Karibian v. Columbia University
| Decision Date | 25 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 513,513 |
| Citation | 14 F.3d 773 |
| Parties | 63 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1038, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,825, 62 USLW 2477, 89 Ed. Law Rep. 41 Sharon KARIBIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, John Borden, Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellees, v. Mark URBAN, Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee. ocket 93-7188. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Elizabeth L. Koob, New York City (Joan Magoolaghan, Cara Cherry, Law Student, Koob & Magoolaghan, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Diane S. Wilner, New York City (Lee S. Gayer, Joel B. Rothman, Wilner & Associates, P.C., of counsel), for defendants-appellees Columbia University and John Borden.
Karen M. Moran, Washington, DC (James R. Neely, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Gwendolyn
Young Reams, Associate Gen. Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Asst. Gen. Counsel, U.S. E.E.O.C. Office of General Counsel, of counsel), for the E.E.O.C. as amicus curiae.
Clifford M. Solomon, Corwin Solomon & Tanenbaum, P.C., New York City, for defendant-cross-defendant-appellee Mark Urban.
Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Sara L. Mandelbaum, Women's Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union, Ellen J. Vargyas, Deborah L. Brake, National Women's Law Center, submitted an amici curiae brief, for the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU and the National Women's Law Center on behalf of plaintiff-appellant.
Before: MAHONEY, McLAUGHLIN and HEANEY, * Circuit Judges.
Sharon Karibian appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Thomas P. Griesa, Chief Judge) granting summary judgment to defendants Columbia University and John Borden, and dismissing Karibian's complaint of employment discrimination. Karibian's complaint alleged that sexual harassment committed by her supervisor, defendant Mark Urban, constituted discrimination by Columbia on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1), and section 296 of New York's Executive Law. Karibian additionally alleged various state law tort claims against Columbia, Borden and Urban.
In the district court, Karibian proceeded under both available theories of sexual harassment: quid pro quo, and hostile work environment. In granting summary judgment to defendants, the district court held that Columbia could not be liable under a quid pro quo theory because Karibian failed to prove any actual economic loss resulting from Urban's harassment. On her hostile work environment theory, the court held that Columbia was not liable to Karibian because it did not have notice of Urban's harassment and had provided a reasonable avenue for harassment complaints. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 812 F.Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y.1993).
We conclude that the district court erred in requiring Karibian to demonstrate actual economic loss to prove quid pro quo sexual harassment. We also conclude that the court failed to apply the proper legal standard to determine an employer's liability for the hostile work environment created by a supervisor. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In 1987, while a student in Columbia University's General Studies Program, Sharon Karibian worked in Columbia's fundraising "Telefund" office. Telefund was administered for Columbia by an independent contractor, Philanthropy Management Company ("PMI"), and was staffed by both PMI and Columbia employees. Karibian was an employee of Columbia. The Telefund office operated under the aegis of Columbia's "University Development and Alumni Relations" office ("UDAR").
In September 1987, Columbia appointed defendant Mark Urban as Development Officer for Annual Giving at UDAR. In that capacity, Urban had supervisory authority over Telefund, and, consequently, over Karibian. Specifically, Urban had the authority to alter Karibian's work schedule and assignments, and to give her promotions and raises (subject to approval). In addition, Urban had at least the apparent authority to fire Karibian.
This case involves Urban's alleged conduct towards Karibian while the two were employees of Columbia. Urban conceded that he and Karibian had a sexual relationship while he was her supervisor; however, the nature of that relationship--i.e., whether consensual or coercive--remains hotly disputed. We limit our discussion to Karibian's version of events.
While working at UDAR, Urban "pursued" Karibian by repeatedly inviting her out to bars, ostensibly to discuss work-related matters. On those occasions, Urban often asked Karibian back to his apartment. Initially, Karibian rebuffed Urban's advances; ultimately, however, she yielded to pressure from Urban. Specifically, Karibian claimed that Urban coerced her into a violent sexual relationship by telling her that she "owed him" for all he was doing for her as her supervisor. Karibian also claimed that the conditions of her employment--including her raises, hours, autonomy and flexibility--varied from time to time, depending on her responsiveness to Urban. Karibian stated that she believed she would be fired if she did not give in to Urban's demands.
At first, Karibian told no one about her relationship with Urban. After some time, however, Karibian contacted two counselors at Columbia. In September 1988, Karibian contacted Columbia's Panel on Sexual Harassment, and met with Panel member Mary Murphy. Karibian told Murphy that she was afraid her boss would retaliate against her if she stopped sleeping with him. Shortly thereafter, Karibian met with Columbia's Equal Opportunity Coordinator, Ruth Curtis. At Karibian's request, both meetings were held confidential, and neither resulted in any investigation of Urban. According to Karibian, both Murphy and Curtis discouraged her from actively pursuing a complaint against Urban.
In April 1989, Karibian came to work upset and told her immediate Telefund supervisor, Loren Spivack, of a particularly violent sexual encounter with Urban. Spivack, a PMI employee, notified PMI's president, Ron Erdos. Neither Spivack nor Erdos informed anyone at Columbia about the incident.
Around July of 1989, Karibian applied for the position of Annual Giving Development Officer at Columbia. Columbia did not immediately consider Karibian for the position because Urban delayed forwarding her resume to the personnel department. Although Columbia eventually considered Karibian's application, she did not get the job. About the same time, Karibian applied for and received a promotion to the position of Project Director, the highest position within Telefund. As Project Director, Karibian reported directly to Urban at UDAR.
In January 1990, Karibian complained to Gertrude de la Osa, the Director of Development Services at UDAR, that she was afraid of being fired by Urban and that Urban was "sabotaging" her at Telefund. De la Osa brought Karibian's complaint to the attention of UDAR's Deputy Vice President, defendant John Borden. Around the same time, Karibian met again with Ruth Curtis; this time, Karibian dropped her request for confidentiality and gave Curtis permission to speak to others at Columbia about her troubles with Urban.
At this point, Columbia took steps to resolve the problem. Borden asked Urban to write a chronology of his relationship with Karibian, and removed him from direct supervisory authority over Karibian. (According to Urban's chronology, his relationship with Karibian was entirely consensual.) Without crediting either Karibian's or Urban's characterization of their relationship, Columbia forced Urban to resign--for reasons that remain somewhat vague. In August 1990, Columbia closed the Telefund office and Karibian was laid off.
Karibian then brought this suit against Columbia, Borden and Urban, claiming that Urban's sexual harassment violated Title VII. Following discovery, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The court began its analysis by recognizing that Title VII encompasses two theories of sexual harassment: quid pro quo, and hostile work environment. 812 F.Supp. at 416. Rejecting Karibian's quid pro quo claim, the court ruled that this theory requires proof of "actual--rather than threatened--economic loss because of gender or because a sexual advance was made and rejected." Id. Because Karibian had not suffered any economic detriment during her relationship with Urban--in fact, she had been promoted and had received pay raises during the relevant time--the court ruled that Karibian had no valid claim for quid pro quo harassment. Id.
The district court also rejected Karibian's hostile work environment theory. Relying on Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1992), the court held that Karibian "must prove 'that the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.' " 812 F.Supp. at 416 (quoting Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63). Applying this standard, the court ruled that (1) Columbia provided a reasonable avenue for making complaints, and (2) once Columbia got actual notice of Urban's misconduct in 1990, it promptly took adequate curative measures. On the latter point, the court rejected Karibian's argument that her confidential disclosures to Murphy and Curtis were sufficient to put Columbia on notice of Urban's harassment. The court also rejected Karibian's alternative argument that notice to her supervisors at PMI, an independent contractor, constituted notice to Columbia. Having disposed of Karibian's federal claim, the court went on to dismiss Karibian's pendent state law claims for lack of jurisdiction.
Karibian now appeals. 1
By its terms, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Although neither the statute nor its...
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