Karoware, Inc. v. United States
| Decision Date | 23 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | C.D. 4681. |
| Citation | 427 F. Supp. 402 |
| Parties | KAROWARE, INC. v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Shaw & Stedina, New York City (Charles P. Deem, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Rex E. Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C. (John A. Gussow and Robert Masters, trial attys., New York City), for defendant.
The question presented in these four cases, consolidated for the purposes of trial, pertains to the proper classification, for customs duty purposes, of certain merchandise exported from Japan during 1968, 1969 and 1970. The merchandise consists of wine racks, and different types of wooden bars, imported together with glassware, and some with bar tools.
The various articles, invoiced as wine racks, keg bars, castle bars, tavern bars, executive roll top desk bars, small keg bars, treasure chest bars, cube bars, wine barrel bars, and bookshelf bars, were classified by the customs officials under different provisions of the Tariff Schedules of the United States TSUS as:
Plaintiff protested these classifications, and claimed that the articles should properly have been classified as furniture under item 727.35, TSUS, as modified by T.D. 68-9, and assessed with duty at the rate of 9, 8 or 7 per centum ad valorem. At the trial, however, plaintiff abandoned its "furniture" claim as to all of the bars except the keg bars, the castle bars, the tavern bars, the executive roll top desk bars,* and the bookshelf bars.
Merchandise invoiced as glassware, consisting of shot glasses, decanters and beakers, imported together with the bars, was separately classified as glassware under items 546.52 and 546.54, TSUS, with duty at various rates, depending upon the date of entry. Plaintiff claims that the glassware should have been classified as entireties with the bars with which imported. Hence, it is claimed that the glassware is dutiable at the rate at which the bars were assessed, or at the rate of the classification claimed to be correct for them.
The importations also consisted of cask bars which were also classified under two of the three aforesaid provisions for wood, except in one instance when they were classified as "furniture" under item 727.35 of the schedules. In addition to the glassware imported with the cask bars were ice buckets classified as articles not specially provided for, of aluminum, under item 654.10, TSUS, and tongs classified as hand tools, of iron or steel, under item 651.47, TSUS, assessed at various rates. The ice buckets and tongs were also claimed by plaintiff to be dutiable as entireties with the cask bars and glassware at the assessed rates with respect to the cask bars.
The merchandise in issue also included book bars and wonder bars. These bars were imported not only with glassware, but also with a set of bar tools consisting of a corkscrew, bottle opener, spoon and strainer or olive pick which were packed together in a cardboard box but not fitted. These bars were classified under item 651.75, TSUS, as sets, dutiable at the highest rate applicable to the articles in the sets subject to the highest rate of duty, i.e., the glassware (at 50 per centum ad valorem under item 546.52, TSUS) in accordance with schedule 6, part 3, subpart E. Plaintiff claims that the book and wonder bars were improperly classified, and should have been dutiable "as entireties, with their glassware and tools, as boxes, cases, or chests of wood under item 204.40 or, as separately dutiable articles, under the same provision, with the glassware being classified under either item 546.50 or 546.54, depending upon its value."
The classification, and hence the rate of duty to be assessed on the imported merchandise, depend upon the answers to three main questions that are presented for the court's determination.
The first is whether the wine racks, the keg bars, the castle bars, the tavern bars, the executive roll top desk bars, and the bookshelf bars are "furniture," within the meaning of that term as used in the tariff schedules.
The second is whether all of the bars are dutiable as entireties, with the glassware, or with the glassware and bar tools, with which they were imported.
The third is whether the book bars and wonder bars were improperly classified as "sets" together with their glassware and bar tools.
At the trial plaintiff called two witnesses and introduced 21 exhibits, which included representative samples of the wine racks and all of the bars in issue. The defendant introduced four exhibits.
Plaintiff's "furniture" claim: pertinent provisions.
On the first question presented, whether the wine racks and the five bars constitute "furniture," the pertinent provisions of the tariff schedules read as follows:
Classified under
Schedule 2, part 1
"Jewelry boxes, silverware chests
cigar and cigarette boxes, microscope
cases, tool or utensil cases
and similar boxes, cases, and chests
all the foregoing of wood:
* * * * * *
Other:
204.40 Not lined with textile fabrics 16 2/3 %
ad val.
* * * * * *
Household utensils and parts thereof,
all the foregoing not specially provided
for, of wood:
* * * * * *
206.97 Other ............................... 10%
ad val.
* * * * * *
207.00 Articles not specially provided for, of
wood ................................ 10% ad
val."
Claimed under:
"Furniture, and parts thereof, not
specially provided for:
* * * * * *
Of wood:
* * * * * *
Other:
* * * * * *
727.35 Furniture other than
chairs .............. 6% ad
val."
Schedule 7, part 4, subpart A, headnote:
Plaintiff's "furniture" claim as to wine racks.
There is no dispute that the articles are in chief value of wood.
Both parties cite with approval, and agree with the reasoning and holding of this court in Morris Friedman & Co. v. United States, 69 Cust.Ct. 184, C.D. 4392, 351 F.Supp. 611 (1972). The question presented in the Morris Friedman case pertained to the dutiable status of rattan hanging chairs. Plaintiff contended that the hanging chairs were embraced within prior judicial determinations of the common meaning of the term "furniture," and that Congress, by the adoption of the headnote provision in schedule 7, part 4, subpart A, did not intend to restrict the classification of furniture to the articles specifically enumerated. The defendant argued that, whether or not the imported articles came within the common understanding of "furniture," that term was statutorily limited by the headnote provision which set forth a restrictive definition that excluded the hanging chairs from classification as "furniture." The question, therefore, was squarely presented whether the headnote provision pertaining to "furniture" constituted a statutory definition restricting the articles classifiable as "furniture."
In overruling plaintiff's claim, the court concluded that the hanging chairs did not come within the purview of the headnote, and, consequently, were not classifiable as "furniture." Hence, this court held that the scope of the "furniture" provision of the tariff schedules is governed by the definition in headnote 1, that the headnote is both exclusionary and restrictive, and that it embraces only those articles expressly described.
The holding of the Morris Friedman case makes it clear that earlier judicial determinations, whether an article was "furniture" under previous tariff laws, are neither binding nor dispositive of the question whether the wine racks or the five bars are "furniture" under the tariff schedules.
Plaintiff asserts that the merchandise in question comes within the purview of the headnote definition since the record clearly shows that the wine racks are "movable articles of utilities designed to be placed on the floor," and that the bars are "kitchen cabinets and similar cupboards * * * designed to be fixed to the wall."
The defendant argues that, even if the court should find that the wine racks (and bars) are embraced by the headnote definition of "furniture," it must also be established that they are of a comparatively substantial nature and fulfill a comparatively important role for personal use, convenience, and comfort.
The wine rack is made of hard wood with a walnut finish. It consists of two parallel boards embedded in a stand, each board containing ten cylindrical holes. The boards are held together by three cross bars, two at the...
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