Kas v. FINANCIAL GENERAL BANKSHARES, Civ. A. No. 82-1996.

• Decision Date: 26 June 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-1996.
• Citation: 617 F. Supp. 288
• Parties: Irving KAS, Helen Sonenshine, Plaintiffs, v. FINANCIAL GENERAL BANKSHARES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

617 F. Supp. 288

Irving KAS, Helen Sonenshine, Plaintiffs, v. FINANCIAL GENERAL BANKSHARES, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-1996.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 26, 1985.

Samuel P. Sporn, Schoengold & Sporn, New York City, Kevin R. McCarthy, Kornmeier, McCarthy, Lepon & Harris, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Robert A. Altman, Paul C. Warnke, J. Griffin Lesher, Robert P. Reznick, Clifford & Warnke, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMA HOLLOWAY JOHNSON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Irving Kas and Helen Sonenshine, bring this action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, common law fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The second amended complaint alleges four counts. The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that defendants issued a false and misleading proxy statement which contained material omissions and misstatements in violation of sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9. Plaintiffs also allege common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The case is presently before the Court on the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted.

I.

The factual background in this matter has already been set forth in great detail in the Court's two Opinions of October 19, 1984, and March 7, 1985. Therefore, it is not necessary to discuss the factual background out of which this case arose.

In support of the motion to dismiss, defendants contend that plaintiffs' claims fail to state a claim under federal securities laws. Defendants allege rather that plaintiffs' claim is one of undervaluation and breach of fiduciary duties which should be resolved in state court. Alternatively, defendants also contend that summary judgment should be entered for defendants on plaintiffs' claims under sections 10(b) and 14(a) because plaintiff's reliance on any alleged misstatement or omission can be neither proved nor assumed. And finally, defendants contend that plaintiffs' causes of action under state law warrant dismissal for lack of pendent jurisdiction or alternatively on the merits.

On April 17, 1985, this Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed in the related case, Berg v. First American Bankshares, Inc., Civil Action No. 83-3887 (D.D.C.) (April 17, 1985, Memorandum Opinion). In so doing, the Court considered and rejected the same fundamental claims and legal theories presented by plaintiffs in this case. The Court will not address the issues decided in the Berg case, but will only address the issues which the Kas plaintiffs contend distinguish this case from Berg.

II.

In addition to claims made by plaintiffs in the Berg case, plaintiffs in the instant case contend that the July 9, 1982, proxy statement was misleading in that it failed to disclose an alleged illegal scheme and an alleged conflict of interest, as well as material omissions with respect to the role of Mr. Darwaish.

Plaintiffs first allege that the proxy statement was misleading because it failed to disclose the alleged "fact that the investors intended to buy up all of Financial General's Class A Common Stock by coercive means for an inadequate, unfair and discriminatory price...." In particular, plaintiffs claim that defendants should have disclosed (1) that they had always intended to "freeze out" the Class A shareholders after the tender offer at an unfair price; (2) that Mr. Casey was so old and sick that he would vote for an unfair merger; and (3) that the Class A shareholders would be coerced into accepting the merger price because there would be no other market for their shares.

Plaintiffs allege that these omissions violate the federal securities laws. The Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs' arguments. These contentions involve an alleged failure by defendants to disclose presumed intentions and schemes and do not involve information which would be material to the shareholders' vote on the sale of their Class A shares for $28.00. The Court has previously dealt extensively in Berg with the issue of whether Mr. Casey's personal interests were material. With respect to plaintiffs' claim that defendants intended to freeze out the Class A shareholders at an unfair price, plaintiffs have presented no evidence to support this claim. Moreover, the conversion of the Class A shares into cash could not have taken place upon the unilateral action of the defendants without the vote of the Class A shareholders themselves. The Court determines that there were no undisclosed material facts with respect to any alleged illegal scheme which would constitute a violation of the federal securities laws.

Plaintiffs also contend that the July 1982 proxy statement failed to disclose an alleged conflict of interest in that it failed to disclose that Messrs. Clifford and Altman had been and were the continuing lawyers for the Arab investors while they served on the Company's board of directors. It is plaintiffs' position that a conflict arose for Messrs. Clifford and Altman in representing the Investors and obtaining the lowest price they would have to pay for the Class A common shares, while at the same time, as directors of the company, obtaining the highest price possible for the holders of the Class A common shares.

Defendants take the position that there was no conflict of interest and that the duty of Clifford and Altman, as members of the board of directors, was to consider the interests of all the shareholders, including the interests of the Investors who held 95% of the voting power, in addition to the interests of the Class A shareholders. It was the duty and the goal of Clifford and Altman, in discussing the merger price, to act on behalf of all the company's shareholders and to obtain a fair price for all shareholders concerned.

The Court determines that no conflict of interest existed. The price obtained for the Class A shares was considered fair by both Mr. Casey, who had the most to lose if the price were unfair, and by First Boston Corporation, the professional investment advisor which rendered a fairness opinion on the price received for the Class A shares. Moreover, the proxy statement clearly disclosed the fact that Clifford...