Karrip v. Cannon Tp.
| Citation | 115 Mich.App. 726,321 N.W.2d 690 |
| Decision Date | 21 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 55715 |
| Parties | George KARRIP, Jr., Lorraine Karrip, Edward J. Nyholt and Susan O. Nyholt, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TOWNSHIP OF CANNON, et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Silver Lake Association, a Michigan non-profit corporation, Intervening Defendant-Appellee, and Wendall Briggs, Ned Stuits, Steve Stuits, Ronald D. Meyers, Robert Wiersing, Individuals, Rockford Sportsmen's Club, A Michigan non-profit corporation, Tri-Town Conservation Club, a Michigan non-profit corporation, and Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Inc., a Michigan non-profit corporation, Intervening Defendants-Appellants. 115 Mich.App. 726, 321 N.W.2d 690 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
[115 MICHAPP 728] Murphy, Burns & McInerney, P. C., Grand Rapids, for plaintiffs-appellees.
[115 MICHAPP 729] McShane & Bowie by Thomas C. Shearer, Grand Rapids, for Cannon Tp.
Peter W. Steketee, Grand Rapids, for intervening defendants-appellants.
Before R. B. BURNS, P. J., and WALSH and MacKENZIE, JJ.
Defendants Briggs, et al, appeal by right from an order of the trial court denying them intervenor status in the case at bar.
In September of 1979, a group of landowners from Cannon Township petitioned the board of county road commissioners of Kent County for the abandonment and discontinuance of a portion of Silver Lake Drive, a county road, which provided public access to Silver Lake. The portion of the roadway sought to be abandoned is located in a recorded plat, Weller Park, in Cannon Township. The landowners also sought abandonment of a strip of land lying outside of the Weller Park plat between the end of Silver Lake Drive and the water's edge of Silver Lake. On September 25, 1979, the Kent County Board of Road Commissioners issued an order providing for abandonment of the land mentioned in the petition, subject to an easement for public utilities.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in circuit court seeking vacation as a public roadway of the land covered by the order for abandonment issued by the board of county road commissioners. Over 30 parties were joined as defendants. Two months later, before any discovery or other proceedings occurred, Briggs, et al, moved to intervene, either by right or permissively, pursuant to GCR 1963, 209.1(3), 209.1(4) and 209.2(2), as party defendants, or, in the alternative, to act as amici curiae. The individual intervenors claimed to use [115 MICHAPP 730] the land sought to be vacated in order to gain access to Silver Lake for recreational purposes. The intervenors that were organizations claimed that some of their members used the land for the same purposes. All parties seeking intervention claimed that vacating the land would cause them immediate and irreparable injury, as it provided "the only effective public access to the lake". The parties seeking intervention also filed a complaint and an affirmative defense which asserted that the land was a public highway which provided public access to a navigable body of water in which the public had rights of use. The trial court denied intervention, finding: (1) that Briggs,et al, did not allege any injury distinct from that of the general public and had no direct interest sufficient to intervene as a matter of right, (2) that any rights of the public must be represented by public officials charged with that responsibility, (3) that Briggs, et al, had not established that the representation of their interests by existing parties would be inadequate and, (4) that, "considering the large number of persons among the proposed intervenors who might opt in", permissive intervention would unduly delay the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and, in its discretion, would not be allowed.
Intervention of right is covered by the following court rule:
"(4) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or officer thereof." GCR 1963, 209.1.
The Supreme Court has found that there is striking similarity between the state and federal intervention provisions and, thus, looked to the federal courts for guidance when deciding that:
"All of the above must be present in order for the applicant to qualify for intervention of right * * * " D'Agostini v. City of Roseville, 396 Mich. 185, 188, 240 N.W.2d 252 (1976).
Generally, a right to intervene should be asserted within a reasonable time and laches or an unreasonable delay is a proper reason to deny intervention. Id. In this case, there is no claim of unreasonable delay by the proposed intervenors and none appears on the record, as they moved to intervene two months after the filing of plaintiffs' complaint and before any proceedings or discovery had been taken. Thus, there was no basis to deny intervention on this ground.
The proposed intervenors satisfied the second requirement by establishing that their representation is or may be inadequate. The burden of making that showing is treated as minimal, Id., 188-189, and there need be no positive showing that [115 MICHAPP 732] the existing representation is in fact inadequate. Rather, one is only required to show that existing representation may be inadequate and bad faith need not be claimed. Davidson v. Pontiac, 16 Mich.App. 110, 167 N.W.2d 856 (1969).
While the Attorney General theoretically represents all of the people of the state along with their many and diverse interests in this action, the proposed intervenors' interests are much narrower, i.e., to maintain access to the lake for recreational purposes, especially fishing. Claiming a much narrower interest than the general public seems to meet the minimal burden necessary to show that one's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nat. Wildlife Fed. v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., Docket No. 121890. Calendar No. 5.
...Trout Unlimited, Muskegon White River Chapter v. White Cloud, 195 Mich.App. 343, 348, 489 N.W.2d 188 (1992); Karrip v. Cannon Twp., 115 Mich.App. 726, 733, 321 N.W.2d 690 (1982). Thus, plaintiffs must allege that their members suffered either an actual injury or an "imminent" injury. Lee, s......
-
Donaldson v. Alcona County Bd. of County Road Com'rs
...public and, hence, had no standing to assert those rights. Id. at 203, 234 N.W.2d 448. Defendants rely upon Karrip v. Cannon Twp., 115 Mich.App. 726, 321 N.W.2d 690 (1982), a case with facts similar to Comstock, but with a different result with regard to the standing We find it unnecessary ......
-
Higgins Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Gerrish Twp.
...Unlimited, Muskegon White River Chapter v. White Cloud, 195 Mich.App. 343, 348, 489 N.W.2d 188 (1992), citing Karrip v. Cannon Twp., 115 Mich.App. 726, 733, 321 N.W.2d 690 (1982). This Court has previously addressed the standing of the HLPOA in the consolidated appeals of the cases involvin......
-
In re Anjoski
...in litigation, as Lisa did here, must demonstrate that the party has standing to assert his or her claims. Karrip v. Cannon Twp., 115 Mich.App. 726, 732, 321 N.W.2d 690 (1982). Because Lisa did not have standing, the trial court properly denied Lisa's motion to 5. Although our conclusion is......