Karczewski v. Ford Motor Company

• Citation: 382 F. Supp. 1346
• Decision Date: 10 October 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 71 H 265.
• Parties: Ronald KARCZEWSKI, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana

382 F. Supp. 1346

Ronald KARCZEWSKI, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. No. 71 H 265.

United States District Court, N. D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

October 10, 1974.

Steve H. Tokarski, Gary, Ind., for plaintiff.

Frank J. Galvin, Jr., Hammond, Ind., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, District Judge.

At the conclusion of all of the evidence the defendant filed a motion for directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in writing, upon which the Court reserved ruling. On September 30, 1974 the defendant filed its motion pursuant to 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since both of these motions raise the same issues the Court will consider them together.

On September 17, 1974, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $10,000.00. Judgment has been entered accordingly.

Counsel for both parties have favored the Court with excellent and helpful briefs.

This case was submitted to the jury upon three possible alternative bases. They are: negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability. (Originally the plaintiff also attempted to advance on the basis of express warranty but because the evidence in the case negated any such basis the case was not submitted to the jury on express warranty.)

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND J.N.O.V.

It is elementary in considering these motions the Court should not interfere with the proper constitutional function of the jury; if there is a proper basis in law and in fact for the jury's decision it should not be disturbed. All of the inferences favor that decision and the defendant here must carry a strong burden to upset the jury's verdict.

Almost 30 years ago the Supreme Court of the United States in Brady v. Southern Railroad, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943), laid down as a standard that a verdict may properly be directed when, without weighing the credibility of witnesses, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. When applying this standard to a Rule 50(b) post-trial motion the verdict actually reached must be contra to that one reasonable conclusion. Conversely, where there is evidence that permits more than one conclusion a directed verdict should not be granted. See Pinkowski v. Sherman Hotel, 313 F. 2d 190 (7th Cir. 1963), and Berry Refining Co. v. Salemi, 353 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1965). (We need not trouble ourselves here with the often discussed but never fully decided question of whether Brady and its progeny speak to a state or federal standard in a diversity case. Dean Harvey, in 3 Indiana Practice 370, indicates that under the present Indiana Trial Rules there is no appreciable difference. Our Court of Appeals has, however, decided that state law controls this question in a diversity case. See Etling v. Sanders, 447 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1971), and see also Perzinski v. Chevron Chemical Co., 503 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1974).

Motions for directed verdict or for judgment N.O.V. are proper only when there is a complete absence of any evidence to warrant submission to a jury. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1968). In this regard evidence and all inferences must be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing directed verdict. Continental Air Lines v. Wagner Morehouse, 401 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1968). Some courts suggest that only evidence supporting the theories of the party opposing directed verdict may be considered. Dun & Bradstreet v. Miller, 398 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1968). Others suggest that directed verdict is proper only when there is a complete absence of the probative facts to support the jury verdict. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969). The fundamental idea in all this compels a Federal district trial court to exercise the greatest self-restraint in interfering with the constitutionally mandated processes of jury decision. The message is to do so only in the clearest of cases. This is manifestly not one of them.

FACTS

The evidence most favorable to the verdict comes both from the plaintiff's and the defendant's witnesses.

In August 1969 the plaintiff purchased a 1969 Ford Mustang, Mach I. The plaintiff testified that he was influenced in this decision by advertising in the television, radio and newspaper media that "Ford has a better idea." The plaintiff purchased this automobile for $3000.00 from one Kenneth Enlow. There is testimony that the original manufacturer's retail on this automobile was about $3600.00. It had a 428 cubic inch engine that was approximately 335 horsepower. There was an express warranty with the automobile for 24,000 miles or 24 months, whichever came first. At the time of the plaintiff's purchase the automobile had 16,000 miles. The plaintiff testified that he had driven this car approximately 2000 miles before the incident here in question and therefore, at that time the car had approximately 18,000 miles on it. There was evidence that there was a pamphlet in the car prepared by the defendant, Ford Motor Company, regarding the car's care and maintenance. That pamphlet contained provisions with regard to a warranty and was in the car when purchased by the plaintiff. About a week after the plaintiff purchased the car he went to a Ford dealer seeking to have the warranty transferred to his name. He was told by the dealer that it would cost $25.00 to make the transfer. He asked the dealer if they would inspect the car or anything to make sure that the car was still good for the warranty. The dealer advised that they wouldn't inspect it but would accept his $25.00 for the transfer of the warranty. He testified that immediately after his purchase there was no malfunctioning of the automobile and that he chose not to pay the $25.00 "because why should I pay for something that's no good." He further testified that before the day of the collision here in question on one or two occasions the car idled rapidly and he put it in neutral, shut if off and started it back up again. In both cases it operated alright.

On September 24, 1969 in Munster, Indiana the plaintiff was operating this automobile on a public street. In the middle of a block after stopping at a stop sign and making a left turn the car went out of control and started to spin around. The plaintiff tried to straighten it out and lost control of it completely. It hit a telephone pole and a tree and then bounced up. It was leaning up against a tree with the front end off of the ground when it came to rest. He attempted to brake the car before the collision but was unable to do so.

As a result of this collision the plaintiff sustained a laceration in his face, medical expenses, damage to his car and a permanent cut on his head. A photograph was displayed to the jury showing the two black eyes, the swelling in the plaintiff's head and the scar in his hairline. The plaintiff also lost some time at work. The so-called specials, including damage to personal property, in this case were in the approximate sum of $2600.00.

The plaintiff also called as an expert witness, Mr. Vucko, a mechanic-bodyman with experience working on automobiles since 1943. This automobile was taken to Mr. Vucko's shop after the collision and he made an examination of the engine and the damage to it. He also testified that the automobile was worth $2500.00 before accident and approximately four to five hundred dollars after the accident. He examined the carburetor return spring assembly of this automobile immediately after the accident and found that it was broken. His exact testimony was as follows:

"A Well, the shaft from the spring to the hook. And it was just the steel rod that was broken.

You have a coil, and then you have a rod, and then you have a hook, where it hooks into a hole on the bracket. And it returns the throttle valve when you release the accelerator."

* * * * * *

"Q Was there any indication that there was any metal — or that any metal would have pressed against the carburetor return spring?

A I didn't see any, no."

The question was then asked as to whether or not this expert had an opinion as to whether the carburetor return spring was broken before or after this collision. The expert testified that he had repaired thousands of automobiles and could not recall one in the shop which was broken after an accident. He also testified that he had never seen a carburetor return spring break on a relatively new car, one year old, due to abuse. This return spring was not stretched. He testified that the function of the carburetor return spring is to return the throttle valve back to a shut position when you release the accelerator pedal. When the driver presses down on the accelerator it causes expansion. If the spring breaks while the accelerator pedal is down, generally it is more likely to stay down since it has no way of returning. He also testified that the broken spring in question was thrown in the garbage can at his garage. He testified that this spring appeared to be the original equipment on this car and that it was an essential part to the safe operation of this vehicle. He further testified that if this particular automobile accelerated out of control before the collision with the tree and post that this would be consistent with the spring having broken before the collision. He testified that when you lose the accelerator in an automobile it is almost as bad as losing the brakes.

The only witness for the defendant was James Scott, a product quality engineer, in the employ of the Ford Motor Company. Detailed drawings and an actual carburetor assembly were placed in evidence and displayed to the jury. (The jury was permitted to take all of the evidence to the jury room during deliberations.) The carburetor in question was a 4-V carburetor used in the 1969, 428, 4-V engine. It is manufactured by the Holley Corporation who provide the same to the Ford Motor Company....