Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran

• Decision Date: 26 August 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16-232 (CKK)
• Citation: 396 F.Supp.3d 12
• Parties: Timothy KARCHER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

396 F.Supp.3d 12

Timothy KARCHER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-232 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 26, 2019

Aaron Schlanger, Ari Ungar, Dina Gielchinsky, Gary M. Osen, Michael J. Radine, Naomi Blank Weinberg, Peter Raven-Hansen, William A. Friedman, OSEN LLC, Hackensack, NJ, Clyde T. Turner, Turner and Associates P.A., North Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge

In Iraq, the U.S. military encountered a unique weapon, known as an explosively formed penetrator ("EFP"), that caused exceptional damage to armored personnel carriers and their occupants. This case concerns ninety-two attacks on U.S. servicemembers and others in Iraq from 2004 through 2011. The vast majority of those attacks involved EFPs. All of them were allegedly facilitated by Defendant Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran").

After Iran was properly served and it defaulted, the Court held a bench trial regarding seven "bellwether" attacks to determine the sufficiency of evidence to support entry of default judgment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").

Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' [80] Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, in an exercise of its discretion the Court shall GRANT default judgment against Iran as to the claims of certain Plaintiffs arising from those seven attacks.

For damages and any other appropriate determinations, the Court expects to refer the bellwether attacks to a special master, who shall prepare a report and recommendation to the Court. At that time, the Court shall issue additional instructions for liability and damages proceedings concerning non-bellwether attacks.

I. BACKGROUND

Well over 300 Plaintiffs filed this suit on February 12, 2016.¹ Those Plaintiffs generally consist of military servicemembers, their estates, and their family members, nearly all of whom are allegedly U.S. nationals.² Plaintiffs allege that Iran went to great lengths to enlist, train, and supply operatives in Iraq to attack American forces. As stated above, most of the attacks at issue in this case involve the EFP, a weapon allegedly attributable to Iran. The three-count Amended Complaint seeks relief for the personal injuries of the surviving victims, the personal injuries and deaths of victims who were killed, and the intentional infliction of "severe" emotional distress endured by families of those injured or killed. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 1161-74.

The Court shall summarize certain proceedings leading up to the bench trial in this matter, and those that precipitate the present decision.

A. Service and Entry of Default

After Plaintiffs purported to effectuate service on Iran via diplomatic channels pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4), and Iran failed to respond, they sought entry of default, which the Clerk entered. See ECF Nos. 16-18. When Plaintiffs thereafter moved for default judgment, the Court denied the motion without prejudice to permit Plaintiffs to demonstrate the grounds for proper service. Nov. 15, 2016 Order, ECF No. 22.

Plaintiffs then took a dual-tracked approach to completing service. They supplied further justification for their attempt to serve Iran under Section 1608(a)(4), while also asking the Clerk of Court to facilitate service on Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs under Section 1608(a)(3). ECF Nos. 23-27. The Clerk again entered default against Iran at Plaintiffs' request once proof of service under Section 1608(a)(3) was returned and Iran failed to respond within the statutory time period. See ECF Nos. 27-30; 28 U.S.C. § 1608(c)(2), (d). The Court then determined that Plaintiffs had properly effectuated service. Apr. 19, 2017 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 31.

The FSIA sets forth the requirements for service on a foreign state such as Iran. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1). Under the FSIA, there are four methods of effecting service, the first two of which, if applicable, must be exhausted before moving to the third. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) ; see also Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of Zambia , 785 F.3d 26, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (recognizing "descending order of preference" in this provision). Neither special arrangements with Iran nor an international convention signed by Iran was available to facilitate service under Section 1608(a)(1) or (a)(2), so Plaintiffs were permitted to avail themselves of Section 1608(a)(3). Apr. 19, 2017 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 31, at 3. Accordingly, even though Plaintiffs had improperly resorted first to Section 1608(a)(4) means, the Court concluded that their belated service under Section 1608(a)(3) was effective. Id. at 2-4.

B. Pretrial Proceedings

Through a series of Orders, the Court elicited Plaintiffs' views to facilitate proceedings in the default setting. See id. at 4; Scheduling and Procedures Order, ECF No. 32; Min. Order of May 15, 2017; Pretrial Scheduling and Procedures Order, ECF No. 39. Based on that briefing, and discussion on the record with Plaintiffs, the Court decided to hold a three-day bench trial regarding a subset of attacks that Plaintiffs proposed as "bellwethers." In the Court's Phase I bellwether proceedings, Plaintiffs would present evidence as to jurisdiction, liability, and at least an aspect of damages. See Min. Orders of June 18, 2018, and July 17, 2018. One or more special masters then would conduct Phase II bellwether proceedings to complete damages determinations and make a report and recommendation to the Court. See Min. Orders of June 18, 2018, and July 17, 2018. The Court would issue further instructions thereafter regarding non-bellwether proceedings. See Min. Order of July 17, 2018.

Subsequent pretrial proceedings included the entry of a protective order to facilitate the military's production of certain documents to Plaintiffs. Privacy Act and Personal Information Protective Order, ECF No. 54. Plaintiffs also sought the Court's pretrial approval of several demonstrative exhibits, two of which the Court permitted in its discretion: an actual-sized model EFP and an actual-sized model High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle ("HMMWV" or "Humvee"). Oct. 9, 2018 Order, ECF No. 55. The Court permitted Plaintiffs to file certain documents under seal; the basis for sealing most of those documents was their national-security sensitivity. See Nov. 5, 2018 Order, ECF No. 57 (citing United States v. Hubbard , 650 F.2d 293, 315-16 & n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ); Min. Order of June 18, 2018.

In a further exercise of its discretion, the Court granted Plaintiffs' request for pre-admission of ninety-six government records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), the public records exception to the hearsay rule. Nov. 27, 2018 Order, ECF No. 64. Plaintiffs had furnished sufficient evidence under the rather liberal evidentiary standards applicable to FSIA cases in default posture, particularly when the foreign sovereign has been recognized as a sponsor of terrorism. Id. at 1-2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) ; Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. granted in part on other grounds sub nom. Opati v. Republic of Sudan , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2771, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2019) (Mem.); Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea , 774 F.3d 1044, 1048-51 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ). The Court nevertheless deferred its "determination of the appropriate weight to accord each of these exhibits." Id. at 2.

The Court refused, however, to pre-admit reports prepared by Plaintiffs' experts, who were scheduled to testify at trial. Nov. 28, 2018 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 66, at 1. Plaintiffs could lay adequate foundation for admission of those reports simply by asking the experts whether they adopted the facts and conclusions therein. Id.

And lastly, at Plaintiffs' request, the Court exercised its discretion to take judicial notice of certain findings by Judge Randolph Moss in another case about the same attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center ("PJCC") in Karbala. Nov. 28, 2018 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 66, at 1-4 (citing Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 320 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2018) (Moss, J.)). Nevertheless, the Court made clear that it must make its "own, independent findings of fact" based on the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 3-4 (quoting Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D.D.C. 2010) ; citing, e.g., Harrison v. Republic of Sudan , 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2012) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Bench Trial

Over the three-day trial, Plaintiffs presented evidence regarding seven bellwether attacks. Six attacks in Baghdad or the vicinity allegedly involved EFPs. The seventh attack—on the PJCC in Karbala—involved more conventional weapons.

Plaintiffs put on a total of 19 witnesses, consisting of 8 fact witnesses and 11 expert witnesses.³ The fact witnesses consisted of the following five military servicemember Plaintiffs who were injured in the bellwether attacks: Robert Bartlett, Robert Canine, David Haines, Chris Levi, and Wesley Williamson. The other fact witnesses were Kelli Hake, a Plaintiff and the widow of servicemember Christopher Hake, who was killed in a bellwether attack; Colonel (Ret.) Kevin Farrell, a non-Plaintiff witness of the attack that injured Mr. Bartlett; and then-First Lieutenant Rusty Mason, a non-Plaintiff witness of the attack that killed Mr. Hake.

Of the expert witnesses, seven spoke to liability issues consisting generally of Iran's role in Iraq, Iran's relationship with its Lebanese and Iraqi proxies, the weapons they used in Iraq, and the U.S. military's efforts to respond. The remaining four experts were medical doctors who testified about EFP-inflicted injuries to inform damages assessments.

Because of the importance of the experts to this case, the Court shall briefly summarize some relevant qualifications of Plaintiffs'...