheridan, Inc.
...1 Unlike the defaulted parties involved in two other recently decided cases out of this court. See Kar Kare Owners Group of Florida v. Chason, 356 So.2d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) and Westinghouse Credit Corporation v. Steven Lake Masonry, Inc., 356 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 4th DCA ...
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Devlin v. Delray Community Hosp.
...relief. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying relief. Cf. Kar Kare Owners Group of Florida, Ltd. v. Chason, 356 So.2d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 362 So.2d 1054 (Fla.1978); Fischer v. Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., 511 So.2d 1087 (Fl......