Karr v. State

• Citation: 14 So. 851,100 Ala. 4
• Parties: KARR v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 07 February 1894
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

14 So. 851

100 Ala. 4

KARR v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 7, 1894

Appeal from circuit court, St. Clair county; Leroy F. Box, Judge.

John A Karr was indicated and tried for the murder of Jason Smith and convicted of murder in the second degree. Reversed and remanded.

The evidence, without conflict, tended to show that at the time of said Smith was shot by the defendant he had a gun in his hand, starting up the steps of the defendant's house, but that the gun was not held by the deceased as if he was about to shoot. The evidence further tended to show that the deceased had many times made threats against the defendant and his son, and had declared, no longer than the morning that he (the deceased) was killed, that he was going to kill the defendant and his son during the day; that this threat was communicated to the defendant and his son; that at the time of the shooting the defendant and his son were in one of the rooms of defendant's house, and, as the deceased started up the steps, each one of them fired upon him. At the request of the solicitor, the court gave the following written charges: (1) "The court charges the jury that if the defendant relies on a justification of his acts partly by threats made against him by Jason Smith before the killing, then such threats will not, of themselves, be a justification of the homicide, unless the jury further find from the evidence that deceased, at the time of killing, was manifesting an intention to carry such threats into execution, by a positive act then done, or that, from the acts of the defendant at the time of the killing, it would have appeared to a reasonable mind, under the circumstances that the deceased was attempting to execute the threats against defendant." (2) "The court charges the jury that a person charged with murder, who seeks to justify himself on the ground of threats against his own life, is permitted to introduce evidence of such threats so made. But the same should not be regarded as affording a justification for the killing or offense, unless it be shown that at the time of the homicide the person killed, by some act then done, manifested an intention to execute the threats so made, or reasonably appeared to defendant to be so doing." (3) "The expressions used, in charging the jury, that the jury must find the defendant not guilty unless the evidence against him should be such as to exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but that of the guilt of the defendant, as charged, and that the evidence from the state should be so convincing as to lead the minds of the jury to the conclusion that the accused cannot be guiltless, are but strong expressions of that full measure of truth which the law exacts before it will sanction a conviction of a criminal offense." To the giving of each of these charges the defendant severally and separately excepted.

John A. Bilboo and John W. Inzer, for appellant.

Wm. S. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

STONE C.J.

The homicide which gave rise to this prosecution was perpetrated on August 28, 1892, and at the entrance of defendant's dwelling. There is no conflict in the testimony on these points. When shot down and killed, deceased was approaching the door of defendant's home with a gun in hand, though not raised, or put in position for shooting. There is testimony that deceased had made threats against the life of the accused, and that he was a man of violent and dangerous character. Now, these facts, alone, do not, of themselves justify or excuse an immediate resort to deadly weapons on the mere suspicion that life is endangered. There must be some demonstration, or apparent demonstration, of an intent, coupled with...