Karim v. Hardy
| Decision Date | 31 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | 11 C 2700 |
| Parties | SAMUEL KARIM, Petitioner, v. MARCUS HARDY, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Samuel Karim, who is serving a life sentence in Illinois state prison for two first-degree murder convictions and one attempted first-degree murder conviction, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition asserts four grounds for relief: (1) that the State coerced him into confessing and ignored his requests for an attorney during questioning, and that the trial judge admitted the confession into evidence in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) that the State destroyed evidence that might have assisted his defense, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that the trial judge deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by barring his attorney from asking potential jurors how they felt about self defense during voir dire; and (4) that the state trial court that reviewed his state post-conviction claims departed from the procedures mandated by Illinois law, a ground that Karim says is bolstered by the ineffective assistance provided by his state post-conviction counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 1 at 5-17. In his reply brief, however, Karim "withdraws Claims Two and Three," Doc. 25 at 2; see also id. at 12,and so the court will consider only the first and fourth grounds. Karim's habeas petition is denied, and the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
The parties agree that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") applies to Karim's petition. The AEDPA provides that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 2010).
Karim's habeas petition disclaimed any challenge to the state trial court's factual findings, which the Appellate Court of Illinois relied upon in rejecting his claims on appeal. Doc. 1 at 5 (). Karim's reply brief, however, states that he "challenges all factual findings from the State court." Doc. 25 at 2. That challenge comes too late: the express disclaimer in the petition of any challenge to the state court factual findings was an explicit and intentional waiver of any such challenge, and even if it was not a waiver, Karim forfeited any such challenge by failing to raise it prior to his reply brief. See United States v. Gaona, 697 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2012) () (internal quotation marks omitted); Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 324 (7th Cir. 2009) ().
Forfeiture and waiver aside, Karim's challenge to the state court factual findings is meritless. Karim's reply brief argues that the presumption of correctness owed to the state court factual findings under § 2254(e)(1) should not apply here due to what he characterizes as Illinois's particularly poor record in protecting the rights of criminal defendants:
Any presumption of correctness is to be denied to Illinois in light of its clear propensity and inclination to ignore and defy the command of law. Its Governor's ignore the law, as does its Judges. Its prosecutor's ignore the law, as does its law enforcement officials. To the extent that AEDPA requires any such presumption, this petitioner reject such an egregious liberty. The facts as relied upon by the Illinois Appellate Court emanated from the State's Attorney Of Cook County and the Chicago Police. It would seem reasonable for this court to conclude that, just as various States were not extended say presumptions where the Voter's Rights Act was concerned due to their clear poor civil rights records, the same standard must be applied where AEDPA and its presumption of correctness are concerned.
Doc. 25 at 3. This argument, while creative, is without merit. Unlike the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 198-99 (2009), the AEDPA does not provide any basis for treating some jurisdictions differently from others. The court therefore will apply the presumption required by § 2254(e)(1).
The last state court to recount the relevant facts was the Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Karim, 853 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. App. 2006), and People v. Karim, No. 1-08-710 (Ill. App. Sept. 30, 2009) (reproduced at Doc. 17-12). Karim has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state appellate court's findings are incorrect, which means that those findings govern this case. The following sets forth those facts as well as the history of Karim's criminal and post-conviction proceedings in state court.
The particulars of the crimes of which Karim was convicted are not relevant to his habeas petition, and the court recounts them briefly only for context. Karim testified that he had been in the business of dealing drugs, particularly heroin. 853 N.E.2d at 826. His heroin was supplied by two men named Parker and Black. Ibid. At some point, Parker and Black sold Karim some heroin that Karim had difficulty selling because of its low quality. Ibid. After Parker refused in a telephone conversation with Karim to replace it with better heroin, they decided to meet in person to resolve their differences. Ibid. Parker and Black showed up in a car driven by a third man named Harris, Karim got into the car with them, and an argument ensued. Id. at 827. Harris then attempted to start the car and Karim panicked, because he did not know what Harris intended to do, because he felt threatened by a baseball bat on the floor in the back of the car, and because Black and Parker knew where he lived. Ibid. So Karim, who had a gun, began shooting. Ibid. Parker and Harris were killed and Black was badly wounded. Id. at 819. Black testified at the trial, id. at 821-22, and though his account differed somewhat from Karim's, there was no dispute that Karim had shot Parker, Harris, and Black.
Karim was arrested at 1:10 a.m. on October 31, 1996, by two detectives, Duffin and O'Connor. Id. at 824. Karim initially denied that he had been involved in the shooting, ibid., but after approximately 28 hours in custody, at 5:00 a.m. on November 1, Karim admitted to an assistant state's attorney named Anderson that he had shot Black, Parker, and Harris. Id. at 825. Karim then signed a written statement summarizing his confession. Id. at 825-26. Only then was he brought before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing. Id. at 819-20.
Prior to his trial, Karim moved to suppress his inculpatory statement. In support of that motion, he made the following arguments:
(1) that his statement was coerced; (2) that he was interrogated despite requesting the assistance of counsel; (3) that he was threatened with the death penalty and promised that he would receive a 20-year sentence if he cooperated; (4) that he was kept isolated at the police station for 30 hours despite requesting counsel; and (5) that the police violated the express terms of the arrest warrant[, which had instructed them to bring Karim before a magistrate "instanter"].
Id. at 819, 830. At the hearing on the suppression motion, Duffin and Anderson testified that they had read Karim his Miranda rights, that Karim had never said that he wished to remain silent, that they had not threatened him with the death penalty or promised him a 20-year sentence in return for cooperation, that he was not handcuffed during the interrogation, and that he was given food and allowed to use the restroom. Id. at 819-20. Duffin did admit, however, that the police had not attempted to bring Karim before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing until after he had confessed, despite express language in the arrest warrant directing them to do so "instanter." Id. at 820. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress. Ibid.
Karim was convicted and sentenced to death, but the Governor of Illinois commuted his sentence to life in prison while his direct appeal was pending. Id. at 818. Karim pressed on with his appeal, contending (among other things) that the trial judge had erred in refusing to suppress his confession. See id. at 827-31. The appellate court held that "the trial court's decision not to suppress the statement was not manifestly erroneous," and thus upheld that decision. Id. at 831. The appellate court reasoned that Karim had not disputed most of the trial court's factualfindings on appeal and that those findings foreclosed most of the arguments he made in support of his suppression motion:
Karim does not dispute most of the trial court's factual findings. This includes the trial court's findings that Karim understood his rights on the date of his arrest because "the defendant underst[ood] his Miranda rights [and had] no mental condition preventing him from doing that." The trial court also found that Karim never asked for an attorney, never said he wanted to remain silent, was never told he would get a 20-year sentence in exchange for his cooperation, and was never threatened with the death penalty. The trial court further found that Karim was given food and drink, allowed access to bathroom facilities and given the opportunity to smoke.
Id. at 831; see also Doc. 17-2 at 14 (...
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