Kargbo v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
| Decision Date | 17 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15–698 (RBW) |
| Citation | 243 F.Supp.3d 6 |
| Parties | Saidu KARGBO, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Saidu S. T. Kargbo, Bowie, MD, pro se.
P. David Larson, William James Delany, Andrew G. Sakallaris, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Saidu Kargbo, the pro se plaintiff in this civil case, filed a complaint against his employer, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), alleging discrimination on the basis of his race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 to – 3 (2012) ("Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" § 1981"). Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 1. Currently before the Court are the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mot.") and the Plaintiff['s] Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Mot."). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,1 the Court concludes that it must grant Amtrak's motion and deny the plaintiff's motion.
The plaintiff is a Black male who was born in Sierra Leone. See Compl. ¶ 7. He immigrated to the United States in 2004 and became a naturalized citizen. See id. The plaintiff has been an Amtrak employee in the District of Columbia since November, 2006, id. ¶ 8, and he has held four different positions at Amtrak: Electrician Journeyman, Management Associate, Locomotive Inspector, and Service Engineer, Def.'s Facts ¶ 3.
On December 6, 2013, the plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, alleging that Amtrak discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin by failing to hire him for approximately seventy Engineering Management positions for which the plaintiff had applied between December 1, 2010, and December 1, 2013. See Def.'s Mot., Exhibit ("Ex.") 10 (Charge of Discrimination) at 1. On January 26, 2015, the EEOC mailed to the plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights form, informing him that "[b]ased on its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes." See Compl., Attachment ("Att.") 1 (Dismissal and Notice of Rights) at 1. The EEOC advised the plaintiff that if he wished to file suit on his Title VII claim, he must do so within ninety days of his receipt of the Dismissal and Notice of Rights. Id. , Att. 1 (Dismissal and Notice of Rights) at 1.
On May 7, 2015, the plaintiff filed his Complaint, alleging that Amtrak unlawfully denied him promotions that he sought between 2011 and 2015 due to his race and national origin, in violation of Title VII and § 1981. See id. ¶¶ 1, 9–10. Because the plaintiff's Complaint does not specify the specific positions to which he applied, see generally id. ¶¶ 9–15, he produced during discovery a list of the various positions he is contesting in this matter. See List of Jobs at 1–2. That list is reproduced below, along with the dates of the hiring decisions, which were provided by Amtrak:2
Courts will grant a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When ruling on a Rule 56(c) motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Powell , 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ). The Court must therefore draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-moving party's favor and accept the non-moving party's evidence as true. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Accordingly, the non-moving party must not rely on "mere allegations or denials ... but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there [are] genuine issue[s] for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 () (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position [is] insufficient" to withstand a motion for summary judgment, as "there must be [some] evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in contract formation and enforcement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Because § 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations, the Supreme Court "held in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. , 482 U.S. 656, 660, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987), that federal courts should apply ‘the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations' to claims based on asserted violations of § 1981." Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. , 541 U.S. 369, 371, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004). In the District of Columbia, the applicable statute of limitations is three years. See D.C. Code § 12–301(8) (2009) (); see also Carney v. Am. Univ. , 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ().
In 1991, Congress amended § 1981 to include protection from racial discrimination in post-contract formation conduct. See Jones , 541 U.S. at 372–73, 124 S.Ct. 1836. As a result of this amendment, § 1981 claims challenging post-contract formation conduct are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which prescribes a four-year statute of limitations period for "civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress enacted after" December 1, 1990. Jones , 541 U.S. at 375, 124 S.Ct. 1836 (alteration in original).
The Court concludes that the plaintiff's claims are still governed by the District of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations period because his claims challenge his non-selection for various positions within Amtrak. See Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, 17. "[C]laims of racially discriminatory ... promotion go to the very existence and nature of the employment contract and thus fall easily within § 1981's protection." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 491 U.S. 164, 185, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (), superseded by statute , Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071,as recognized in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries , 553 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 170 L.Ed.2d 864 (2008) ; see also id. (). If the plaintiff had been selected for any of the positions for which he now challenges his non-selection, he would have had "a new and distinct relation" with Amtrak, and thus, his claims would have been actionable prior to the 1991 amendments to § 1981. See id. As a result, the District of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations period applies. See Lattisaw v. District of Columbia , 118 F.Supp.3d 142, 156 (D.D.C. 2015) (); see also Uzoukwu v. Metro. Wash. Council of Gov'ts , 27 F.Supp.3d 62, 66 (D.D.C. 2014) (same).
Amtrak argues that the plaintiff's challenges of his non-selection for positions that Amtrak filled before May 7, 2012 are time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Def.'s Mem. at 10–11. The Court agrees.
The plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 7, 2015. See Compl. at 1. Accordingly, the challenged hiring decisions must have occurred after May 6, 2012, to be actionable in this Court. Cf. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan ,...
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