Karoly v. Industrial Commission of Colorado

Decision Date06 May 1918
Docket Number9281.
Citation176 P. 284,65 Colo. 239
PartiesKAROLY v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO et al.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1918.

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Charles C Butler, Judge.

Proceeding for compensation for injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Joe Karoly, opposed by the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, employer and self-insurer. Compensation was awarded, and claimant petitioned for payment in gross, which was denied by the Industrial Commission, and claimant petitioned to vacate its order. To review judgment confirming the order, claimant brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Bailey White, and Garrigues, JJ., dissenting.

G. W Musser and John T. Maley, both of Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Leslie E. Hubbard, Atty. Gen., and John L. Schweigert, Asst. Atty Gen., for Industrial Commission.

Fred Herrington, of Denver, for defendant in error Colorado Fuel & Iron Co.

ALLEN J.

On and prior to August 6, 1915, the plaintiff in error, Joe Karoly, was an employé of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, one of the defendants in error. On the date above named Joe Karoly was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The employé and employer, above named, were each subject to the compensation provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (chapter 179, Session Laws 1915). They were unable to come to an agreement in regard to compensation, and the employé applied for a hearing before the Industrial Commission. Such hearing was had in August, 1916. The commission found the facts above stated, and with respect to the accident and the injuries received found:

'* * * That while undermining a loose rock it fell upon him, causing a fracture of the right radius, laceration of the right forearm and hand, fracture of the second and third lumbar vertebrae, causing a marked deformity by protrusion of the lower back at the site of the fracture, also causing permanent cystitis; that up to the present time the said injured employé is totally disabled.'

The commission ordered that the company, which was carrying its own insurance, pay to Joe Karoly compensation at the rate of $8 per week, beginning with August 27, 1915, 'and continuing throughout the period of his natural life or until such time as compensation shall cease' or the order be modified.

On or about the 18th of January, 1917, and after six months had elapsed from the date of the injury, the plaintiff in error filed before the commission his petition for payment in gross. The petition, after describing the claimant's injuries and condition, alleged, in substance, that he almost continuously suffers severe pains and is totally and permanently disabled in consequence of his injuries; that he requires the attention of a physician every day; that he requires the care of an attendant to wait upon him, and medicine and appliances; that he should be in a hospital, where such attention and care can be more readily and cheaply provided; and that such needs will continue for an indefinite time in the future. The petition further alleged that claimant has no money, property, or means other than the $8 per week which had been awarded by the commission, and no friends or relatives able to provide any more; that the weekly payment awarded him does but little good, and is wholly insufficient to provide him with necessary food, clothing, physician's attention, medicine, and hospital care; and that as a result he is compelled to live with and endure pain and suffering without even meager care. The plaintiff in error in his petition states that if he were paid a sum in gross he could then provide himself with the things which are reasonable and necessary for him on account of his disabled and injured condition, and prays that the commission order that he be paid such sum as to the commission may seem meet and proper, not less than $8,500 in gross, or in such manner as the commission may determine.

This petition was heard by the commission on February 5, 1917, and on February 26, 1917, the commission ordered and adjudged that claimant's petition for a lump sum settlement should be denied. The order embodies brief findings of fact, from which it appears that the petition was denied upon two grounds. The commission found:

'That the extent of disability of the claimant cannot at this time be determined, for the reason that the claimant is suffering a permanent total disability, and in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the award hereinabove mentioned, is to receive payment throughout his natural life, and it is humanly impossible at this time to determine the length of time which the claimant shall live. * * *
'The commission further finds that it is not for the best interest of the parties concerned in this case to grant a lump sum in settlement, and that therefore the claimant's petition for a lump sum settlement should be denied.'

On March 30, 1917, the plaintiff in error filed in the district court his complaint or petition to vacate the Industrial Commission's order of February 26, 1917, on the ground that the same is unlawful and unreasonable. The petition, in addition to asking that the order be set aside, prayed that the district court enter judgment granting the petition for payment in gross and ordering payment of a sum in gross of not less than $8,500 or in payment of not less than $40 per week.

The Industrial Commission answered, and tendered to the court copies of its findings and awards, and its original record as to the remaining matters pertaining to the proceedings hereinbefore mentioned.

On August 30, 1917, the district court, upon hearing, confirmed the commission's order of February 26, 1917. The claimant brings the case here for review.

The bill of exceptions clearly shows that the trial court based its decision entirely upon the theory that the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act relating to payments in gross, being section 57, chapter 179, Session Laws 1915, 'does not apply to cases of total permanent disability.' The findings of the commission, accompanying its order of February 26, 1917, indicate that the commission also took this view of the law.

If such ground is an erroneous theory of the law as to the power of the commission to order payments in gross in cases of permanent total disability, the plaintiff in error was prejudiced by this error, even though the commission also denied his application for a lump sum settlement upon the ground that it would not be for the best interests of the parties concerned. Matecny v. Vierling Steel Works, 187 Ill.App. 448. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the trial court disposed of the case entirely upon its construction of the statute, without determining whether it would confirm the...

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21 cases
  • Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez School Dist. RE-1
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • October 26, 1992
    ...1171 (Colo.App.1990). Moreover, "[a]n exception not made by the Legislature cannot be read into the statute." Karoly v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Colo. 239, 245, 176 P. 284, 286 (1918). Absent constitutional infirmity, it is not within the judicial power to exclude from a statute that which the......
  • City and County of Denver v. Holmes
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1965
    ...than that which ordains that courts should not read into statutes exceptions not made by the legislature. Karoly v. Industrial Commission, 65 Colo. 239, 176 P. 284; Stockton Theatres, Inc., v. Palermo, 47 Cal.2d 469, 304 P.2d 7; State of Minnesota v. Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158, 2 N.W.2d 833, 1......
  • Buckley v. Chilcutt
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1998
    ...made by the Legislature." Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237, 246 (Colo.1992) (quoting Karoly v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Colo. 239, 245, 176 P. 284, 286 (1918)). We find the opposite to be true. On the record before us, even taken in a light most favorable to the respond......
  • Dodge v. Department of Social Services of State of Colo.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • July 1, 1982
    ...not at liberty to create such exception judicially. See Tompkins v. DeLeon, 197 Colo. 569, 595 P.2d 242 (1979); Karoly v. Industrial Commission, 65 Colo. 239, 176 P. 284 (1918). The categories and standards contained in §§ 26-4-104 and 26-4-105(1), C.R.S.1973, though necessarily broad, prov......
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