Karmatzis v. Hamilton
| Decision Date | 30 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-CV-2222 |
| Parties | THOMAS KARMATZIS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL HAMILTON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
On June 28, 2012, Magistrate Judge David G. Bernthal filed a sua sponte Report and Recommendation (#71) in the above cause. The Magistrate Judge recommended that this court is bereft of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. After a careful and thorough de novo review, this court agrees with and accepts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Further, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (#23), Motion to Amend (#61), and Motion for Status (#72) are DISMISSED as MOOT.
Plaintiff alleges that during and before the incident giving rise to the present suit, he had been receiving medical benefits from the VA. (#1 p.5). On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff underwent back surgery at the Indianapolis VA Medical Center. (#1 Ex. 1 p. 6). Plaintiff experiencedsignificant complications during and after the surgery, which required the resection of the right side of his colon and the removal of parts of his small intestine. (#1 p. 6). He avers that he "only went in to get my spine double fused and ended up losing over half my bowels and the right side of my colon."1 (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that due to the need to recover from the complications, he was repeatedly hospitalized from time to time between March 16, 2009 and April 10, 2010. (#1 p. 7).
On March 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed a VA Form 21-526 Application for Compensation and/or Pension. (#78, Ex. 2). In the application, he states that (#78 ex. 2).
In a letter dated June 23, 2010, Defendant Department of Veterans Affairs sent Plaintiff a letter informing him that the VA Illiana Health Care System had determined that Plaintiff was ineligible for healthcare benefits. (#1; #78). The letter stated, among other things, that (Id.) Further, the letter also states: "Based on review of your DD214, it has been determined that you served active dutyfor training purposes only and you are not eligible for VA medical care." (Id.) (emphasis in original.) As a result, Plaintiff was no longer able to receive medical care through the Department of Veterans Affairs. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Disagreement appealing the denial of his benefits on July 25, 2011. (#1 Ex.1 p.9; #78 Ex. 4). Plaintiff avers that "[t]his issue is still on going and has no regards to the complaint that is being filed for being cut off immediately from medical service that endangered the life and well-being of the plaintiff." (#1 p. 4). Plaintiff further notes that "as for the benefit issue of 15 years of being at the VA and request for compensation a Notice of Disagreement has been filed to the Department of Veterans Affairs but these matters are separate from this." (#73 p. 4).
In his application for compensation, VA Form 21-526, Plaintiff claimed that he entered active service on September 5, 1979, and left on August 12, 1985 (#78 Ex.1 p.4). However, Defendant VA provided declarations showing that Plaintiff enlisted for active full time duty with the U.S. Army on September 5, 1979, and was enrolled in basic training between September 5, 1979 and November 30, 1979, whereupon he was discharged from active duty while still in basic training. (#76 ¶¶ 1-3; #82 p.6 (Defendant's DD214)). Plaintiff provided his own DD214, which indicates that he entered active duty on September 5, 1979 and was honorably discharged on November 30, 1979 pursuant to the Trainee Discharge Program, the reason given as "marginal or nonproductive." (#82 p.6). For this period, his MOS was listed as 05C00 -- "Basic Trainee". On June 18, 1983, Plaintiff was ordered to active duty for training for 60 days to attend OSUT (One Station Unit Training, a combination of basic combat training and advanced individual training) for MOS 13b, cannon crewmember. Finally, Plaintiff's DD214 indicates that his ReserveObligation Termination Date was August 12, 1985.
On September 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint (#1) along with a petition to proceed in forma pauperis (#2) and a motion to appoint counsel (#3). Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his "filing a complaint on 3-31-10 for the happenings from the surgery on 3-17-09 leaving me hospitalized and disabled is the reason they instantly stopped all services to include life threatening medications and life-threatening treatments;" "the Veterans Affairs Administration negligently and unconstitutionally [infringed] my rights and endanger me and threatened my life by immediately stopping all medications and treatments;" and thus, "because of the withdrawal changed my ways of thinking and caused actions out of myself that caused me to break the law and get an even longer sentence because of the major withdrawal from all the medications from the injuries that the VA inflicted on me." (#1 p. 8).
On October 13, 2011, Magistrate Judge Bernthal allowed Plaintiff to proceed without prepayment of fees (#14) but denied the motion to appoint counsel (#15). On June 28, 2012, Magistrate Judge Bernthal issued a sua sponte Report and Recommendation, recommending that this court dismiss the case due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (#74). On July 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed an objection (#73); on July 13, 2012, Defendant VA filed a motion to file additional evidence (#74); and on July 24, 2012, Defendant VA filed its Response to Plaintiff's Objection, along with a Motion for Summary Judgment (#76) and with four declarations (#77-#80). On July 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amendment to his objection (#82). On August 1, 2012,Defendant VA filed its Response to Plaintiff's amendment (#84). On August 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant VA's Motion for Summary Judgment (#85).
As a preliminary matter, this court must determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. If a federal district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, it is powerless to entertain the merits of the case and instead must dismiss it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2008) ()
As Magistrate Judge Bernthal correctly noted in his Report and Recommendation (#73), the critical threshold issue in the instant case is whether this court has subject-matter jurisdiction in light of the Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, 38 U.S.C. § 511 (hereinafter "VJRA"). The VJRA's jurisdictional scheme precludes district courts from reviewing challenges to individual benefits decisions such as denials or delays of benefits. Lewis v. Norton, 355 F. App'x 69, 70 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).
A brief history of federal judicial review of VA decisions is instructive. 38 U.S.C. § 211 was the pre-VJRA equivalent to present-day § 511. The text of § 211 read, in pertinent part:
[T]he decision of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
38 U.S.C. § 211 (1982). The plain language of § 211 bars any federal court review of a VA decision. In 1974, the Supreme Court analyzed the jurisdictional implications of § 211 and expressed concern that a statute that wholly and completely precluded federal courts from deciding its constitutionality would raise serious questions concerning the constitutionality of the statute itself. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 (1974). Because courts must construe statutes so as to render them constitutional, the only alternative is that when a plaintiff alleges a serious constitutional violation has occurred, the allegations must become open to judicial review regardless of any door-closing provisions. Id.
In Marozsan, the plaintiff injured his back while on active duty in the Navy in 1949. Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1988). He filed several claims for veterans' benefits, all of which were denied until the Board of Veterans' Appeals rated him as 20% disabled in 1981. When he sought to increase his rating, the Board refused to do so. Marozsan then filed an action asserting that the VA employed an arbitrary quota system in processing claims, thereby denying him due process of law. The district court cast his claim as a challenge to the VA's determination of his benefit level and therefore a claim seeking money from the Treasury. Accordingly, that court held that it was prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over the claim with respect to the decision of the V.A. regarding his entitlement to V.A. disability benefits. Marozsan v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ind. 1986). Following the reasoning in Johnson v. Robison, the Seventh Circuit reversed and allowed him to proceed with his case, holding that because § 211's door-closing...
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