Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-1258,83-1258
• Citation: 10 OBR 497,462 N.E.2d 403,10 Ohio St.3d 163
• Parties: , 10 O.B.R. 497 KARABIN, Appellant, v. STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 163

10 Ohio St.3d 163

462 N.E.2d 403, 10 O.B.R. 497

KARABIN, Appellant, v. STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 83-1258.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 25, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The unambiguous language of former R.C. 3937.18(E) permits insurance carriers to include provisions in automobile insurance contracts which preclude stacking of uninsured motorist coverage.

2. Medical payments coverage in insurance contracts is neither mandated nor governed by statute. It is thus simply a matter of contract between the insurer and insured.

Defendant-appellee, State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. ("State Auto"), issued two automobile insurance policies to plaintiff-appellant, John Karabin, insuring different vehicles. Each policy provided medical payments coverage of $1,000 per person and uninsured motorist coverage of $50,000 per person. Each policy contained an anti-stacking provision, declaring that State Auto's maximum liability under all the policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit under any one policy.

Both policies were in effect on April 17, 1981, when Karabin was injured by an uninsured vehicle while he was a pedestrian on a sidewalk. State Auto honored Karabin's claims under one policy but refused to honor those claims under both policies.

Karabin brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to recover under both policies. The matter was submitted to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted each party's motion in part, holding that the uninsured motorist coverages would be aggregated but that the medical payments available were limited to those payable only under one policy. The court of appeals affirmed on the question of medical payments but reversed on the issue of the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage.

This cause in now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Komito, Nurenberg, Plevin, Jacobson, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., and Anne L. Kilbane, Cleveland, for appellant.

Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman and Burt Fulton, Cleveland, for appellee.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

The issue presented by this case is whether a provision in an insurance contract which purports to limit the amount of uninsured motorist and medical payments coverage when more than one insurance policy covers the insured is valid under R.C. 3937.18. Because of the recent expression of legislative policy on the subject this court concludes that such a provision is now valid.

R.C. 3937.18(A), as effective on the date of Karabin's accident, provided:

"No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless an equivalent amount of coverage for bodily injury or death is provided therein or supplemental thereto * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury * * * resulting therefrom."

In Curran v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co. (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 33, 38, 266 N.E.2d 566 , this court held the purpose of this statute to be that " * * * coverage be provided to persons injured through the acts of uninsured motorists." R.C. 3937.18(A) was to be construed liberally in order to effectuate that purpose and it was determined that to permit an "other insurance" clause to be enforced would thwart the legislative intent. That decision was followed in subsequent cases. Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665 ; Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Volkmann (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 58, 374 N.E.2d 1258 .

Karabin contends that this interpretation remains valid and applicable since there has been no substantial modification of division (A) and that State Auto is stripping him of his benefits contrary to the statutory requirements. Such an assertion is untenable in light of the June 25, 1980 amendment of R.C. 3937.18 which added division (E), as follows:

"Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes uninsured motorist coverage may include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of uninsured motor vehicle coverages." ¹

The importance of the change wrought by the addition of division (E) was recognized by this court in Ady v. West American Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio st.2d 593, 433 N.E.2d 547 . Justice Holmes, dissenting, observed at 606-607, 433 N.E.2d 547 that R.C. 3937.18(E) legislatively abrogated the prior holding in Volkmann. Justice Clifford F. Brown's concurring opinion stated, " '[a]ny contractual restriction or exclusionary clause on the uninsured motorist coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18, except as authorized in division (E), is * * * invalid.' " (Emphasis added.) Id. at 600, 433 N.E.2d 547. Chief Justice Celebrezze's majority opinion remarked that any restriction on full coverage should arise from the legislature and noted the amendment adding division (E). Id. at 596-597, 433 N.E.2d 547. It is clear to this court that approval for anti-stacking restrictions in uninsured motorist coverage has indeed emanated from the General Assembly. In view of such a statutory change, Karabin's reliance on pre-amendment authority for his interpretation of R.C. 3937.18 is misplaced.

Karabin further contends that division (E) in no way alters the requirements of R.C. 3937.18(A) because there is no indication of a legislative intention to abrogate the judicial interpretation of division (A). This contention is rebutted by the very language of the statute which demonstrates the General Assembly's intention to alter the requirements governing stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. Additionally, R.C. 1.47(B) states that an entire statute is intended to be effective. When read together, it is apparent that divisions (A) and (E) complement rather than conflict with each other. Division (A) sets forth the general policy guaranteeing that an insured will be afforded the opportunity to purchase uninsured motorist coverage in an amount up to his liability limits. Division (E) provides a specific modification, permitting insurers to confine their liability to the limits of a single policy.

Additionally, Karabin alleges that R.C. 3937.18(E) is ambiguous, lacking a definition of stacking, and should thus be construed strictly in favor of the insured. Karabin's assertion that the term "stacking" applies only to intra-policy integration is without merit. This court has previously stated:

"The Legislature is presumed to know the decisions of this court, and, where it uses words or phrases that have been defined or construed by this court, it is presumed to have used them in the sense that they have been so defined or construed * * *." Tax Comm. of Ohio v....