Kaseman v. District of Columbia

Decision Date07 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 03-1858 ESH.,CIV.A. 03-1858 ESH.
PartiesKatheryn KASEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Donna Lee Wulkan, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Melvin W. Bolden, Jr., Office of the Corporation Counsel, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HUVELLE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are forty-two minor children and their parents or guardians who seek attorney's fees, costs, and both pre- and post-judgment interest relating to their successful administrative actions under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. They have filed for summary judgment against the District of Columbia and the Superintendent of the District of Columbia Public Schools (collectively "DCPS") for attorney's fees and costs under IDEA and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. They also seek a declaratory judgment ordering DCPS to reimburse future prevailing parties who are represented by plaintiffs' attorney herein for attorney's fees within forty-five days of submission of their invoices. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs will be awarded the requested attorney's fees, costs and interest under section 1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA, but are not entitled to a declaratory judgment or to a fees award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

BACKGROUND

IDEA guarantees all children with disabilities "a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). As a condition of receiving federal funds under the Act, IDEA requires school districts to adopt procedures to ensure appropriate educational placement of disabled students and to develop comprehensive plans for meeting the special educational needs of these students. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1413, 1414(d)(2)(A). Parents who object to their child's "identification, evaluation, or educational placement" are entitled to an "impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1), where they have a "right to be accompanied and advised by counsel." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1).

Parents who are "aggrieved by" a hearing officer's decision may bring a civil action in either state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). IDEA gives courts the authority to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party" in any action brought under the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). It is well-established in this Circuit that section 1415(i)(3)(B) also authorizes a parent who prevails in an IDEA administrative hearing to recover attorney's fees by filing suit for the fees in federal court. See Moore v. Dist. of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 176 (D.C.Cir.1990); Holbrook v. Dist. of Columbia, 305 F.Supp.2d 41, 44 (D.D.C.2004). And, although Congress has placed a cap on the amount of attorney's fees the District of Columbia can pay lawyers of parents who prevail in IDEA actions and proceedings, the D.C. Circuit has held that courts can still award attorney's fees above the statutory cap despite DCPS's lack of authority to pay them.1 Calloway v. Dist. of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C.Cir.2000).

This suit encompasses fifty-two fee petitions for forty-two minors, all of whom were represented by attorney Donna Wulkan and prevailed at their separate administrative due process hearings during 2002-2004. Each plaintiff submitted detailed documentation to DCPS listing the attorney's fees and costs they incurred in an attempt to obtain reimbursement from DCPS instead of seeking a court-ordered fee award. In response to twenty-nine of the invoices, DCPS provided partial payment, often accompanied by a "disputed items" list setting forth its objections to specific items as to which it refused to make payment. For the other twenty-three invoices, DCPS neither paid nor responded. Plaintiffs have filed suit to collect their outstanding fees and costs in the amount of $352,714.58.

DCPS does not dispute that each plaintiff is a prevailing party entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Nor does it deny that it has not paid, or has only partially paid, the fee requests submitted by plaintiffs. Instead, it argues that many of plaintiffs' claims for fees are barred by the statute of limitations, and further it complains that the hourly rate charged by plaintiffs' attorney is excessive, that many of the hours expended by plaintiffs' attorney were unreasonable, and that plaintiffs are not entitled to interest on the fees. Finally, it argues that the Court may only award fees under IDEA, these fees are subject to the statutory cap, and plaintiffs cannot evade the cap by invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each of DCPS's arguments will be considered seriatim.2

ANALYSIS
I. Statute of Limitations

DCPS contends that a majority of plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with a thirty-day statute of limitations.3 Because IDEA contains no statute of limitations, the Court must import a limitations period from an analogous state cause of action. See Spiegler v. Dist. of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 463-64 (D.C.Cir.1989). DCPS proposes that the thirty-day limitation period applicable in this jurisdiction to petitions to review agency decisions should be applied to fee petitions. Although the D.C. Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, DCPS cites Spiegler, in which the Court enforced a thirty-day limitation for the filing of an appeal of a substantive determination under the IDEA, and argues that although "this case involves claims for attorneys fees and not a substantive appeal from an administrative decision" (Supp. Opp. at 2), a similar limitation should apply.

Two circuits have agreed with DCPS's position, holding that actions seeking attorney's fees are ancillary to the underlying administrative proceedings and are therefore subject to state law limitation periods for judicial review of administrative agency decisions. See, e.g., King v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir.2000); Powers v. Ind. Dep't of Educ., 61 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir.1995). These courts have found that importing the short limitation period common to administrative appeals is consistent with IDEA's goal of encouraging the expeditious resolution of matters regarding disabled students' educational needs. See id.

Other courts, however, have distinguished between the substantive cause of action brought under section 1415(i)(2)(A) of IDEA and a claim for attorney's fees brought under section 1415(i)(3)(B) for purposes of borrowing an appropriate statute of limitations. See Zipperer v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, Fla., 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir.1997); see also Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 209 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1044-45 (C.D.Cal.2002); Murphy v. Girard Sch. Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 431, 436 (W.D.Pa.1999); Shanahan v. Bd. of Educ. of Jamesville-Dewitt Sch. Dist., 953 F.Supp. 440, 443 (N.D.N.Y.1997). In Zipperer, the Eleventh Circuit held that an independent action for attorney's fees is not analogous to the appeal of an agency determination. 111 F.3d at 852. It reasoned that while a short limitation period is appropriate for substantive appeals in order to ensure prompt resolution of disputes regarding appropriate educational accommodations, a longer limitation period should apply to attorney fee petitions in order to best achieve IDEA's goal of providing quality legal representation to parents and guardians of disabled children. Id.

Distinguishing Spiegler and following Zipperer, two district courts in this jurisdiction have borrowed the three-year statute of limitations provided by D.C.Code § 12-310(8), which applies to causes of action "not otherwise specifically prescribed," for IDEA attorney fee actions. See Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 193 F.Supp.2d 134, 144-45 (D.D.C.2002), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.3d 970, 971-72 (D.C.Cir.2003); Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 02-0373, slip. op. at 5-7 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2002). Finding the reasoning of Zipperer to be persuasive, this Court will also apply the three-year statute of limitations. Because district courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to award attorney's fees under section 1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA, an action for attorney's fees is not akin to an appeal from an administrative decision, and thus, importing the statute of limitations for appeals would be inappropriate. A longer limitation period, moreover, provides a more realistic opportunity for the negotiation and settlement of fee petitions, thereby hopefully minimizing the need to turn to federal courts with unnecessary, and often burdensome, attorney fee litigation.4 Therefore, applying the three-year statute of limitations provided by D.C.Code § 12-310(8), the Court concludes that plaintiffs' claims are not time-barred.

II. Reasonableness of Rates Charged

Under IDEA, the amount of fees awarded "shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). Courts in this Circuit have found rates charged by attorneys in IDEA actions to be reasonable if they conform to the United States Attorney's Office's Laffey Matrix. See, e.g., Whatley v. Dist. of Columbia, 224 F.Supp.2d 62, 66-67 (D.D.C.2002); Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.2d 37, 44 (D.D.C.1999).

For work completed between June 1, 2001 and May 31, 2002, the Laffey Matrix indicates that attorneys with Ms. Wulkan's level of experience could bill $360.00 per hour. During that time, she billed at a rate of $290.00 per hour. (See Wulkan Aff. at 2.) For work completed between June 1, 2002 and May 31, 2003, the Matrix provides that she could bill $370.00 per hour, which she did. (See id.) Her two associates have between one and three years of legal experience and have also billed at rates...

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