Karaffa v. Montgomery Twp.
| Decision Date | 21 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 12-1184 |
| Parties | PATRICIA KARAFFA v. MONTGOMERY TOWNSHIP, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Patricia Karaffa brings this action against her former employer, Montgomery Township (the Township), and two former supervisors, Jo Marie Pearson and Ann Shade, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Karaffa alleges Defendants unlawfully interfered with her rights under the FMLA (Count I), discriminated against her for taking FMLA leave (Count II), and constructively discharged her in violation of the FMLA (Count III). Karaffa has filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Defendants' liability for Counts I and II. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on all Counts. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
In 2001, the Township hired Karaffa as a police dispatcher. In June 2010, Karaffa learned she was pregnant. That same month she informed the Township she was pregnant and would berequesting maternity leave. In November 2010, Karaffa submitted a letter to the Township informing it she had a planned delivery date of February 4, 2011, and requesting leave for her delivery and for recovery/maternity leave under the FMLA. Defendant Anne Shade, the Township's Director of Human Resources, informed Karaffa her FMLA leave request was approved.
Township police dispatchers work in three shifts, seven days a week: 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. (hereinafter, "morning shift"); 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. (hereinafter, "evening shift"); and 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. (hereinafter, "overnight shift"). From at least June 2010 to December 2010, Karaffa was assigned a "rotating shift," which she described as a combination of all three shifts.
In December 2010, Karaffa was diagnosed with gestational diabetes, a condition in which a woman develops high blood glucose levels during pregnancy. Karaffa requested a new schedule pursuant to the FMLA so she could properly treat her gestational diabetes. In support of her request, Karaffa's physician, Dr. Angela C. Boylan, M.D., completed and sent to the Township an FMLA request form certifying that treatment for Karaffa's gestational diabetes required that she work only the morning shift, rather than rotating shifts, so Karaffa could better maintain her glucose levels through a prescribed diet plan. Dr. Boylan also informed the Township that Karaffa's gestational diabetes was a temporary condition, which would resolve after her delivery. The Township granted Karaffa's request and assigned her only morning shifts until she began her previously scheduled FMLA leave for her delivery and recovery/maternity leave. Karaffa commenced this FMLA leave on February 1, 2011, and, as Dr. Boylan indicated, her gestational diabetes completely resolved after her delivery.
On April 11, 2011, Karaffa received a letter from the Township informing her that upon her return from maternity leave she would be scheduled to work only overnight shifts. Karaffainformed the Police Chief and Deputy Chief she did not want this schedule, and that such an assignment was inconsistent with the Karaffa's seniority and the seniority system of shift assignments. The Township agreed the assignment of permanent overnight shifts was an oversight, as the scheduler mistakenly believed Karaffa desired this shift because she had worked permanent overnight shifts in the past. Before Karaffa returned to work, her schedule was changed to evening shifts with two weekends of overnight shifts per month. Karaffa returned to work shortly after April 11.
On May 17, 2011, Karaffa was injured in a car accident and could not immediately return to work. At that time, Karaffa had exhausted her FMLA leave. In a May 19 email to the Township, Karaffa requested leave to recover from her car accident injuries and asked that such leave be considered an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She did not request FMLA leave for this time period, and she admitted she did not know if she had any available FMLA leave when she made her request for an ADA accommodation. Nevertheless, in a June 13, 2011, letter, Shade informed Karaffa she would not be receiving FMLA leave for her recovery time because her FMLA benefits were exhausted through February 4, 2012; rather, Karaffa's leave beginning May 17, 2011, would be covered under her short-term disability policy.
On August 4, 2011, Karaffa again returned to work. Upon her return, Karaffa was not tasked with dispatcher duties, but was asked by her supervisor, Defendant Jo Marie Pearson, to perform other tasks which Karaffa thought were "menial and degrad[ing]," like shredding paper and organizing documents. Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 20, ECF No. 30.2Karaffa performed these tasks in an area separate from where the dispatchers were located. The Township asserts Karaffa was taken off of the dispatcher schedule to comply with the work restrictions imposed by her physician; however, Karaffa argues these restrictions did not prevent her from performing dispatcher duties. Karaffa's physician imposed the following restrictions: part-time sedentary work only; no prolonged standing; no squatting; no heavy lifting; no sitting in a rolling chair; a maximum four hour shift; and a preferred shift of 7 a.m. to 11 a.m.
In an August 11, 2011, letter, Shade informed Karaffa that she would be required to undergo an examination by an independent physician to determine the existence of any potentially disabling conditions and to evaluate the appropriateness of the limitations imposed by her treating physician. The letter further stated Karaffa would not need to report to work until the independent physician made his evaluation, but she would still be paid for a total of eight hours of work per day, half of which would be paid through short-term disability. Karaffa did not view this letter as terminating her employment.
Approximately one month later, in early September 2011, Karaffa submitted a complaint to the Township alleging she had been harassed and retaliated against for taking FMLA leave. An attorney for the Township attempted to solicit additional information from Karaffa about her complaint, but Karaffa did not respond. Karaffa did send an email to the Township on September 14, 2011, requesting additional time to respond to a Township inquiry for additional information; however, it is unclear if this inquiry is the same as the inquiry from the Township's attorney. Shade granted Karaffa additional time to respond in a September 16, 2011, letter. Karaffa alleges she was constructively discharged on September 7, 2011, due to the ostracism and harassment she had experienced.
On March 7, 2012, Karaffa filed the instant lawsuit, asserting the following FMLA claims against the Township, Pearson, and Shade: (1) unlawful interference with FMLA rights (Count I); (2) discrimination for requesting and taking FMLA leave (Count II); and (3) constructive discharge under the FMLA (Count III). Karaffa filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking this Court to find she has established Defendants' liability for Counts I and II only. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all Counts.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Material" facts are those facts "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must make all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267. "On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must construe the motions independently, viewing the evidence presented by each moving party in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." Selective Way Ins. Co. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 724 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Pichler, 542 F.3d at 386). To defeat a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party "must rely on affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" to show there is a genuine issue of material fact. Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is 'no genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The FMLA guarantees an eligible employee 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period due to the birth of a child, a family member's serious health condition, the employee's own serious health condition, and other exigencies involving a family member's service in the armed forces. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Upon an employee's return from FMLA leave, the employer must restore the employee to the position she held when her leave commenced or an equivalent position with equivalent benefits and conditions of employment. Id. § 2614(a).
The FMLA also makes it unlawful "for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise," FMLA rights. Id. § 2615(a)(1). Additionally, employers may not discriminate or retaliate against an employee based on the exercise of FMLA rights. Id. § 2615(a)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (); Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005) (). Finally,...
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