Karsner v. Hardin Cnty.

Decision Date08 March 2021
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-125-RGJ
PartiesPATRICIA KARSNER Plaintiff v. HARDIN COUNTY, et al. Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Patricia Karsner ("Karsner") alleges violations of state law and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986 for alleged violations of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution against Defendants Hardin County, Kentucky; Jenny Oldham ("Oldham"), individually and in her official capacity as Hardin County Attorney; Office of the Hardin County Attorney; Shane Young ("Young"), individually and in his official capacity as Commonwealth's Attorney, 9th Circuit (Hardin); Teresa Logsdon ("Logsdon"), individually and in her official capacity as Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney, 9th Circuit (Hardin); Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney, 9th Circuit (Hardin); the City of Radcliff, Kentucky; Radcliff Police Department; Sgt. Jarrett Kirkpatrick ("Kirkpatrick"), individually and in his official capacity as City of Radcliff police officer; and Warren Tooley ("Tooley"). [DE 16 at 134-35]. Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint. [DE 18; DE 26; DE 27; DE 28; DE 39]. Briefing is complete and the matter is ripe. [DE 24; DE 32; DE 33; DE 34; DE 35; DE 37; DE 38; DE 42]. For the reasons below, Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED [DE 18; DE 26; DE 27; DE 28; DE 39].

I. BACKGROUND

The events at issue in this case stem from a family court dispute between Karsner and Tooley. [DE 16 at 141]. On September 21, 2015, Tooley "enlisted Defendant Kirkpatrick to conduct a civil standby in a confederacy to retrieve Tooley's teenage daughters . . . from Karsner's custody pursuant to a Jefferson County Family Court Order." Id. Karsner refused to relinquish custody of their daughters. Id. Tooley and Kirkpatrick "left without the girls and without Kirkpatrick arresting Karsner for any crime." Id. Kirkpatrick "advised Tooley to return to Jefferson County Family Court to resolve the matter." Id. Instead, approximately an hour after leaving Karsner's house, Tooley "swor[e] out a false criminal complaint against Karsner for felony custodial interference which the Defendant Hardin County Attorney and Hardin District Court negligently accepted with reckless indifference to the rights of the Plaintiff while under the direct supervision of Defendant Jenny Oldham." Id. at 142 (internal citation omitted).

Two days later, "two other Radcliff Police Department officers acting upon the arrest warrant issued for Karsner resulting from Tooley's false criminal complaint broke Karsner's left arm very badly while trying to arrest and handcuff Karsner on her own front porch." Id. As a result of her injuries, "Karsner on June 14, 2016, filed a federal lawsuit (3:16-cv-372-JHM) against the City of Radcliff, the City of Radcliff Police Department, the two Radcliff police officers involved in that entirely separate incident, and Tooley." Id. The court dismissed the claims of abuse of process and malicious prosecution against Tooley and City of Radcliff settled the case with Karsner. [DE 39-4 at 468-71; DE 27-2 at 300-03].

In July 2016, Young and Logsdon "conspired with Kirkpatrick (as witness) to present Karsner . . . to a Hardin County Grand Jury . . . for indictment on one count of felony custodial interference in retaliation for Karsner filing the aforementioned federal lawsuit against the friendsand co-workers of Kirkpatrick and Logsdon and Young." [DE 16 at 143]. A jury convicted Karsner of custodial interference. Id. The Kentucky Court of Appeals vacated the conviction. See Karsner v. Commonwealth, 582 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018) ("Here, there was no evidence produced by the Commonwealth that Karsner engaged in any overt conduct with the intent to keep the children from Tooley's custody. There being no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find that Karsner took, enticed or kept the children from Tooley's custody, Karsner was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal").

Karsner filed suit in this Court in February 2020. [DE 1]. Karsner asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986 and state-law malicious prosecution claims against Hardin County, Oldham, Office of the Hardin County Attorney, Young, Logsdon, Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney, City of Radcliff, Radcliff Police Department, and Kirkpatrick. [DE 16 at 143-53]. And she asserts state-law claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process against Tooley. Id. at 145-48. Each Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them. [DE 18; DE 26; DE 27; DE 28; DE 39].

II. STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) instructs that a court must dismiss a complaint if the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "But the district court need not accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "A complaint will be dismissed . . . if no law supports the claims made, if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the complaint presents an insurmountable bar to relief." Southfield Educ. Ass'n v. Southfield Bd. of Educ., 570 F. App'x 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-64).

III. DISCUSSION1
A. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that Karsner's § 1983 and § 1985 claims, to the extent they are based on false arrest and false imprisonment, are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. [DE 26 at203-04; DE 27-1 at 290-91; DE 28-1 at 315-16]. Karsner does not respond to their arguments and therefore waives opposition to them.2

§1983 does not provide its own statute of limitations, so federal courts "borrow" the limitations period for personal injury actions from the state where the events occurred. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). For constitutional torts committed in Kentucky, the one-year limitation period under K.R.S. § 413.140(1)(a) for bringing general personal injury actions applies. Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 181-82 (6th Cir. 1990).

Federal law, on the other hand, governs when the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim begins to run. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). And the Sixth Circuit has held that the "statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has occurred." Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, with regard to § 1983 claims based upon false arrest and false imprisonment, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the plaintiff is detained. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 235 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Wallace to hold that plaintiff's claims against arresting officer and others, alleging arrest without probable cause and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and state lawclaims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery, accrued, for limitations purposes, on date of arrest, and were barred by Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations).

Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a complaint can be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations of the complaint demonstrate that the claim would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Franklin v. Fisher, No. 16-6464, 2017 WL 4404624, at *2 (6th Cir. 2017) ("The district court properly dismissed [the plaintiff's] complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because it is obvious from the face of her complaint that almost all of her claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations"); Castillo v. Grogan, 52 F. App'x 750, 751 (6th Cir. 2002) ("When a meritorious affirmative defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint, sua sponte dismissal of the complaint as frivolous is appropriate").

Karsner knew, or should have known, about the facts underlying her constitutional claims on September 23, 2015, the date of her allegedly false arrest and false imprisonment. [DE 16 at 142]. Thus, to satisfy Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations application to § 1983 actions, Karsner should have filed this § 1983 action asserting claims under the Fourth Amendment no later than September 23, 2016. Karsner, however, did not initiate this action until February 2020, more than three years after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. [DE 1]. As a result, the Court will dismiss Karsner's § 1983 and § 1985 claims, to the extent they are based on false arrest and...

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